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THE CAPITAL GAINS "SIEVE" AND THE 
"FARCE" OF PROGRESSIVITY 1921-1986 
John W Lee, Ill 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the Revenue Act of 1921, which introduced an individual capital 
gains preference, to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which repealed making 
the maximum individual permanent ordinary income rate and capital gains 
rate both 28 percent, the capital gains preference reduced, on average, the 
effective income tax rate of high income individuals substantially below 
the top nominal progressive income tax rates. This made progressivity "a 
farce, ... grotesquely unfair, ... a wicked fraud upon the small income 
taxpayer."1 Economist Henry Simons described this combination of high 
* John William Lee, III, Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. B.A. 1965, 
University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1968, University of Virginia; LL.M. (Taxation) 1970, 
Georgetown University. I am grateful for the generous financial support of the College of 
William & Mary School of Law. I also wish to thank Ed Cohen, who taught me corporate 
tax, and recounted to me over the past three decades after tax conferences at the University 
of Virginia (often at his home) so much of the tax history which he experienced, and played 
a role in over the past seven decades. 
I. Cf 65 CONG. REC. H2085 (1924) (statement of Rep. Mills) ("[The progressive rate] 
becomes a farce, it becomes grotesquely unfair, it becomes a wicked fraud upon the small-
income taxpayer if the law at the same time provides that the men with larger incomes may . 
. . entirely avoid the taxes."). Mills was referring to tax exempt interest not the capital gains 
preference, for which he was a leading proponent. !d. at 2848. "In Andrew Mellon's view 
[which Mills shared], when faced with excessive taxation, investors will shift capital from 
productive enterprises into tax-exempt securities or other alternatives that can avoid the 
realization of taxable income." G. Marc Worthy, Book Note, An Examination of Tax Law 
and Supply-side Economics: Creed of Greed or Opportunity for All?, 72 N. DAK. L. REV. 
691, 699 (1996). Representative William A. Oldfield, D-Ark., proposing repeal of the 
capital gains preference [defeated 137 to 58 by a half empty Chamber], identified 
Representative Mills and Ways & Means Chair William R. Green, R-lowa, as his chief 
opponents. 65 CONG. REC. H2846 (1924). 
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nominal individual ordinary income tax rates with a substantial individual 
capital gains preference as "a grand scheme of deception, whereby 
enormous surtaxes are voted in exchange for promises that they will not be 
made effective. . . . Politicians may point with pride to the rates, while 
quietly reminding their wealthy constituents of the loopholes .... Congress 
... [should] quit this ludicrous business of dipping deeply in large incomes 
with a sieve."2 Based on the legislative history of capital gains for the next 
80 years, maintenance of high ordinary income rates while granting 
preferential capital gains rates appears less duplicitous except, perhaps, in 
the case of Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon3 and between opposing 
2. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 68 (1938). See also Marc Lindner, Eisenhower-Era Marxist-
Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate Reduction for the Rich, 70 TuL. L. 
REV. 905,925-26 (1976); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another 
Hero, 60 So. CAL. L. REV. 397, 418 (1987) ("While rhetoric and attention focused on 
nominal tax rates, real or effective rates could be lowered more quietly by creating 
preferential capital gains rates .... "). In closed hearings, a letter was read pointing out the 
broad language of the predecessor to Section I 031, like-kind exchange, "would seem to 
make possible the exchange of any security held for investment for any other security .... 
We would seem to be approaching what may be desirable- a practical elimination of any 
graduated tax." Confidential Hearings on H.R. 8245 before the Senate Finance Committee, 
67th Cong. 41 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings] (letter to Sen. Reed 
Smoot, R-Utah, from Robert R. Reed, Esq.). See Greene v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 401 (1929), 
aff'd, 42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding that stocks of all classes are of like-kind, such as 
common and preferred). 
3. H.R. Rep. No. 68-179, at 77-82 (1924) (presenting the minority views of II 
Democratic House Ways and Means Committee members asserting that "the proposed 
Mellon bill is drawn for the purpose of giving principle [sic] relief to the large taxpayer and 
our plan is based upon giving relief to all income taxpayers, but the larger percentage of 
relief to the small taxpayer"); GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 
I 075 (1988) ("Mellon insisted that [tax reductions] should go mainly to the rich."). But see 
Worthy, supra note I, at 695-713 (defends Sec'y Mellon's tax philosophy as not shifting the 
tax burden from the wealthy to the poor). For a more thorough analysis, see Marc Linder, 
Eisenhower-era Marxist-confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate Reduction 
for the Rich, 70 TuL. L. REV. 905, 987-95 (1996). Secretary of the Treasury Andrew 
Mellon's actions in providing preferences for capital gains and like-kind exchanges in 1921 
and 1923 as well as lowering the top ordinary rates, see infra note 37, suggest that he 
actually did not favor progressivity. Indeed, Secretary Mellon stated that capital gains 
should not be subject to income taxation. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: 
American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 151 (1994). 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury Dr. T.S. Adams said that the previous 
Secretary of the Treasury favored progressivity albeit at a lower level. Hearings on 
Revenue Revision before the House Ways and Means Committee, 66th Cong. 10-11 (1920) 
[hereinafter 1920 House Hearings] (Sec'y Huston under President Woodrow Wilson "said 
[what] he would prefer is a simple reduction of the surtax rates to the point which would not 
force investments in tax-exempt securities .... As you know, our surtaxes go to 65 per cent. 
There is in addition 8 per cent normal tax, making a total maximum of 73 per cent. It is an 
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factions in Congress: one favoring progressivity, the other favoring lighter 
burdens on capital. This schism between an income tax and a consumption 
tax has existed for over 100 years. 4 
Any substantial individual capital gains preference substantially lowers 
the effective rate only at the highest income levels. This is because 80 
percent of those who enjoy such preference earn the top 2 to 3 percent of 
income anually. Year-after-year those same individuals enjoy between 60 
and 70 percent of the tax benefits of any substantial individual capital gains 
preference on economic income. 5 They thereby achieved effective income 
tax rates substantially below the top individual income tax brackets. 6 This 
distributive effect results from the concentration of capital wealth among 
three quarters of high-income taxpayers/ as well as the higher ordinary 
income tax rates otherwise applicable there. In short, an individual capital 
gains preference produces vertical inequities for lower income taxpayers 
and horizontal inequities for high-income taxpayers not realizing capital 
gains.8 
extreme rate which I think may be fairly be said to be impossible, impracticable in times of 
peace."). 
4. Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power. the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
"Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1062, 1100-04, 1123-28, 1130-33, 1153-54 (2001); see 
also John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax 
Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2095 (2000); SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 72 (1983) 
(Democrats historically favor more progressive forms of taxation; Republicans have 
historically opted for lower taxes on business and flat rate or regressive taxes.). But see 
Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENY. U.L. REV. 329, 333 (1996) ("[A] struggle 
of more than fifty years to replace a regressive tax system with a proportional, not 
progressive, one ... to balance out the regressive effects of other aspects of the federal 
revenue system and to require the wealthy to contribute their proportionate share."). In a 
cash flow consumption tax, all cash flows are included in the tax base, and any amount not 
spent on consumption is deductible; thus the cost of investments would be deductible. J.M. 
DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE & POLICY 70 (2004). 
5. See infra notes 86, 112, 137 and 228, and accompanying text. 
6. Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top One 
Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99, 117 (2003). 
7. See infra notes 142 and 203-06 and accompanying text. 
8. See Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House 
Ways & Means Comm., pt. 4, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1592 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 House 
Hearings] (Statement of Assistant Sec'y of the Treasury for Tax Policy Stanley Surrey) 
("Fairness it seems to me comes down to two things- one, that as between people who have 
different levels of income, one higher and one lower, the person with higher income should 
pay a progressively greater tax [i.e., 'vertical equity']; and second, as between people who 
are at the same level of income and who are similarly situated, they should pay the same tax 
[i.e., 'horizontal equity']."). 
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"For the past one hundred years, the income tax laws and the 
surrounding debates have been incredibly repetitive in broad themes and in 
specific metaphors and references."9 This is particularly the case with 
individual capital gains preference debates that occurred between 1921 and 
1986. Constant themes or arguments in support of a capital gains 
preference include: 
(1) ameliorating the bunching of realized gams which blocked 
realizations, and thus increased revenues, 10 
(2) after 1930, encouraging investments, II 
(3) serving as a rough offset for inflation, I2 and 
(4) benefitting the economy as a whole and allowing the benefits to 
trickle down to workers.I 3 
In addition to disproving these contentions (other than the preference 
contributing to a rise in the stock market for a time and temporarily 
increasing revenues); the principal argument against a capital gains 
preference since the 1930's has been that its distributive effect undercuts 
the fundamental tax policy of ability to pay since higher income individuals 
gamer 70 to 80 percent (over ninety percent in the beginning) of the tax 
benefits of any substantial capital gains preference. I4 This concentration of 
benefits at the top occurs because stock constitutes as much as 85 percent 
of realizations in boom market years, and 50 percent in other years. Is 
Further, the top 1 percent hold such a large majority of individually owned 
stock that they report at least one-half of realized individual stock gains 
year after year.I 6 The increasing concentration of capital gains income 
results in a substantial capital gains preference lowering the effective 
individual income tax rates at the very top below the effective rates of the 
taxpayers directly below them, making it appear that some of the top 
9. Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 122. 
I 0. See infra notes 48-60, 84 (temporarily increase but at the cost of decreasing future 
revenues), 97, and 146 and accompanying text. 
II. See infra notes 64 and 261 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 57, 82, 98, and 245 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. For refutations of the contentions of 
capital gains proponents listed in the preceding text, see John W. Lee, Critique of Current 
Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REV. I (1995). 
14. See infra notes 43-4, 50, 86, and 136, 228, 267 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 57, 89, 91, and 134 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 112-13, 134-37, and 163 and accompanying text. 
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income taxpayers have effective income tax rates equal to the average 
taxpayer with modest income. 17 
There has been a pattern of cloaking public stock- often, proponents' 
real target for the capital gains preference - with more popular symbols, 
such as breaking up small farms in the beginning and more recently small 
investors or small business. 18 Furthermore, from the 1940's through 1986, 
supporters of a capital gains preference generally ignored more universal 
interests and larger annual realizations, and instead championed the tax 
preference for particular local constituent special interests accounting for 
minuscule percentages of annual realizations of capital assets, such as 
timber, farm livestock, land, 19 and more recently, start up ventures.20 
Not surprisingly, taxation of capital gains has been intensely political. 
A Republican Congress and Administration (President Warren G. Harding) 
fashioned the first individual capital gains preference in the 1920's;21 then a 
Democratic Congress and Administration (President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt) cut back on such preference in the early 1930's.22 Next, a 
Conservative Coalition of predominantly Southern conservative Democrats 
and Republicans under both Democratic and Republican Administrations 
increased it several times from the late 1930's through the early 1980's.23 
Then, a bi-partisan coalition of Conservatives and Liberals together with 
the Republican Administration of President Reagan ended the capital gains 
preference in 1986 in exchange for much lower ordinary rates.24 
The combination of the aforementioned political partisanship and the 
power of the capital gains special interests, especially in the eyes of the 
Conservative Coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats, made 
reform of individual capital gains taxation exceedingly difficult. Ideal 
solutions such as (a) raising the capital gains rate and lowering the top 
ordinary rate to narrow the gap between them, thereby limiting capital 
17. See infra notes 140, 204-06 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 51-3, 221-23, 270 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 133-34 (data for 1959) and 329 (data for 1985). 
20. See infra notes 171, 226, 356, and 367-60 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 65, 72-4, 106 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 352 and 377 and accompanying text. I appreciate Professor Jim 
Bryce's focusing my attention on this feature of capital gains legislation with his questions 
and the patience of many of my colleagues at the University of Alabama Law School during 
my fruitful visit last school year as I kept them posted on my progress in this area. 
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gains preference to the traditional targets of stock and real estate, and 
taxing unrealized capital appreciation at death;25 or (b) even better, 
universal indexing of capital and depreciable assets with no special rate 
treatment,26 proved politically impossible prior to 1986. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 produced only symbolic reform. 
Surrogate limitation on the individual capital gains preference of high 
income taxpayers, the minimum tax on tax preferences (80 percent of 
which was the initial capital gains preference27), was gutted in enactment 
by the same political process that made direct reform impossible.28 
Further, the ultimate impact of this minimum tax on the individual capital 
gains preference was greatly reduced.29 Today, the successor Alternative 
Minimum Tax threatens to burden only middle income taxpayers, not the 
rich for whom the minimum tax was first intended.30 
The Second Best solution taken by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to 
make the top individual capital gains rate the same as the top permanent 
individual ordinary income rate of 28 percent.31 In substance, the capital 
gains preference had been eliminated by taxing ordinary income like 
capital gains. 32 Even this solution was made politically possible only by 
the notion of distributional equity - that a tax cut must be equivalent as a 
percentage decrease in effective rates across income classes.33 For the 
reduction of the top individual income tax rate from 50 percent to 28 
percent in the 1986 Act not to violate distributional equity, preferences 
concentrated at top income levels had to be eliminated, especially the 
individual capital gains preference.34 
25. See infra notes 117-20, 131 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 337-40 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 196-97 and 199 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra note 352 and accompanying text. 
32. A 28% maximum capital gains rate had been sandwiched between 1978 and 1980, 
see infra notes 248 and 290 and accompanying text; a 25% rate from 1942 to 1977, see infra 
notes I 02-03 and accompanying text; and a 20% rate between 1981 and 1985, see infra 
notes 290, 348, 377 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra note 353 and accompanying text. 
34. !d. 
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II. THE EARLY YEARS: 1920'S TO 1950'S 
A. 1920'S TO 1940'S SETTING THE STAGE: THE PREFERENCE FOR BIG 
INCOMES AND PUBLIC STOCK 
7 
Enactment of an individual capital gains preference in 1921 - a flat 
12\12 percent for capital assets held two or more years at disposition "to 
distinguish between ordinary daily transactions of the speculator on one 
side, and the more deliberate and long transactions which characterize the 
investor on the other side"35 - coupled with a step up (or down) in basis of 
assets held at death to fair market value at that time,36 rendered the 
progressive individual ordinary income rates ofthe dai7 a "farce."38 
35. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227,233 (1921); 1920 
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 128-32, 134-35 (statement of Frederick Kellogg, Esq.) 
(originator of separate capital gains rate and holding period concepts). There was no need 
for a corporate capital gains preference at this time, since the individual flat rate capital 
gains preference deliberately paralleled the corporate flat rate income tax. 1921 
Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Special 
Tax Advisor). 
36. Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(a), 42 Stat. 227, 229; 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings, 
supra note 2, at 307 (statement of Sen. Reed) (Anecdote of publisher with multimillion 
dollar building, who would rather give it to posterity than sell with 80% of profits going to 
the Government); see also 1920 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 14-15 (Statement of Ways 
and Means Chair Fordney) (Example of retained earnings apparently by a closely-held 
corporation probably in the automotive business, such as Ford Motor Co.). Professor Bank 
shows, however, that corporations began to accumulate more earnings not in response to 
double taxation of distributed earnings. Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat 
for Declining Dividends? Evidence From History, 56 TAX L. REV. 463, 466 (2003) 
("[D]ouble taxation of corporate income first emerged between World War I and II in 
response to a shift in corporate attitudes toward retained earnings, and not vice versa."). 
37. The Revenue Act of 1921 reduced the maximum rate from 73% to 58%. § 210,42 
Stat. 227, 233, 237. Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon directed further reductions in the 
Revenue Act of 1924, and the Revenue Act of 1926 reduced the top rate to 25%. Pub. L. 
No. 69-20, § 210 (maximum normal rate of 5%) and § 211 (maximum surtax of 20% of net 
income in excess of $1 00,000), 44 Stat. 9, 21-23 (1926). Interestingly, the House bill 
picked a top surtax rate of 33% because 32% was the spread in interest rates between tax 
exempt and taxable bonds. 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 39-40 
(colloquy between Sen. Smoot and Dr. Adams.) 
38. See supra note I and accompanying text; see generally the seminal Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do with It?, 39 Sw. 
L.J. 869, 873 n.IS (1985). 
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During the Roaring Twenties' boom stock market years, capital gains 
amounted to almost 50 percent of individual sector taxable income.39 In 
the 1925 boom stock market year, the 12 Yz percent flat rate capital gains 
preference benefitted only individuals with more than $30,000 of taxable 
income ($313,910 in 2004 dollars40) where an ordinary income rate greater 
than the flat capital gains rate first applied.41 That year only 68,317 
taxpayers reported over $30,000 a year;42 and among this small group, the 
9,560 taxpayers reporting more than $100,000 ($1,070,286 in 2004 dollars) 
received $91 million in tax relief from the flat 12Yz percent capital gains 
rate while the remaining 62,757 taxpayers received only $13Yz million.43 
Thus, fewer than 10,000 individual taxpayers with $100,000 or more in 
annual income paid about 50 percent of the individual income taxes44 and 
received almost 90 percent of the benefits of the flat capital gains rate. 
Accordingly, the effective income rate of the rich of the day was far below 
the nominal top income tax rates. 
39. Proposed Revision of the Revenue Laws of 1938: Report of a Subcomm. on Internal 
Revenue Taxation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 90 
(1938) [hereinafter Vinson Report]. Since only 15% of personal income was then taxed, see 
infra note 45, capital gains constituted only 7.5% of personal income albeit 50% of taxed 
income. In the recent stock market boom years of 1998-2000, capital gains taxes constituted 
10%, II%, and 12% of income taxes respectively. CBO, CAPITAL GAINS TAXES AND 
FEDERAL REVENUES 3 (Oct. 2, 2002) [hereinafter CBO, CAPITAL GAINS TAXES]. Since the 
maximum capital gains rate during this period was 20% and the maximum ordinary rate was 
39.6% (before phase outs), capital gains income possibly made up as much as 20% of 
individual income during this period. 
40. All calculations in this Article of changes in purchasing power over the referenced 
years were made with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis "calculator" at 
http:/ /woodrow. mp Is. frb. fed. us/research/ data/us/ calc/. 
41. Revenue Act of 1921 § 211, 42 Stat. at 236. Dr. Adams disingenuously answered 
the query of Senator David Walsh, D-Mass., as to whether "you discriminate in favor of 
those who have an income of over $29,000" with "[ w ]e simply say that their tax on capital 
gain shall not be over 12.5 percent." 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 
39. 
42. I STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
ON CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES, pt. 7, at 4-5 (1929) [hereinafter 1929 JOINT COMM. 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT]. 
43. !d.; see also Hearings on H.R. 7385 before the Senate Finance Committee, 73rd 
Cong. 180 (1934) (statement of Herbert Wood, Esq.) ("Out of seven billion and one hundred 
and some million of capital gains realized in the taxable years 1925 to 1929, over six 
billions occurred in incomes of $100,000 or more."). 
44. See Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1938 Before the House Committee on Ways & 
Means, 75th Con g. II 0 (1938). 
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Most workers were exempted from the income tax due to generous 
personal exemptions,45 but were heavily burdened by regressive excise 
taxes, prompting the "Mellon Ditty."46 Undersecretary ofTreasury Ogden 
Mills, who had been a Wall Street tax lawyer and member of the House 
Ways and Means Committee in the early 1920's, pointed out in the 1932 
Senate Finance Committee Hearings that the real tax burden were state and 
local taxes borne by small and moderate income taxpayers.47 
Congress' articulated rationale for the initial capital gains preference 
was that "bunching" of gain accrued over many years into a single year 
subject to progressive rates "blocked" voluntary transactions such as sales 
of capital assets.48 On the eve of the Revenue Act of 1921, sales of public 
stock by the highest income individuals were indeed blocked.49 However, 
45. Only 2.5 million individuals paid Federal income taxes in 1925 out of perhaps 30 
million workers. See Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 873 n.l8. From 1918 to 1920 only 
9.5% of the U.S. population was subject to the Federal income tax; from 1921 through 1929, 
only 13% to 14% of personal income was taxed. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX 
ANALYSIS, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CAPITAL GAINS TAX REDUCTIONS OF 1978, at 49 
n.l4 (Sept. 1985) [hereinafter 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT]. The $4,000 personal 
exemption for a married taxpayer was worth $41 ,855 in 2004 dollars. See generally Geier, 
supra note 6, at 103. 
46. 65 CONG. REC. H3031-32 (statements of Rep. Lankford) (populist doggerel about 
the Mellon Plan's taxing farmers, laborers, and small businesses through excise taxes, while 
"urging less taxes for the millionaire profiteer and more for the common folks." The 
following lines from two verses give the flavor: "Tax the people, tax with care; Tax to help 
the millionaire; Tax the farmer; Tax his fowl; Tax the dog and tax his howl; ... Tax his 
"Henry," tax the gas; Tax the road that he must pass; And make him travel o'er the grass; 
Tax him just all you can; This is, friends, the Mellon plan."). See generally John W. Lee, 
"Death and Taxes'" and Hypocrisy, 60 TAX NOTES 1393 (1993). 
47. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1932 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 72nd 
Con g. 3 (1932) (testimony of Undersecretary Ogden Mills). 
48. Thus, the capital gains preference was enacted "to permit such transactions to go 
forward without fear of a prohibitive tax .... " H.R. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921 ). See 
also id. at 128-32, 134-35 (Frederick Kellogg, Esq.) (proposing separate schedule for capital 
assets because of blockage of transactions with high individual surtax rates); 61 CONG. REC 
H5201 (1921) (statement of Rep. Hawley) (noting that the blocking surely was influenced 
by the prospect that with the end of WWI the high income rates would be slashed). 
TINDALL, supra note 3, at 1020-22 (discussing transition from wartime to peacetime). Cf 
61 CONG. REC. H5178 (Aug 18, 1921) (statement Rep. Oldfield) (Rich taxpayers knew "that 
the Republican party was liable to come into power, and they knew you [Republicans] 
would ... reduce the taxes on the rich .... "). 
49. "For the year 1916, when the tax rate was low, there was reported by taxpayers 
having a net income of $300,000 over $992,000,000 in net income .... By 1918 -that is to 
say, in two years, and good years - the amount of net income reported by taxpayers having 
incomes of $300,000 or over had fallen to $392,000,000. It seems to me the common sense 
of the situation indicates that we can not successfully enforce tax rates running to 73 per 
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such blocking arose from the high rates alone, not bunching, since the bulk 
of capital gains then, as now, are realized year-after-year by individual 
taxpayers with income otherwise taxable at the top nominal brackets. 50 
The legislative history reveals that from the beginning, capital gains 
proponents cloaked the true object of their bounty (public stock 
concentrated in high income taxpayers) with more popular symbols. For 
instance, the House floor debate on the Revenue Act of 1921 generally 
spoke first of high rates blocking sales of farm land before discussing their 
blocking sales ofsecurities.51 A decade later the Chair ofthe House Ways 
and Means Committee, recalling that the 1921 introduction of a capital 
gains rate had been presented as having a tendency to permit the break up 
of large farms, asked what percentage of capital gains sales was attributable 
to such real estate. 52 Undersecretary Ogden Mills (who had been a Ways & 
cent." 1920 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 10-11 (Statement of Dr. T.S. Adams); 61 
CONG. REC. H5201 (August 18, 1921) (statement of Rep. Hawley); 1921 Confidential 
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 36-37; accord, id. at 306-07 (Sen. Smoot). Some 
proponents based their support on the increased revenues from unblocking. 65 CONG. REC. 
H2847 (Feb. 20, 1924) (statements of Rep. Green). Populist Rep. William A. Oldfield, D-
Ark., argued that if the taxpayer did not sell an appreciated capital asset, he wouldn't have 
the gain. 65 CONG. REC. H2846 (Feb. 20, 1924). This is a very valid point in boom-bust 
cycles. In fact, Representative Oldfield would have preferred that they not sell real estate at 
the higher prices generated by inflation, "because these immense profits . . . have been 
capitalized, and the people of America, in every city in this country, are paying rent on that 
high capitalization due to inflation and due to this [capital gains preference] provision." 1d. 
at 2848. Interestingly the Nation was in a major recession in 1921. 1921 Confidential 
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 199-202 (statement of Dr. Adams for Treasury); see also, 
Greene v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 401,407 (1929) (board reviewed), aff'd, 42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 
1930). 
50. Hearings on H.R. 7385 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 73rd Cong. 176-79 
(1934) (statement of Herbert Wood, Esq.); see also 1929 JOlNT COMM. SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORT, supra note 42. 
51. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC., pt. 5, at H520 I (Aug. 18, 1921) (statement of Rep. Willis 
C. Hawley). Rep. William A. Oldfield, D-Ark., seeking repeal of the capital gains 
preference in 1924, recounted that the Ways and Means Committee had provided the 
preference, because "there were a great many people in America in 1921 ... who had 
timberlands and coal lands and other lands which they had owned for some years, and they 
did not want to sell them at inflated prices which we had in 1920 and 1921 and pay the high 
surtax rate." 65 CONG. REC., pt. 3, at H2846 (Feb. 20, 1924) (statement of Rep. Oldfield). 
This story is suspiciously similar to the better-documented special interest origins in 1923 of 
the "stock or securities" exception to tax-free like-kind exchanges under the predecessor to 
Section I 031, which had been a companion provision to capital gains in 1921. See 64 
CONG. REC., pt. 3, at H2852-53 (Feb. I, 1923) (statement of Rep. Gamer). 
52. Hearings on Revenue Revision 1932 Before the House Committee on Ways & 
Means, 72nd Cong. 42 (1932) (statement of Chair Collier) [hereinafter 1932 House 
Hearings]. 
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Means Member in the early 1920's) replied that he did not know the 
percentage, but acknowledged that a substantial part was from public 
stock. 53 Actually, it was about 85 percent. 54 
By the beginning of the New Deal, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
had reported the distributive effects of Mellon's flat 12\12 percent capital 
gains rate for the 10,000 Oligarches to the tax writing committees. 55 In 
1934 Congress tried to solve some of the distributive defects of a flat 
capital gains rate by employing a deduction instead, while concurrently 
attmepting to preserve the "unblocking" benefits of a low rate. 56 As a 
partial offset for inflation,57 the drafters of the Revenue Act of 1934 
fashioned that deduction as a 4-step sliding scale58 with a maximum 
53. !d. (statement of Undersecretary Mills). 
54. 1929 JOINT COMM. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 14, 16 (85% of gain 
realized from public stock). 
55. !d. 
56. Treasury Undersecretary Dr. Magill doubted that the 1921 Act's 12.5% capital 
gains rate had been the factor unlocking transactions. Revenue Act of 1934: Confidential 
Hearings on H.R. 7385 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 
107, 110 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Confidential Senate Hearings]. 
57. !d. at 54-55 (colloquy between Sen. McAdoo and Magill). 
58. The schedule had three 20% steps, or incremental deductions, over years two 
through five, plus a final fourth I 0% step after a ten-year holding period. Revenue Act of 
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 117,48 Stat. 680,714. The origins of the House bill's sliding 
scale was the Joint Committee's 1929 proposal of a two to fifteen year sliding scale capital 
gains deduction with a I 00% deduction after fiften years based on (a) the policy of 
approximating the tax that would have been paid had the capital gain been realized in equal 
annual payments over the holding period, and (b) the premise that a large part of capital 
gains "is derived from the taxation of appreciation in money value as distinct from actual 
value." 1929 JOINT COMM. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, pt. 7, supra note 42, at 2. The House 
Ways and Means Committee bill dropped the later years' deductions of the Joint 
Committee's 1929 proposal, and particularly the I 00% exclusion after fifteen years, due to 
revenue needs in 1933 and 1934. Revenue Act of 1938: Confidential Hearings on H.R. 9682 
Before the Senate Finance Committee, 75th Con g., 3rd Sess., pt. I, at I 02-03 (1938) 
[hereinafter 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings] (Chief of Joint Comm. Staff Lovell 
Parker). The House bill provided just three 20% deductions at years one, two, and five for a 
maximum deduction of 60% (with the maximum capital gains rate at the last step of 26.8% 
[40% inclusion x 67% maximum ordinary rate = 26.8%]). H.R. Res. 704, 73rd Cong. 
(1934) ("The theory is that the gain or loss should be somewhat reduced in proportion to the 
time for which the capital asset has been held.") (emphasis added). The Senate bill 
(followed by the Conference bill) added a fourth I 0% step at year ten, resulting in a 
maximum deduction of 70%, and hence a maximum capital gains rate of 18.9%, which is 
closer to the 1921 Act's flat 12.5% rate. 1934 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 56, 
at 107-09; S. REP. No. 558, at 12 (1934) (additional bracket in order not to prevent normal 
business transactions). In fact, the ten-year, 70% sliding scale deduction ultimately enacted 
in 1934 taxed capital gains considerably less than they would have been taxed each year as 
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deduction of 70 percent, and thus, a maximum effective rate of 18.9 
percent59 after a ten year or longer holding period. 
Just as the Treasury had wamed,60 top upper income individuals 
disproportionally sold their public stock at the last step, and obtained the 
greatest capital gains deductions while the moderate income taxpayers 
disproportionally sold at the shortest steps. Statistics from 1934 "indicate 
that of taxpayers with incomes of over $100,000 [$1,398,000 in 2004 
dollars], 70 percent of their net capital gains was derived from transactions 
involving assets held over 10 years, whereas in the case of taxpayers with 
incomes not exceeding $25,000 [$349,430 in 2004 dollars], only 25 percent 
of their capital gains came from transactions in assets held over 10 years."61 
Thus, the sliding scale increased rather than lessened blocking. At the 
same time, disproportional benefit between income classes rose in 
substance, albeit not in form. 
After quadrupling from its depression lows, the Stock Market suffered 
a more than 50 percent decline in 1937, and plunged the Nation into a 
recession.62 Business witnesses in the 1938 House and Senate tax writing 
Committee Hearings blamed a host of hated "soak-the-rich" tax provisions, 
accrued. 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings, pt. I, at II (statement of Dr. Roswell Magill, 
Undersecretary of the Treasury). 
59. Maximum individual rate was 63% (normal tax of 4% plus surtax of 59%) on 
income above one million dollars. Revenue Act of 1934 §§ II and 12(b ), 48 Stat. at 684-
85. 
60. Statement of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury Regarding the Preliminary Report 
of a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Ways and Means Relative to Methods of Preventing the 
Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue Laws Together with Suggestions for the 
Simplification and Improvement Thereof, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (Comm. Print 1933) (1933 
House Ways & Means Subcommittee bill's 60% step-down after a five-year or longer 
holding period "would in fact operate to encourage taxpayers to hold appreciated assets for 
[five] years, instead of for [two], as at present, which would be an undesirable result."); see 
also 1934 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 56, at I 09 (statement of Sen. Gore). 
61. H.R. REP. No. 2333, at 30 (1942). Due to continuation of the broad personal 
exemptions, the Federal income tax remained a tax only on higher income taxpayers who 
maintained low effective rates (in the 20% range) through the capital gains preference while 
the masses remained subject to regressive excise taxes. In short, only "symbolic reform" 
was affected as to capital gains in the Revenue Act of 1934, as with other FDR income tax 
changes. MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM 2-3, 288-93 (1984) (use of 
"political enemies" in political discourse which deflects and reassures reformists or at least 
the people undermines reform efforts; thus Roosevelt espoused soak-the-rich income tax 
policies, but regressive excise taxes raised even more revenues compared to income tax 
revenues during the New Deal Era than before (in 1920's) or after (late 1940's) the FDR 
years. 
62. Mitch Zacks, Market Rally Signaling Recovery in Economy, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, 
June 15, 2003, at 36 (54.3% decline during the bear market of 1937-1938). 
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such as freezing capital, for causing a resurgence of the Great Depression. 63 
Congress accepted this conventional wisdom that the 1934 sliding scale 
capital gains deduction contributed to the 193 7 stock market break, because 
it encouraged longer holding periods at the higher income levels where 
capital assets continued to be concentrated.64 Accordingly, in 1938 
Congress collapsed the sliding scale into only two vestigial steps - a 33 
percent deduction with a maximum effective rate of 20 percent at eighteen 
months, and a 50 percent deduction with a maximum effective rate of 15 
percent at twenty-four months. 65 Congress intended the 33 to 50 percent 
deductions to benefit taxpayers with small capital gains and net income, 
and the maximum rate ceilings of 20 to 15 percent to benefit the upper 
income individual taxpayers, who controlled the bulk of the public stock.66 
Thus, Congress structurally brought back the disproportional benefit 
feature of the 1921 Act's flat rate, but did not shut the "little fellow" - the 
moderate income taxpayer - out entirely this time due to the deduction 
alternative. 
B. THE 1940'S: SPECIAL INTERESTS' FOUNDATION FOR A CONSERVATIVE 
COALITION ON CAPITAL GAINS EMERGES, ALONG WITH THE FIRST 
APPEARANCE OF THE 25 PERCENT MAXIMUM CAPITAL GAINS RATE 
63. 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 387 (statement of Rep. 
Keller); id. at 154 (statement of M.L. Seidman, N.Y. Board of Trade) (businessmen believe 
this to be case). Cf Revenue Act of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 77th Cong. 1217 (1942) [hereinafter 1942 Senate Finance Comm. 
Hearings] (statement of Elisha Friedman, New York City attorney and self-styled 
economist) ("lockout capital"). In fact frozen credit from lenders not making loans was a 
feature of the Great Depression. Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Report for 1992: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, I 02nd Cong. 70 
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearing] (In bust phases, "sharp declines in output and 
income were associated with a freezing up of credit availability, widespread bankruptcies by 
borrowers, and closings of newly insolvent financial institutions."). 
64. S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 6 (1938) ("[T]he committee believes that the plan proposed 
in the House bill is excessively complicated and will not permit a free flow of capital into 
productive enterprises. The committee is convinced that at the present time transactions are 
prevented by the capital-gains tax and that the result has been a material hindrance to 
business and a considerable loss of revenue."); accord, Harrison Demands End of Profits 
Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1938, at A-1 (quoting Senate Finance Chair Pat Harrison, D-
Miss., that "a sit-down strike upon the part of capital ... should [be broken] ... and ... 
effective work should be done toward removing some of the barriers that are checking the 
flow of capital and credit into new investment and new industries."). 
65. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 117(b), 52 Stat. 447, 501 (1939). 
66. 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at II, 15-16 (statement of Dr. 
Roswell Magill, Undersecretary of the Treasury). 
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With the expansion of the individual Federal income tax base in the 
early 1940's, the modern federal income tax first became a mass tax 
(through lowering personal exemptions)67 with high rates (ultimately up to 
88 percent).68 This transformation was also reflected in the expansion ofthe 
individual capital gains preference. In developing the Revenue Act of 
1942, the House and Senate tax-writing committees reconsidered the 
treatment of capital gains for the third time in a decade. Citing declining 
capital gains revenue,69 they strengthened the capital gains preference by 
shortening the holding period to six months, and provided a single 50 
percent deduction for the small taxpayer while increasing the alternative 15 
67. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the 
Expansion of the Income Tax During World War If, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686, 694-95 
( 1989) (By lowering personal exemptions, 1940 and 1941 Revenue Acts increased the 
number of taxpayers from 7,000,000 to 17,000,000 and then to 27,000,000; and then a 45% 
increase to around 40,000,000 taxpayers.). Randolph Paul regretted the further lowering of 
exemptions, but considerations of equity were trumped by the goal of avoiding inflationary 
price increases. TREASURY DEP'T AND HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, DATA ON 
PROPOSED REVENUE BILL OF 1942 170 (Confidential Comm. Print 1942) [hereinafter DATA 
ON PROPOSED 1942 BILL] Exhibit 64 at 169 (statement ofSec'y of the Treasury Morgenthau) 
(lowering the personal exemptions under the individual income tax from $1,500 for a 
married person plus $400 for each dependent to $1,200 and $300, respectively, would 
produce additional revenue of $1, I 00,000,000 of which about I 0 percent would come from 
6,900,000 new taxpayers). Professor Carolyn Jones, supra, pointed out that the total 
reductions in the personal exemptions greatly increased the number of covered taxpayers: 
from 7 million to 40 million income taxpayers in the early 1940's (possibly including both 
civilian and military populations). 
In DATA ON PROPOSED 1942 BILL, supra at p. 170 Exhibit 65, Assistant Secretary 
Randolph E. Paul regretted the necessity of lowering exemptions because they were at the 
right level based on equity; but they had to be lowered in order to withdraw excess 
consumer purchasing power, which otherwise would create inflationary pressure. 
Historically, family exemptions offset any income otherwise reportable by the working 
masses during the Great Depression. Jones, supra. 
Excess turns on the experience of the viewer. My maternal grandfather first paid 
income taxes in the early 1940's when he worked as a carpenter at construction sites for 
munitions making plants or "powder plants" across the deep South and then the old Midwest 
in the early 1940's. (Then he moved to Vallejo, California in late 1944 to work at the Naval 
munitions factory at Mare Island. My earliest memories commence then.) He would 
proudly show us the Powder Plants he had "built" in Southwest Ohio on some Sunday 
drives, when we lived in trailer camps in and around Dayton, Ohio in the early 1950's. (All 
of those camps are still there, but stuffed with much larger trailers, not like the ones my 
grandfather used to pull with a car or a truck whenever we moved.) 
68. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L 77-753, § 102 (normal tax of 6%) and § 103 
(maximum surtax of 82% on net income over $200,000), 56 Stat. 798, 802-03. 
69. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 29 (1942) ("It has been shown that too high a capital 
gains tax will result in a loss of revenue to the Government."). 
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percent flat rate from the Revenue Act of 1938 to a single 25 percent 
maximum rate for the high income taxpayer. 70 
More significantly, in 1942 and 1943 Congress extended the preference 
beyond the public stock and real estate investments of high income 
individuals to benefit a wide range of middle class taxpayers who were 
often the Democrats' constituent groups/1 such as taxpayers with timber 
royalties,72 revenue from the sales of used equipment and livestoce3 and 
lump-sum distributions from qualified retirement plans.74 This laid the 
initial political foundation for a capital gains coalition of Republicans and 
conservative, predominantly Southern, Democrats - the Conservative 
Coalition.75 Incidentally, when President Roosevelt, vetoed the 1943 Act, 
70. Revenue Act of 1942, § 150, 56 Stat. at 843-44; see supra note 65 and 
accompanying text. 
71. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, vol. I, 77th Cong. 196-99 (1942) [hereinafter 1942 House Hearings] (statement of 
Merle Miller, Esq.). 
72. Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 127, 58 Stat. 21, 46; S. REP. No. 78-
627, at 25-26 (1943); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 78-1079, at 52-53 (1944); see JOHN F. WITTE, 
THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 121 (1985). Timber 
witnesses, who argued that current rules discriminated against a taxpayer cutting her own 
timber or selling under a timber cutting contract, asked for up front deductions for 
cultivation expenses. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1943 Before the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 78th Cong. 795-97 (1943) (statement of Lovell Parker, former Chief of 
Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, representing the forest industries). 
Members of the Committee appeared impressed with Parker's presentation. !d. at 824-29. 
73. Revenue Act of 1942 § 151, 56 Stat. at 846. The House Committee on Ways and 
Means Bill added buildings and similar real estate improvements back to capital assets to 
eliminate unfairness and considerable administrative difficulty in allocation of gain between 
land and improvements. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 52 (1942). The earlier deletion of 
depreciable property had been "a relief provision to enable corporations to have the full 
benefit of a loss from the sale of machinery, instead of being limited by the capital loss 
provisions, which [then] would permit it only a certain percentage of the loss. It was felt at 
the time that the taxpayer should not be denied the full loss because it sold the property at a 
loss instead of abandoning the property." !d. at 54. The war economy sales were now at a 
gain, and so the House Committee on Ways and Means provided capital gains for net gains 
and an ordinary loss for net losses in the case of sales or exchanges of depreciable personal 
property, and involuntary conversions of all depreciable property including real estate 
improvements. !d. at 54, 96-97. 
74. Revenue Act of 1942 § 165(b ), 56 Stat. at 863. The Senate Finance Committee bill 
afforded capital gains treatment to lump-sum distributions from qualified retirement plans 
on account of separation from service with neither a rationale, S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 138 
(1942), nor prior discussion in the Senate hearings or on the House side, evidencing special 
interest influence, i.e., a "backroom deal." 
75. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1957-1994 surveyed roll call votes in both 
Houses in which a "Conservative Coalition" arose. A majority (usually almost all) of the 
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while specifically citing timber royalties, because it was "not a tax bill but 
a tax relief bill, providing relief not for the needy, but for the greedy."76 In 
response, a Conservative Coalition overrode this first tax bill veto.77 The 
innovation in the plea hearings for special capital gains relief78 that would 
have resulted in narrow provisions is a hall-mark of special interest 
provisions. 79 
The Treasury's Special Tax Advisor, Randolph Paul, was ineffective in 
combating these special interest add-ons in 1942. He was too busy fending 
of~0 the brush fire from the publicly supported Bland Amendment, which 
called for a flat rate of 10 percent with no holding period.81 
Republican members and a majority of the "Southern" Democrats voted one way and a 
majority of the "Northern" Democrats voted the other way. The Conservative Coalition first 
began to appear as a reaction to FDR's attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court in 1937. See 
JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW DEAL 87-127 (1967). 
It appeared twice as often during Truman's Administration. JOEL P. MARGOLIS, THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 1933-1968 81 (1973) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin- Madison) (on file with the University 
of Wisconsin Library) (most likely to appear on issues of taxes, economic policy, health, 
education, welfare, and labor); see LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN 
FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT I 09-36 (1967) (apparent electoral triumph of 1936 would be 
dissipated in 1937 because of the failure of the "court-packing" plan). It essentially 
disappeared after the 1994 elections as the newly empowered GOP did not need the votes of 
Southern Democrats (a dwindling breed) to advance its agenda. 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC C-
1 0 (1995). 
The Conservative Coalition appeared stronger on capital gains than on other issues. 
45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 40-B (1989). This may well have been due more to a congruence of 
interest groups benefited, some favored by Republicans and others favored by Southern 
Democrats, than to any shared ideology as to capital gains taxation. 
76. H.R. Doc. No. 78-443, at I (1943). President Franklin Roosevelt specifically 
criticized the treating of income from the cutting of timber as capital gain. !d. at 2. 
77. WITTE, supra note 72, at 121. 
78. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at !51 (statement of M.L. Seidman, 
N.Y. Board of Trade) (criticism of non-business bad debt rule); accord id., vol. I, at 962-63 
(statement of Frank I. McNeny) (origin of family guarantee rule once contained in Section 
166); id. vol. I, at 962 (statement of McNeny) (criticism of capital loss rule); id., vol. 2, at 
1734 (statement of Paul E. Shorb, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (criticism of worthless 
securities rule); id., vol. 2, at 1745 (statement of Shorb) (need specific rule for mortgage 
foreclosures); id., vol. 2, at 1784 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce) (criticism of involuntary conversion rule as not going far enough); id., vol. I, at 
4 70 (statement of Joseph Bright, estate analyst) (requesting approval of overlapping pension 
and profit-sharing plans). 
79. Frank Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 16 (1984). 
80. Largely in response to Representative Bland's proposed bill, Randolph Paul (Paul), 
the preeminent tax expert of the day, refuted the myths that the Government would be ahead 
if capital gains and losses were excluded from income and that the British tax system did so. 
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In the 1942 Hearings, Randolph Paul provided the most thoughtful 
analysis of the capital gains policy to date backed by extensive historical 
data. He debunked a long-time favorite rationalization for the preference, 
that the treatment of capital gains and losses had a major impact on the 
stock market, and addressed the inflation rationale.82 He presented data, 
including charts, showing the historical fluctuations in revenues from 
capital transactions reflected market conditions rather than capital gains tax 
rates. 83 Nevertheless, conservative Republican capital gams cuts 
1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 251-65; id., vol. 2, at 1628-58, (statement of 
Paul); 1942 Senate Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 63, at 87 (statement of Paul). Paul 
sought to reduce the disparity between capital gains and ordinary income rates and to 
minimize the revenue losses from deducting a portion of net long-term capital losses against 
ordinary income. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 85 (statement of Paul) 
(noting that capital gains rates were left at 1938 rates while ordinary income rates have been 
substantially increased; and with the rate increases, the privilege of deducting capital losses 
from ordinary income has encouraged an unusually large amount of capital loss realization 
at the end of 1941 after Pearl Harbor). Treasury also recommended that the step-up (or 
more rarely step-down) in basis at death be replaced by carryover basis to avoid this 
"special privilege" whereby a "large part of the capital gains inherent in the increased value 
of property thus escapes income tax, as the assets are handed down from one generation to 
another." See 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 89-90 (statement of Paul). 
While few witnesses in the House Hearings addressed this issue, the bankers and the trust 
officers who did were vehement in their opposition, claiming that the proposal "would affect 
a fundamental change in our entire economy and eliminate most, if not all, of the incentive 
for private enterprise which has been peculiar to the American way of life." See, e.g., 1942 
House Hearings, vol. 3, supra note 71, at 2878 (statement of Charles My lander, 
representing the American Bankers Association). 
81. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 122 (statement of Rep. Carlson). 
82. Special Tax Advisor Paul, addressing the more serious allegation that the capital 
gains tax and limitation on deductibility of capital losses against ordinary income had a 
negative effect on the stock market in the 1930s, admitted the capital gains tax had some 
effect on the stock market, but in his opinion "market conditions are determined by the more 
broad economic conditions rather than by the tax rate." 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra 
note 71, at 257; see also id. at 262-63 (statement of Paul indicating that Treasury's proposed 
30% maximum alternative rate took account of inflation). See also 88 CONG. REC., pt. 8, at 
Hl34 (Jan. 15, 1942) (extension of statements of Rep. Keller). Paul also correctly argued 
before the House Ways and Means Committee that inflation increased other kinds of income 
as well as capital gains, including business profits and wages, so that adjustment of the tax 
laws for general price changes, i.e., inflation, as to capital assets would in justice require 
similar adjustment as to the other forms of income and loss also. 1942 House Hearings, vol. 
2, supra note 71, at 1636. For example, debt carrying capital assets (including mortgage 
interest) should be indexed as well to prevent distortion. 134 CONG. REC. S3954, 3957 (Apr. 
14, 1988) (statements of Sen. Bradley and Rep. Bensten ). 
83. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71 at 256-7; id. at 1628-30, 1642-43, 1647 
(charts). For example, during the period 1925-1931 when the flat rate of 12.5% prevailed, 
net capital gains fluctuated from $4.5 billion in 1928 to $500 million in 1931. !d. at 256. 
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proponents continued to assert that decreases in the capital gains rate were 
necessary to increase revenues by unblocking transactions.84 
Paul's most significant innovation in the 1942 Hearings was to proffer 
an "equity argument" against a rich capital gains preference supported by 
distribution statistics showing disproportional benefits received by the most 
wealthy taxpayers. He asserted that the Bland bill would reduce the taxes 
of not more than one-tenth of the taxpayers with the probable result that the 
other nine-tenths of taxpayers would be called upon to pay what the one-
tenth saved. 85 
The capital transactions are largely concentrated in the higher income 
groups. In 1937 more than 60 percent of the returns with income above 
$25,000 [$325,174 in 2004 dollars] reported capital transactions. In 1938 
statutory net capital gains constituted 64.7 percent of the net income of 
individuals with net incomes of$1,000,000 [$13,280,000 in 2004 dollars] 
and over, but less than 1 percent of the net incomes of individuals with net 
income under $5,000 [$64,200 in 2004 dollars].86 
From these facts, it is inescapable that the highest income individuals 
had effective rates far below the top ordinary income rates. 
In 1938, net capital gains income was concentrated among taxpayers 
with net incomes of $100,000 ($1,328,000 in 2004 dollars) to under 
$1,000,000 who reported 27.3 percent of net long term capital gains, and 
taxpayers with $1,000,000 and more than 21.9 percent net long term capital 
gains. 87 In the House Ways and Means Hearings on the Revenue Revision 
of 1942 Act, Randolph Paul was asked what percentage of capital gains and 
Similarly, notwithstanding the "increase" in rates under the 1934 Act, net capital gains 
almost doubled from 1935 to 1936 reflecting the economic recovery (i.e., $762 million to 
$1.456 billion). !d. at 256-57. 
84. Paul argued that a capital gains rate reduction (if it were not expected to be 
permanent) would increase revenues temporarily but at the cost of future revenue yield 
resulting in net revenue loss, as had happened in 1938. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra 
note 71, at 1628-29. Compare id. at 262-3 and id., vol. 2, at 1652-25 (colloquy between 
Paul and Rep. Knudson) with id., vol. I, supra note 83, at 265 and id., vol. 2, at 163-64 
(colloquy between Paul and Rep. Reed) for Congressional disagreement. Paul also was the 
first to point out the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains problem (i.e., retention 
of corporate earnings example; discount bonds; Iiquidation-reincorporation). !d., vol. I, at 
1630-31. 
85. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 253 (statement of Paul). In 1937 
less than one in ten taxpayers reported a capital gain. !d. 
86. !d. (statement of Paul). For 1959 distribution of individual ownership of stock, see 
infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
87. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 261. 
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losses arose from stock market transactions. Paul replied that it depended 
on the taxpayer's income bracket:88 "Under the $5,000 brackets it is shown 
that 74 percent of the gains come from profits on stocks and bonds .... 
These figures show that in incomes between $100,000 and $1,000,000, 81 
percent of these gains were from profits on stocks and bonds, and when 
you get over $1,000,000, 99 percent were from that source."89 Third 
Ranking Representative Jere Cooper, D-Tenn., observed that every ten 
years or so the Committee was told that 85 percent of capital gains and 
losses consisted of stocks and bonds by income group, but the above data 
showed a 90 percent average.90 Paul replied that the average was 80 
percent of capital gains and 70 percent of the losses.91 
The unconvincing response of proponents of the Bland amendment was 
that these statistics reflected the desirable effects of closely-held businesses 
going public.92 Similarly, the response of a pro-Bland capital gains cut 
witness, when questioned about the alleged 85 percent of capital gains 
realizations coming from public securities transactions, was the "cloaking" 
argument: the remaining 15 percent covered many hardships such as gains 
from residential sales.93 Nevertheless, Paul failed to carry the day for the 
Treasury counter-proposal of a 50 percent deduction and an alternative 30 
percent flat rate with an eighteen-month holding period.94 However, he may 
have prevented adoption of the Bland 10 percent flat rate without any 
holding period. 
Apparently detecting a cool breeze from Ways and Means, Paul revised 
theTreasury's proposals between the time of the Ways & Means Hearings 
(and after consultation with the Joint Committee Staff) and the release of 
the House report. The new Treasury proposal called for a (reduced) 
holding period of fifteen months, a 50 percent deduction and a (reduced) 
alternative maximum capital gains effective rate of 25 percent.95 While ten 
percentage points higher than the maximum individual capital gains rate 
88. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 260 (statement of Rep. Broehne, 
Member, House Comm. on Ways and Means). 
89. !d. (statement of Paul). 
90. !d. at 261 (statement of Rep. Cooper). 
91. !d. (statement of Paul). 
92. !d. at 924 (statement of Emil Schram, President of the New York Stock Exchange). 
93. 1942 Senate Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 63, at 1225 (statement of 
Friedman). 
94. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 89-90 (statement of Paul). 
95. DATA ON PROPOSED 1942 BILL, supra note 63, at 352-53. 
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under the Revenue Act of 1938, this maximum rate was roughly 
comparable to the 25.2 percent maximum effective rate after five years 
under the House Revenue Bill of 1934's year one to five, 3-step sliding 
scale.96 
The 1942 House Ways and Means Committee Report, as the public 
witnesses appearing before the Committee, did not acknowledge Paul's 
arguments except to implicitly deny them.97 Notwithstanding the Ways 
and Means Committee Report's implicit rejection of Treasury's arguments, 
the final House bill abandoned the sliding scale approach due to its 
"tendency to delay the taking of gains [while] stimulat[ing] the realization 
of losses," and instead adopted Treasury's modified proposal: a fifteen 
month holding period, a 25 percent maximum rate, and an alternative 50 
percent deduction. 98 
The 1942 Senate bill, following the pattern for the past decade, was 
more favorable to holders of capital assets than the House bill, which 
shortened the holding period to six months and expanded the definition of 
capital assets while generally following the House's 25 percent maximum 
capital gains rate and alternative 50 percent capital gains deduction.99 
96. H.R. 7835, 73d Cong. § II (2d Sess. 1934) (4% normal tax). !d. at§ 12(b) (59% 
surtax at $1 million). !d. at§ 117(a) (40% inclusion after five years). 40% x 63% = 25.2%. 
97. "It has been shown that too high a capital gains tax will result in a loss of revenue to 
the Government." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Con g., I st Sess., at 29 (1942); accordS. REP. 
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 49-50 (1942). The House Report, ignoring the 
implications of Treasury's testimony as to the concentration of public stock at the upper 
income levels, asserted also that too high a capital gains tax would "have the effect of 
discouraging taxpayers from investing in new or productive enterprises," reasoning that too 
high capital gains rates would discourage sales and hence reinvestment [in new and hence 
non-public stock]. H.R. REP. No. 2333, at 29. And rather than speaking of bringing the top 
capital gains rate into line with the increases in ordinary rates as Paul had, the Report noted 
that with a top ordinary rate of 88%, "it is not believed that a moderate increase in the 
capital-gain rate will retard capital transactions." !d. at 30. (The "moderate increase" was 
from a maximum individual capital gains rate of 15 percent to 25 percent. This 25% 
maximum rate lasted until 1978 when the capital gains deduction was increased to 60% 
resulting then in a maximum individual rate of 28%--70% maximum rate on investment 
income 40% of gains remaining after the capital gains deduction. When President Ronald 
Reagan cut the top rate on unearned income in 1981 to the same as the top 50% rate on 
earned income, the capital gains rate ceiling fell to 20% (50% x 40% remaining after the 
capital gains deduction). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 raised the maximum individual 
capital rate back to 28%. President Bill Clinton in 1997 signed the first of a series of 
income tax cuts "for the greedy not for the needy." If anything, the needy got spending cuts 
as to social services. It is worth noting the FOR so described the Revenue Act of 1944, 
which he vetoed, but the Conservative Coalition overrode. 
98. !d. at 30, 31. 
99. H.R. 7378, 77thCong. §§ 152(b)-(c)(2dSess. 1942). 
May 2005] THE CAPITAL GAINS "SEIVE" 21 
Citing the declining capital gains revenue data, the 1942 Finance 
Committee Report concluded that too high a rate reduced revenues. 100 This 
ignores the adverse effect of WWII on the stock market (and hence, 
declining revenues). 101 
The Conference followed the Senate bill 102 fixing the 50 percent capital 
gains deduction for the next 36 years, with the long-term capital gain 
holding period remaining six months, except for 1978-1982 when a 1-year 
holding period applied. The 25 percent alternative maximum rate was, 
however, limited in 1969103 and eliminated in 1978 104 at the same time that 
the individual capital gains deduction was increased to 60 percent. 
C. THE 1950'S: BUSINESS AS USUAL (BUT ON A CLEAR DAY, YOU CAN 
SEE FOREVER) 
1. Revenue Act of 1951: "A Veritable Landslide of Special Provisions"105 
The Revenue Act of 1951 extended capital gains coverage, through 
numerous exceptions, to the sale or exchange requirement and to resolution 
in favor of taxpayers in conflicts between the Internal Revenue Service and 
the courts over capital transaction treatment. 1 06 This pattern extended 
100. S. REP. No. 1631, at 49-50. 
101. David James, The Main Campaign, Bus. REVIEW WEEKLY, Mar. 27, 2003, at 14 
(charting initial decline in Dow Industrial average after Pearl Harbor, some rebound in 
month after, and decline again after three months and substantial decline after six months); 
Jason Kirby, Time Is On Your Side, CANADIAN Bus., Oct. 15, 2001, at 17 (touching on 
Americans' fears about the outcome of the Second World War, noting that at the time of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941, the Dow was at 110, and five months after the Pearl 
Harbor attack the Dow had fallen 16%; when America's strength in WW II began to be felt, 
Dow began its rise). 
102. H.R. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942). 
103. The House bill eliminated the alternative maximum 25% rate. H.R. 13270, 91 st 
Cong. §§ 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516( c) (1st Sess. 1969). The Senate bill capped capital 
gains subject to 25% maximum rate to $140,000. !d. The Conference bill and hence final 
legislation lowered the cap to $50,000. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 301, 511, 83 Stat. 487, 580-85, 636-37. 
104. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402, 92 Stat. 2763, 2867. 
105. WITTE, supra note 72, at 142. 
106. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 31-37,41-43,47-48 (1951) (tax-free 
rollover on sale of residence, capital gains for coal royalties under predecessor to Section 
631 (c), and for sale of livestock and unharvested crops in the context of predecessor to 
Section 1231 ); WITTE, supra note 72, at 143. Sales of livestock also constituted a far 
greater percentage of capital gains realizations by lower income taxpayers than in any other 
income class, see infra note 134, reflecting the lower income of smaller farmers. 
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capital gains treatment (1) as a relief for certain types of income, (2) in lieu 
of an explicit averaging device, or (3) as an incentive.I 07 
2. 1954 Code Continuation ofPatterns of Late 1939 Code 
The 1954 Code Hearings rehashed the previous two decades by either 
echoing the folklore of 1930's and 1940's Hearings as to rates, holding 
period and capital losses, or, as in the 1940's, entertaining special interests 
pleas for aid.Ios The original 1954 Code continued the late 1939 Code 
107. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., THE FEDERAL 
REVENUE SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 16 (Comm. Print 1956). The Staff study lists 
timber, livestock, unharvested crops, coal royalties, lump-sum distributions from retirement 
plans, lump-sum employment payments, and employee stock options. !d. at 16-21. The 
Staff Report was heavily influenced here by Professor Surrey's paper submitted for the 
accompanying Hearing. See infra notes 116 and II 7. 
108. Some witnesses at the 1953 House General Revenue Revision Hearings raised the 
threadbare arguments that capital gains should be taxed at 1 0% or 12.5% at the most, or not 
at all. Further, they argued that capital losses should be deductible against ordinary income 
in order to (a) unblock transactions, (b) increase the revenue yield, and (c) reduce boom and 
bust distortions in the stock market. Hearings on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General 
Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Ways and Means Committee, pt. 2, 
83d Cong. 1184, 1196, 1202, 1206 (1953) [hereinafter 1954 House Hearings] (statement of 
Ellsworth Alvord; National Association of Manufacturers; American Taxpayers 
Association; Council of State Chambers of Commerce; respectively); see also The Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954: Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Finance Committee, pt. 2, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 711, 741, 742, 997 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Senate Hearings] 
(statements of Edward McCormick, American Stock Exchange [holding period]; G. Keith 
Funston, New York Stock Exchange [holding period, rate, and capital losses]; Walter 
Maynard, Association of Stock Exchanges [rate and holding period]; Arthur Jenkins [capital 
losses]; respectively); 1953 House Hearings, supra at 1185-91, 1198-1200, 1203-05, 1207 
(statements of John W. Anderson, National Patent Council ["encourage inventors by 
increasing their rewards"]; Stuart McCarthy [termination of personal service agencies]; 
American Institute of Accountants [worthless stock in wholly owned subsidiary and bidding 
in at foreclosure sale]; Council of State Chambers of Commerce [bidding in at foreclosure 
sale and loss on abandonment of option]; respectively); 1954 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, supra 
at passim (statements of Fortescue Hopkins, Esq. [business bad debt treatment for 
shareholder loans]; Charles Briggs [seeking to reverse House capitalization of 
administrative timber cutting expenses]; Merril Bradford [same]; Harold Kuhn [elective 
non-recognition of sale of residence and limitation of capital losses]; R.J. Dearborn 
[patents]; respectively); id., pt. 3, at passim (statements of J. Alter Meyers, Jr., Forest 
Farmers Ass'n of Atlanta; William Barnes [patents]; Rolla Campbell, National Council of 
Coal Lessors, Inc.; J.S. Seidman, American Institute of Accountants [foreclosure]; John 
Williamson, Nat'! Ass'n of Real Estate Boards [investment by dealers]; Robert Wadlington 
[same]; Brach, Gosswein & Lane [short sales]; Henry Isham, Clearing Industrial District, 
Inc. [investment by dealers]; respectively); !d., pt. 4, at passim (statements of Richard 
Uhlmann, Chicago Board of Trade [holding period]; Francis Davis [patents]; John Giesse 
[same]; Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. [capital losses and tacked holding period]; 
Ellsworth Alvord, Esq. [qualified stock options, capital gains rate, and like-kind exchange of 
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format of high and sharply progressive ordinary income rates (up to 91 
percent or so) at the upper individual brackets coupled with a substantial 
preference for long-term (six months) individual capital gains in the form 
of a 50 percent deduction for individuals with small incomes and a 
maximum rate of 25 percent109 for the big incomes. Also included were a 
few more special interest provisions. 110 
In the 1960's and 1970's the result in practice under the 1954 Code, 
due to these structural provisions, was an effective rate of 35 percent. 111 
This was primarily due to the concentration of capital gains income at the 
highest level of income individuals: top 1 percent or less. 112 Every year on 
average, the top 1 percent of individuals realized 50 percent or more of the 
capital gains realized by individuals, 113 who own nearly half of the public 
stock coupled with taxation of unrealized appreciation at death], respectively). See also S. 
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 110, 114 (1954) (mortgage foreclosures and investment 
accounts of real estate dealers). 
I 09. Internal Revenue Code of I 954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 120I(b), I 202, 68A Stat. 3, 
320. 
110. Given the number of appeals for extension of capital gains treatment by interest 
groups, the actual extension of the preference was moderate. Proponents of extension met 
with success as to patents and timber administrative costs, S. REP. No. 1622,at 8 I, I 14; but 
arguably failed with other controversial House special interest capital transactions, id. at I I 0 
(mortgage foreclosure), I 13 (investment account of real estate dealers), I 16 (private 
annuities). The reason probably was that the Republican-controiied Senate Finance 
Committee, fearing the controversial provisions could delay the biii to the next term of 
Congress wherein the one-seat Republican control of the Senate might be lost (as it was). 
Hence, the proponents generaiiy removed innovative and controversial House provisions. 
See John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured Discretionary Justice Under 
Section 355, 44 TAX NOTES I 029, I 033 n.44 (1989). 
I I I. For example, in the I 960's high income individuals in general had an effective rate 
of around 35%. 1 I 0 CONG. REC., pt. 2, at S 1438 (Feb. 1964) (statement of Floor Manager 
Sen. Long, Senate Finance Comm. Member). 
I 12. See, e.g., supra notes 43 (data as to 1925), 86 (1937, 1938) and infra note 136 
(1960). The top 1% of families owned 31% ofhousehold net worth in 1983 (36% in 1989). 
Ann Fisher, The New Debate over the Very Rich, FORTUNE 42, 43 (June 29, 1992). The top 
I 0% of families owned 89.3% or so of ail publicly traded stock held by individuals. 
DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 99TH CONG., TRENDS IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AMONG AMERICAN FAMILIES 24 (Comm. Print 1986). Currently 
the top 2% of households with highest incomes own 70% of large firms and 45% of smaii 
firms. John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: 
"Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 910 (2000). 
I 13. CBO, How CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES AFFECT REVENUES: THE HISTORICAL 
EVIDENCE 30-3 I (1988) (around 50% of the realized capital gains in the I 950's and I 960's, 
dropping to 30% to 40% in the 1970's, and climbing back to 55% in 1982 through I 985); 
CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF 
CAPITAL GAINS 2, 15, 20, 21 tb1.6, 22 fig.5 (1997) [hereinafter CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON 
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stock held by individuals. II 4 At this time, one fourth of high income 
individuals who did not enjoy significant amounts of capital gains had 
effective rates much closer to the nominal top individual ordinary income 
rate. I Is 
3. Mills Tax Policy Hearings: The Best Policy Discussion to that Date 
Possibly in response to the Senate and Conference Committee's 
thwarting of the most controversial provisions in the House version of the 
1954 Code, soon to be Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, Representative Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., commenced innovative 
tax policy hearings in 1955 with submitted papers from invited witnesses, 
including academics rather than the special interest witnesses primarily 
used in the past. This culminated in the well-known 1959 TAX REVISION 
COMPENDIUM and its accompanying PANEL DISCUSSIONS. The consensus 
conclusion of the Mills Hearings witnesses on capital gains was the notion 
propounded by Harvard Law Professor Stanley SurreyiiG that the 
excessively high nominal individual ordinary income rates coupled with the 
excessively large individual capital gains preference created politically 
irresistible pressure to expand the categories of capital gains.II? The 
OWNERSHIP] (For 1979-85 the 3% of families with adjusted gross income of $100,000 or 
more in 1993 dollars accounted for 70% of all realized gains; those families with $200,000 
or more adjusted gross income accounted for over 50% in seven and nineteen year 
averages.). See also supra notes 86 and infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
114. See infra notes 142-46 and 163 and accompanying text. 
115. See infra notes 139 and 204-06 and accompanying text. 
116. Surrey's posture in the Mills Hearings was presaged by the ALI Study. The 
fundamental goal of the ALI project was simplification without touching the core political 
contracts or "policy." [ AM. LAW [NST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE xvi (Feb. 1954 
draft). Consequently the ALI capital transactions proposals (Harv. Prof. Stanley Surrey was 
the Chief Reporter of this Project, id. at v.) left in place the 50% deduction feature and 
sought simplification through (a) tightening the definition of a capital asset by deleting the 
services- and inventory-favored and royalty additions of the '40's and early '50's, id. at 329-
42 and the tables at 339-41; and (b) eliminating the long- and short-term gain distinction and 
the sale or exchange requirement, id. at 319-20. In many other income tax areas the ALI 
proposals served as the model for at least the House bill and often the final 1954 Code 
provisions, however in regards to capital transactions, this was not to be. The probable 
reason for this was because the pertinent 1939 Code sections were permeated with special 
interest provisions. Any proposed repeal would have raised considerable opposition -
anathema to the 1954 Code drafters particularly on the Senate side. See supra note II 0. 
117. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY: PAPERS SUBMITTED BY PANELISTS APPEARING BEFORE 
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TAX POLICY 404 (Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter 1955 TAX POLICY 
PAPERS]. Professor Surrey's "paper" also appears in Surrey, Definitional Problems in 
Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1956), and in revised form in 2 HOUSE 
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consensus was to lower individual ordinary income rates, raise capital gains 
rates, repeal the 1940's and 1950's accretions to capital gains treatment, 118 
"recapture" depreciation deductions to correct the Crane character mis-
characterization, and tax unrealized capital gains at death and upon gifts. 119 
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1203-32 (Comm. 
Print 1959); see also Hearings on Federal Tax Policy for economic Growth and Stability 
before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, S. Rep. 
No. 1310, 84th Cong. 322 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 Tax Policy Hearings] (Statement of 
Prof. Carl Shoup [chief economist in '54 Code triumvirate]; 326 (Prof. Surrey); and 327 
(Prof. Keith Butters). Treasury had earlier noted that the "discrepancy" in the upper 
brackets between the alternative tax and the regular income tax had resulted in increased use 
of conversion methods and "stimulated efforts to obtain legislation broadening the area of 
capital gains." Revenue Act of 1951: Hearings on H.R. 4473 Before the Senate Committee 
on Finance, pt. 1, 82nd Cong. 120 (1951) (Sec'y of the Treasury Snyder). 
118. Paralleling "his" 1954 ALI Capital Gains Proposals, see supra note 116, Surrey 
presented the basic definitional issues as (I) distinguishing investment from (a) business, (b) 
speculation, and (c) personal efforts; (2) classifYing recurring receipts; and (3) 
transformation of (a) tangible assets into intangible property, viz., equity interests in 
collapsible corporations and partnerships, and (b) retained corporate ordinary income into 
stock appreciation. 1955 TAX POLICY PAPERS, supra note 117, at 406-15. By the 1959 
Panel Discussions Chairman Mills at least clearly had accepted the policy argument that the 
capital gains preference should be limited to traditional investment assets and manifested a 
thorough knowledge of the host of exceptions. Panel Discussions on Income Tax Revisions 
before the House Committee on Ways & Means, 86th Cong. 693 (1960) [hereinafter I959 
Panel Discussions]. Even as the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy under Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson, Professor Surrey was unable to significantly reform the definition of 
capital gains. He was only able to change the definition of a depreciation recapture (which 
was 80% ineffective as to real estate improvements due to the compromise limitation of 
"recapture" to the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line depreciation) and 
ultimately service-flavored compensation (lump-sum and employer stock distributions from 
"qualified" profit sharing and stock bonus plans, and qualified stock option plans). 
119. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. I (1947) (stating that exclusion of allowable 
deprecation deductions from consideration in computing gain would result, in effect, in a 
double deduction on the same loss of assets). See 1955 TAX POLICY PAPERS, supra note 117 
at 406-15; Message from the President of the United States relative to our Federal Tax 
System, H.R. Doc. No. 140, at 13 (1961) ("Our capital gains concept should not encompass 
this kind of income. This inequity should be eliminated, and especially so in view of the 
proposed investment credit. We should not encourage through tax incentives the further 
acquisition of such property as long as this loophole remains."). Crane required that non-
recourse liabilities be included in the amount realized under the predecessor to Section 1001 
in part because such liabilities had been included in basis at acquisition and thus supported 
depreciation deductions which reduced such basis. Mis-characterization arose because the 
depreciation deductions were ordinary, whereas the gain resulting from such basis reduction 
was capital under the predecessor to Section 1231, (enacted after the tax years in Crane but 
long before the Court's decision). See John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader, Contingent Income 
Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer 
Reflection of Income, 12 J. CORP'N L. 137, 219-20 (1987). 
The 1955 Tax Policy Hearing Pamphlet prepared by the Staff discussed a proposal 
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Ill. UPS AND DOWNS OF CAPITAL GAINS 
TAXREFORM: 1960's-1980'S 
A. 1960'S: THE FAILURE OF THE BEST, AND COMMENCEMENT OF 
SURROGATE CAPITAL GAINS REFORM 
[Vol. 1:1 
1. President John F. Kennedy's Reform Proposals: Uniting the Special 
Interest Opponents 
In the early 1960's the Kennedy Administration formulated a tax plan 
incorporating several features of the 1950's Mills Hearings radical 
consensus on the best capital gains tax policy: equitable limitations and 
taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death. 120 The common 
denominator to the Kennedy proposals and to the Mills capital gains 
consensus was Harvard Professor Stanley Surrey who served as JFK' s 
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy. 
A combination of the traditional Republican tax cuts to spur the 
economy leg and a traditional Democrat equity leg ran through the 1963 
Kennedy tax proposals, 121 no doubt motivated at least in part by a desire to 
derived from Surrey's paper to confine capital gains to "the sale or exchange of a much 
narrower category of assets than at present, principally corporate securities." STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM: FACTS 
AND PROBLEMS 32 (Comm. Print 1956). "Other types of income currently receiving capital 
gains treatment, such as those representing compensation for personal service (distributions 
from retirement plans, stock options, patent royalties), gains from transactions involving 
inventory-type assets (coal royalties, cutting of timber, livestock), and anticipation of future 
income (in-oil payments, life interests in estates) would be subject to ordinary income 
treatment or whatever preferential treatment specifically accorded with the special 
circumstances." !d. The principal objection was the virtual impossibility of distinguishing 
"true" capital gains from the wide range of other income receiving capital treatment, which 
often turned on the circumstances under which the income was received. Even strict 
adherence to the capital asset-sale or exchange rule would still leave open the question of 
what assets were to be included as capital assets. !d. at 32-33. 
When Section 1250 was enacted, real estate depreciation recapture was limited to 
the excess of accelerated over straight-line depreciation, which Rep. AI Ullman, D-Wash., 
viewed as not costing the real estate industry greatly and not putting a damper on real estate 
development. Hearings on President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Committee on 
Ways & Means, pt. I, 88th Cong. 895 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 House Hearings]. For the 
Committee Report rationalization seeS. REP. No. 830, at 132 (1964). 
120. PRESIDENT'S 1963 TAX MESSAGE 26, reprinted in 1963 House Hearings, pt. I, 
supra note 119. 
121. The JFK Administration believed that the reduction in the capital gains rate would 
be "somewhat more than offset by the increased revenue from the change in holding period, 
the taxation of capital gains at death and the changes in definitions .... " PRESIDENT'S 1963 
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broaden the support base for tax reform. This was also described as a "quid 
pro quo" concession by the Kennedy Administration. JFK' s proposed 
capital gains rate cuts - a 70 percent capital gains deduction not seen since 
FDR's Revenue Act of 1934's "sliding scale" deductions, coupled with a 
reduction of the top individual ordinary income rate from 90 to 65 percent, 
resulted in a maximum capital gains rate of 19.5 percent. 122 This ran 
contrary, however, to the radical consensus of raising not cutting the 
capital gains rate. On the other hand, President Kennedy's proposed cut in 
the top ordinary rates123 was thought to lessen the pressure for new capital 
. dd 124 gams a -ons. 
Nevertheless, the benefit of the Democratic "quid" (increased capital 
gains preference) was outweighed in the eyes of the Republicans by the 
burden of their "quo"125 (taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death 
which would have more than paid for the capital gains cuts through 
increased realizations126) in the eyes of both wealthy individual taxpayers 127 
TAX MESSAGE, supra note 120 at 26. The anticipated increase in revenue would have arisen 
primarily from the elimination of the ability to avoid all capital gains by holding assets until 
death. The increased volume of realizations was to yield approximately $700,000 per year 
in additional revenues for a net increase of $100,000 per year. !d. Between 50% and 70% 
of annually accrued capital gains are not realized prior to the owner's death, see note 126 
infra at which point the estate or heirs take a date of death (or alternate valuation date) fair 
market value as their basis in the capital asset, Section I 014, with no income tax being paid 
on the appreciation in value. 
122. Proposed top individual rate of65% x 30% = 19.5%. 
123. PRESIDENT'S 1963 TAX MESSAGE, supra note 120, at 6 (proposed reduction of top 
individual rate from 90% to 65%). 
124. See 1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117. 
125. Revenue Act of 1963: Hearings on H.R. 8363 Before the Senate Finance 
Committee, pt. I, 88th Cong. 285 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Senate Hearings] (statement of 
Sec'y C. Douglas Dillon) ("We did not get a quo. So that is why we are asking that 
provision be stricken."). 
126. Between 50% and 70% of accrued capital gains are not realized prior to the owner's 
death at which point the estate or heirs take a date of death (or alternate valuation date) fair 
market value as their basis in the capital asset with no income tax being paid on the 
appreciation in value. Jane Gravelle, Limits to Capital Gains Feedback Effects, 51 TAX 
NOTES 363, 364-65 (Apr. 22, 1991) (Director of Congressional Research Service) (From 
1949 to 1989 on the average about 30% of all capital gains accruals were recognized; with 
adjustments for gains not recognized because of reasons other than stepped up basis at 
death, e.g., owner-occupied housing sold after age fifty-five and corporate stock held by tax-
exempts, taxable realizations were about 46% of accruals). 
127. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 199, at 1419 (statement of Keith Funston, New 
York Stock Exchange) (capital gains cuts do reduce taxes, but taxation at death of 
unrealized appreciation "takes away the benefit-- so that I don't believe, in general, the 
present tax bill is any great advantage to the persons above the middle-income bracket in 
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(long a Republican constituency) and special interests such as farmers, 
ranchers, 128 and small businessmen, 129 which were more likely than not to 
be Democrat constituencies in the South. Consequently, the House 
retained the traditional 50 percent deduction and six month holding period 
for both the special interest statutory add-ons and "classic" capital assets 
(stock and real estate) while granting an additional capital gains cut (60 
percent deduction after 1-year holding period) for classic capital gains 
assets only. 130 However, it did not provide for taxation of unrealized 
capital appreciation at death. Therefore the best capital gains reform 
proposals to that date (definitional purification and taxation of unrealized 
appreciation at death) united the interest groups in opposition, thereby 
dooming the Kennedy capital gains reform proposals. 131 
terms of the complete package."). See also 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 496 
(Joel Barlow, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.) (would not support capital gains cut if 
dependent on taxation of unrealized capital appreciation). 
128. 1963 House Hearings, pt. 3, supra note 120, at 1538, 1540-42 (Albert Mitchell and 
Stephen Hart, Esq., National Livestock Tax Comm.); id., pt. 5, at 2529-91 (Rep. Joseph M. 
Montoya D-N.M.) (taxation of unrealized appreciation at death would create a severe 
hardship on small businesses and especially ranches). 
129. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 1327 (Henry Bison, National Association 
of Retail Grocers); id. at 1344 (statement of Donald Alexander, Association of Institutional 
Distributors) (heaviest burden would fall on small- and medium-sized businesses, citing 
1959 Panel Discussions); id. at 1364 (Samuel Foosaner, New Jersey Manufacturer's 
Association) (burden on small business particularly from "goodwill" based upon capitalized 
earnings). 
130. The 1940s' and 1950s' add-ons were limited to the old 50% deduction. The Mills 
Hearings manifest that Chairman Mills had learned the difference between classic capital 
assets and the 1940's and 1950's special interest "hardship" add-ons. But the 1963 House 
Hearings equally manifest the attachment of Committee members to the special interest 
provisions. Chairman Mills' compromise was not to cut back on the existing preference 
(50% deduction) for such items (newly labeled as "Class B" or "statutory" capital assets), 
but instead to limit the new additional preference (60% deduction) to "Class A" or classic 
capital assets. Indeed, the House bill extended the Section 631 (c) capital gains treatment for 
timber and coal royalties to iron ore royalties. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., I st Sess. 93-
94 (1963). The House bill used two holding periods (similar to the Revenue Act of 1938), 
providing the additional preference only to Class A Assets held two or more years. !d. at 
96-97. Secretary Dillon criticized the House two step arrangement and two maximum rates 
as seriously complicating the capital gains portion of the tax return and the Code. 1963 
Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 129. 
131. It was the date of death taxation of unrealized appreciation issue which was critical, 
not the too readily conceded definitional issues, as perhaps could have been predicted by the 
response of the Congressmen at the Mills Hearings. For example, Senator Douglas stated, 
"What has progressively happened has been that the reform elements which you [Sec'y 
Dillon] propose, and I think they were rather timid, I may say, have been progressively 
eliminated, and I think they have been eliminated in large part because the members of the 
legislative bodies and the special interests who throng these hearing halls and who call upon 
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Rhetoric in the 1963 House Hearings on JFK's capital gains proposals 
constituted a transition from earlier decades. This rhetoric justified the 
capital gains preference on the basis of its alleged salutary effects on the 
stock market, the economy, or on increasing revenue, to an overt 
Congressional policy of principally intending that the capital gains 
preference benefit special interests as a subsidy, 132 to small businessmen, 
farmers, ranchers, or timber owners with no attention explicitly given to the 
actual distribution of net capital gains by classes of assets and levels of 
income, although Treasury supplied the data for 1959. 
For 1959, the largest percentage sources of individual net long-term 
capital gain were 41.5 percent from corporate stocks, and 18 percent from 
real estate. 133 For higher income taxpayers the percentage of net capital 
Senators and Congressman, have the impression that you are so anxious for a tax cut that 
you can throw all of these away and nothing will happen, so that by not presenting a virile 
position, not having a virile stance in favor of tax reform, you have permitted the tax reform 
measures to be progressively gutted." 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 286 
(statement of Sen. Douglas). 
132. See, e.g., 1963 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 125, at 483-84 (written statement 
of Joel Barlow, Director U.S. Chamber of Commerce); id. at 542-43 (written submission by 
Forest Industries); id. at 759-60 (statement of Harv. Prof. Dan Throop Smith); id. at 810 
(written statement of Roswell Magill, Esq., Undersecretary of Treasury under FDR); id. at 
916,923-28 (statement of G. Keith Funston, New York Stock Exchange); id., pt. 3, at 1187 
(statement of J. Sinclair Armstrong, U.S. Trust Co.); supra notes 128-29 and accompanying 
text. 
By subsidy I mean a rate reduction or preference for an activity that the taxpayer 
probably would have engaged in anyway. Soon to be Chair Mills, D-Ark., noted that the 
statutory proliferation of categories of capital assets in effect lessened the channeling value 
of the preference. 1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117, at 326. See also S. REP. No. 
131 0, at 8-9. 
133. Net long-term capital gains, 1959, by type of gain, amounts and percent, 1963 
Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 197: 
[D ollar amounts in thousands] 
[Percent] 
Total net long term gain $12,331 ,867 100.0 
Corporate stocks $5,116,261 41.5 
Bonds and notes $189,480 1.5 
Distributions from mutual funds $360,371 2.9 
Share from partnerships/trusts $1,010,202 8.2 
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gains from sales of stock ranged from 53.5 percent for AGI's from $50,000 
to $100,000 ($322,000 to $644,000 in 2004 dollars) to 70.5 percent for 
$500,000 and above ($322 million in 2004 dollars). 134 Conversely, the 
Livestock $701,116 5.7 
Natural resources $262,593 2.1 
Depreciable assets used in trade or business $537,631 4.4 
Real estate $2,217,438 18.0 
Other capital assets $1,936,775 15.7 
134. Net Long-term capital gains, 1959, percentage distribution by type, for AG income 
classes, id. at 197, tb1.5, were as follows: 
Income Classes rin thousands of$ 
$0 to $10 $50 $100 $500 All 
$10 to to to + 
$50 $100 $500 
Security-type gain 30.4 55.9 67.2 70.6 78.4 54.1 
A. Securities 19.4 43.1 55.2 61.6 72.4 43.0 
I. Corporate stock 19.1 41.7 53.5 59.8 70.5 41.4 
2. Bonds 0.3 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.6 7.1 
B. Mutual Fund Distributions 3.8 4.0 2.2 0.7 0.4 2.9 
C. Gains from Partnerships/ 7.2 8.8 9.0 8.3 5.6 8.2 
Trusts 
Real Estate 29.4 18.2 11.3 10.2 1.5 18.0 
Depreciable property 5.9 5.3 2.2 1.5 1.0 4.4 
Livestock 16.3 2.2 1.0 0.05 0.1 5.7 
Natural resources 3.5 1.2 0.3 1.7 2.6 2.1 
Other 13.9 16.6 17.3 15.6 16.2 15.7 
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percentage of net long-term capital gains consrstmg of real estate and 
livestock, and to a lesser degree depreciable business property, decreased 
the higher the income class. 135 Capital gains realizations were concentrated 
in higher income taxpayers, 136 reflecting the concentration of ownership of 
public stock, which was concurrently in the hands of the top 14 percent of 
families, who owned 64 percent of all public stock, especially the top 4 
percent, who owned 42 percent. 137 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
135. !d. 
136. Amounts and percentages of net long-term capital gain among individual income 
classes in 1959 Jd at 197 tbl 5 .. 
AGI Classes Amount of Percent of Average gain Percent of all 
gains total gains in income class returns in 
(thousands) reporting gains income class 
Total $12,331,867 100.0 $2,516 8.1 
Under $10,000 $3,562,976 28.8 $1,100 5.8 
$10,000, under 
$50,000 $4,350,337 35.3 $3,428 29.0 
$50,000, under 
$100,000 $1,454,337 11.8 $15,712 82.4 
$100,000, under 
$500,000 $1,991,358 16.1 $87,346 85.7 
$500,000 or 
more $983,030 8.0 $1,028,242 95.8 
137. Concentration of publicly traded common stockholdings, by income classes, 1960. 
Jd at 168 
Income Class Percentage of all Percentage of total value 
families of stock 
Under $5,000 47 10 
$5,000 to $10,000 39 26 
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For the first time the Senate Hearings and floor debate disclosed hard 
evidence on the use by the vast majority of highest income individuals of 
the capital gains preference (75 percent of their income then consisted of 
capital gains) to obtain low effective rates of income taxation with the very 
top high income taxpayers achieving even lower effective rates than those 
just below them. 138 For example, most individuals with $1,000,000 or 
more annual income in 1963 ($6, 100,000 in 2004 dollars) used the capital 
gains preference to obtain a 22 percent effective rate when the top 
individual ordinary rate was still 90 percent. 139 High income individuals 
generally had an effective rate of approximately 35 percent. Such effective 
rates were averages with one-quarter of the high income taxpayers paying 
an effective rate much closer to the nominal rates, e.g., 50 to 60 percent in 
the early 1960's, and 75 percent paying a much lower effective rate than 
the average. 140 A structural feature of President Kennedy's 1963 tax 
$10,000 to $15,000 10 22 
$15,000 and over 4 42 
Total 100 100 
138. Senator Douglas, D-Ill., asked Secretary Dillon if certain tables (including those 
contained in the footnotes above) prepared by the Treasury Department in 1962, but not 
released, were accurate. Dillon dryly replied, "I recall those tables." Senator Douglas then 
had them entered into the Record of the Hearing. 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 
278-83 ([Sen. Douglas]: "Now, Mr. Secretary, I find these figures shocking. Here are 20 
men with adjusted gross incomes of over $5 million who paid no taxes." !d. at 283); id. at 
1253, 1291. 
139. Seesupranote 114. 
140. See supra note 131, and infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. Effective tax 
rates on adjusted gross income and amended adjusted gross income 1960 are as follows 
(amended adjusted gross income includes full capital gains and losses realized in the tax 
year and excludes capital loss carryovers): 
dollars in millions] 
AGI classes AGI Adjusted AGI Tax as Tax as 
percentage percentage of 
ofAGI Adjusted AGI 
Up to $5,000 $69,141 $69,564 9.1 9.0 
$5,000 to $10,000 $138,456 $139,244 11.1 11.0 
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proposals was to weigh individual income tax reductions disproportionally 
to the lower income groups to increase consumer spending. 141 
In the Senate floor debate on the Revenue Act of 1964, Floor Manager 
Long, while successfully arguing against a capital gains cut not coupled 
with some treatment of unrealized capital appreciation at death, pointed out 
$10,000 to $20,000 $56,128 $57,060 15.0 14.8 
$20,000 to $50,000 $21,901 $22,902 22.8 21.3 
$50,000 to 
$100,000 $6,648 $7,300 34.3 31.1 
$100,000 to 
$150,000 $1,688 $1,971 40.3 34.6 
$150,000 to $750 $920 42.6 34.7 
$200,000 
$200,000 to $1,370 $1,821 44.3 33.3 
$500,000 
$500,000 to $486 $726 46.4 31.1 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 upward $584 $869 47.8 32.3 
Total $297,151 $302,377 13.3 13.0 
141. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 28 (distribution of proposed tax liability 
changes by income classes). The Kennedy tax proposals thereby neglected, according to 
conservatives, upper income groups who, under the trickle down theory, would invest the 
tax reduction. I d. at 1069 (statement of Throop Smith); id. at 1370-74, 1385, 1387 
(statement of Roswell Magill, Esq., who had represented Treasury in the 1934 and 1938 Act 
Hearings, here a partner in Cravath, Swaine & Moore) (arguing that lower brackets should 
not get as much of a tax cut because "investment money is largely produced by the middle 
and upper brackets and not by the lower brackets. . . . In sum, these structural [capital 
transaction] changes would steepen the progression of the individual income tax, add a new 
layer of complex restrictions and requirements on top of existing complexities, free some 
groups of taxpayers from any tax, and limit tax relief in the middle and higher income 
brackets."). Another structural feature of Kennedy's 1963 tax proposals was financing the 
tax cuts with deficits rather than cuts in expenditures. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 
120, at 534, 626 (statements of Reps. Byrnes and Curtis) (critical of such deficit financing). 
For subsequent compositions see infra note 339. 
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that the vast majority of top bracket individuals used the capital gains 
preference (75 percent of their income then consisted of capital gains) to 
obtain "surprisingly" low effective rates of income taxation (22 percent). 142 
Assistant Secretary Surrey testified at the end of lame duck President 
Johnson's Administration, that in 1964 for approximately 7 5 percent of the 
individual taxpayers with over $1,000,000 in actual annual income, the 
effective income tax rate clustered in the area between 20 percent and 30 
percent, which was comparable to the effective rates paid by approximately 
60 percent of the individual taxpayers in the group, who earned between 
$20,000 and $50,000 of actual income. 143 The effective rate increased with 
actual income for taxpayers up to $50,000, flattened for those earning 
$50,000 to $100,000, and decreased for those earning above $100,000. 144 
Surrey further testified that these figures did not appear to be a one-shot 
phenomenon as to high income individuals. 145 The capital gains preference 
constituted the primary reason for these low effective rates. 146 The 
purchasing power of a 1964 dollar was $6.04 in 2004. The super rich thus 
enjoyed a lower effective rate than the merely wealthy. In Long's words, 
the "tax on this capital gains income is low enough already. In a long run, 
capital gains clearly represents an ability to pay taxes .... [b ]ecause this 
income is bunched, we tax it at lower rates; but is not 25 percent low 
enough?"147 
Without taxation of unrealized appreciation, the JFK capital gains cut 
would have primarily benefitted upper income taxpayers, as the major 
capital gains preference legislation of the past had. Kennedy believed the 
reduction in capital gains rate would be "somewhat more than offset by the 
increased revenue from the change in holding period, the taxation of capital 
gains at death and the changes in definitions." 148 Consequently, the 
142. 110 CONG. REC., pt. 2, S1438 (Jan. 30, 1964) (statement of Floor Manager Sen. 
Long). 
143. 1969 House Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 8, at 1598-99 (statement of Assistant Sec'y 
Stanley Surrey) 
144. !d. 
145. !d. 
146. !d. 
14 7. II 0 CoNG. REc., pt. 2, at S 1438 (Jan. 30, 1964) (statement of Floor Manager Sen. 
Long). For a debunking of the bunching myth, see supra note 50 (1920' and 1930's capital 
gains realization concentrated at the top brackets) and Lee, supra note 13, at 40-50. 
148. PRESIDENT's 1963 TAX MESSAGE, supra note 120, at 26. The anticipated increase in 
revenue would have arisen primarily from the elimination of the ability to avoid ail capital 
gains by holding assets until death. The increased volume of realizations would yield 
approximately $700 miiiion per year in additional revenues for a net increase of $100 
miiiion per year. !d. at 26. 
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Kennedy Administration opposed the aforementioned notion of two classes 
of stock compromise the House had passed, but without taxation at death of 
unrealized appreciation. 149 The Senate (and the Conference Committee) 
agreed, rejecting the flawed House capital gains provisions with its quid 
without the quo. The end result was continuation of the 1954 Code's 25 
percent flat rate for the upper income, 50 percent deduction for the 
moderate income taxpayer, the special interest add-on of capital assets 
(e.g., coal, timber, livestock and, iron ore), and a step-up in basis at death 
of capital assets. 
The Surrey/JFK capital gains reform attempt, and hence the Mills Tax 
Policy Hearings in this context, thus came to naught because it had united 
in opposition all of the interest groups underlying the Conservative 
Coalition on capital gains. Aiding this process was the fact that Chair Mills 
was so obsessed with obtaining consensus in his Ways and Means 
Committee and victory on the floor, that its bills were more conservative 
than Congress as a whole. 150 Additionally, Secretary Dillon, who was 
demanded by Congress to present President Kennedy's tax proposals 
instead of the theoretician Surrey, was overly willing to concede at least the 
capital gains definitional reforms. 151 Even though Mills was personally 
convinced of the merits of capital gains definitional simplification, 152 the 
Committee in 1963 only restricted the proposed additional capital gains 
149. See supra note 125. Secretary Dillon also criticized the House 2-step arrangement 
and 2 maximum rates, see supra note 130, as seriously complicating the capital gains 
portion ofthe tax return and the Code. !d. at 129. 
150. BARBER. CONABLE, CONGRESS AND THE INCOME TAX 19-20 (1989) ("[S]ince Wilbur 
was a legislative psychologist who waited for the committee to make up its mind and then 
positioned himself at the head of the column, the result was that the Ways and Means 
Committee came to have a consensus that was much more conservative than was the case 
with the majority of the Democratic party in the House."). 
151. Former Commissioner Morty Caplin recounted the story of this Congressional 
demand at a social event at Ed Cohen's house following a Virginia Tax Conference. Rep. 
John W. Byrnes, R-Wis., announced to Secretary Dillon at the beginning ofthe 1963 House 
Hearings "that the greater part of the proposed structural reforms had better be put in deep 
freeze if we are going to get a tax bill this year." 1963 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 
534. Indeed, when Secretary Dillon conceded that the proposed elimination of coal 
royalties from capital gains treatment was probably the smallest "suggestion in the whole 
bill," Rep. Howard Baker, R-Tenn., quipped: "and could well be put in Mr. Byrnes' 'deep-
freeze."' Secretary Dillon responded, "I don't think the bill would suffer if that happened." 
/d. at 607. 
152. See supra note 130. 
36 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:1 
preference to classic capital assets. Further, Mills did not favor taxation of 
unrealized appreciation at death. 153 
2. Surrey Papers and Tax Reform Act of 1969: Surrogate Limitations on 
the Capital Gains Preference 
In 1968, Surrey, continuing as Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax 
Policy under President Johnson, designed a different approach to tax 
reform of capital gains and other areas. Surrey's approach, which included 
surrogate limitations aimed at the effect of tax "preferences" or 
"expenditures"154 rather than at the cause, 155 was backed up by a 
complicated allocation of deduction provisions that Surrey wrote of in the 
landmark TREASURY DEPARTMENT, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND 
PROPOSALS, which came to be known as the "Surrey Papers." 156 
153. 1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 118, at 55-59. 
154. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, pts. 1-4 (Comm. 
Print 1969) [herein~fter Surrey Papers] (prepared in 1968 and published in 1969); Joseph J. 
Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 TAX NOTES 1359, 1362 (Dec. 27, 1987); Sylvia 
Porter, Your Income Tax, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1969, at B-1 ("the most sweeping blueprint 
for tax reform ever to come out of government"). Text accompanying infra notes 154-67 
sketches the Strange Political Story of (a) President Lyndon Johnson refusing to publish the 
Surrey Papers despite a Congressional directive to do, and (b) really short-term Secretary of 
Treasury Joseph Barr's letting several cats out of the tax bag by (i) handing over the Surrey 
tax studies to the incoming Secretary of Treasury in the first Nixon Administration, and (ii) 
revealing to a Congressional Committee that 155 "millionaires" had paid no federal income 
taxes in 1967 and explaining to it the role played by tax preferences (especially the capital 
gains preference). Mostly likely this explains the publishing of Treasury Studies jointly by 
the House Ways & Means Committee headed by powerful Chair Wilbur Mills in his finest 
hour in 1969, having directed tax reform studies often with hearings with invited witnesses 
only in the first four or five years following enactment of the 1954 Code, and the Senate 
Finance Committee. The Committee Print stated that the document had not been considered 
by either Committee and was "being printed for information purposes only so as to make it 
available." !d. pt. I, supra at p. i. Professor Stanley Surrey had frequently appeared in 
Mill's reform hearings. See, e.g., notes 116-19 supra. 
155. "Stanley S. Surrey, a lawyer, contributed a new view of the selective tax 
preferences in the law [i.e., departures from a uniform or ideal tax base]. He likened the tax 
savings from a preference for a particular purpose, say encouraging business investment, to 
a government outlay for the same purpose. Thus was coined the term, 'tax expenditures.'" 
Minarik, supra note 154, at 1361; see generally Barry Forman, Origins of the Tax 
Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537 (Feb. I 0, 1986). Senator Jacob Javits, R-NY, 
argued that a list of tax expenditures should be part of Treasury data. 1969 House Hearings 
pt. 4, supra note 8, at 2358 (statement of Sen. Javits). "This concept was institutionalized 
on an illustrative basis in the federal budget in the mid-1960s [sic, mid-1970s ], and has had 
a powerful influence on virtually all deliberations on the Federal income tax ever since." 
Minarik, supra note 154, at 1361. 
156. The Surrey Papers computed the minimum tax base by adding back to taxable 
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Surely reflecting the 1963-64 experience, the Surrey Papers did not 
tighten the capital gains definition, but did include "Supplementary 
Material" as to the tax treatment of timber and real estate. 157 They 
documented the concentration of preference in high income individuals and 
corporate taxpayers along with other inequities, including the relative 
inefficiency of "recapture" of depreciation under Section 1250.158 Similar 
to the 1963 JFK capital gains proposals, the Surrey Papers proposed taxing 
unrealized capital gains at death. 159 The author suspects that Surrey knew 
that this proposal would go nowhere in Congress at this time 
notwithstanding the support of some liberals. 160 If so, he was right. 161 
The Surrey Papers also addressed the other side of the capital gains 
problem: artificially high nominal ordinary income rates that seldom 
actually applied. When they did apply, they presented substantial 
horizontal inequity162 as Senator Long had pointed out on the Senate Floor 
in 1964.163 The Surrey Papers would have applied an optional, alternative 
maximum 50 percent tax to an expanded tax base substantially identical to 
income (in the order of revenue importance) (1) one-half of net long-term capital gain, (2) 
tax-exempt interest, (3) charitable contributions of appreciated property, and (4) percentage 
depletion in excess of cost depletion. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at II 0 (ranking 
of items reducing taxes for high income taxpayers); id., pt. 2, at 136-40 (minimum tax 
base). Surrey proposed a graduated minimum tax rate of 7% to 35% (roughly parallel to 
half of graduated rates under the regular rates), limited to a maximum rate of 25 percent in 
the case of unrealized appreciation in capital assets taxed at death. !d., pt. 2, at 141-42. 
!57. The Surrey Papers pointed out (as Sen. Long had noted in 1964) that the wealthy 
with large amounts (and percentages) of capital gains income often achieved substantially 
lower effective rates than the 25 percent alternate maximum capital gains rate by offsetting 
or "sheltering" the taxable income remaining after the 50 percent capital gains deduction 
with other deductions. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 84-86; id., pt. 2, at 142-45. 
Therefore, Surrey's Treasury proposed that non-business deductions be allocated between 
taxable income and the more common sources of tax exempt income and only the former 
portion be allowed as a deduction. !d., pt. 2, at 145-46. 
158. !d., pt. 2, at 434-58. 
159. !d., pt. I, at 118-19; id., pt. 2, at 334-51. 
160. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 2, at 2121 (Jan. 9, 1968) (statement of Rep. Reuss); see also 
id., pt. 8, at H9956 (Apr. 22, 1969) (statement of Rep. Hanley). 
161. H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. I, at 2 (1969) ("[Y]our committee found that the time 
available did not permit the inclusion of reform measures relating to the revision of the 
estate and gift tax laws or the related problem of the tax treatment of property passing at 
death."). 
162. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 172 (29 percent of individuals with adjusted 
gross income of $500,000 or more would pay more than 50 percent of their true income in 
taxes). See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text. 
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the alternative mmrmum tax base (plus the value of any stock options 
exercised during the tax year in excess of the option price). 164 The 
articulated purpose was to reduce the incentive to use tax loopholes. 165 
Thus, with the minimum tax raising the effective rate of high income 
individuals for capital gains to a 35 percent range, and the maximum tax 
lowering the maximum rate on ordinary income to 50 percent (if no 
preferences were present), Surrey would have achieved his agenda of a 
decade and a half earlier. 
President Lyndon Johnson refused to release the Surrey Tax Reform 
Studies and Proposals even though Congress had directed him to submit 
specific tax reform proposals by the end of 1968. 166 On January 17, 1969 
just three days prior to President Richard Nixon taking office, Treasury 
Secretary Barr (who held office just eighteen days) warned of a "taxpayer's 
revolt" pointing to the 155 individuals with adjusted gross incomes of 
$200,000 or more-$1,522,000 in 2004 dollars (including 25 with incomes 
topping $1,000,000)- who paid no federal income tax in 1967; and handed 
the Surrey Papers over to Treasury Secretary-Designate Kennedy. 167 
164. Surrey Papers, pt. 2, supra note 154, at 172. 
165. Porter, supra note 154; cf H.R. REP. No. 413, at 208 ("The 50-percent limit on the 
tax rate applicable to earned income was adopted not as a tax relief measure but to reduce 
the pressure for the use of tax loopholes."). 
166. On December 31, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson formally advised Congress of 
the existence of the Treasury Tax Reform Studies and Proposals and of his decision to make 
no recommendations to Congress in light of his leaving office in January 1969. Surrey 
Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at iii. See Congressionally Initiated Tax Reform Bill Enacted, 
25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 596 (1969); 1969 House Hearings, pt. 7, supra note 8, at 2358 
(statement of Sen. Javits ). 
167. Porter, supra note 154. See 115 CONG. REC., pt. 7, H22562 (1969) (statement of 
House Ways and Means Chair Wilbur Mills); accord, Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings on 
HR. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Committee, pt. 26, 91 st Cong. 35484 (1969) 
[hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings] (statement of Senate Finance Comm. Chair, Russell 
Long); Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on HR. 10612 Before the Senate Finance 
Committee, pt. 4, 94th Cong. 1004-05 (1976) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearings] (statement 
of former Undersecretary Walker) (constituent ire ignited by Barr revelation in January 
exploded with the addition of the Vietnam War gasoline surtax on April 1969 returns). 
The real problem was not the zero tax millionaires, most of whom had non-abusive 
causes for paying no taxes as Assistant Secretary Cohen pointed out. 1969 House Hearings, 
pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5486-87 (statement of Assistant Sec'y Ed Cohen); see also 1969 
Senate Hearings, supra at 639-40 (1969) (colloquy between Assistant Sec 'y of the Treasury 
for Tax Policy Ed Cohen and Sen. Williams, R-Del.). The story improved with the telling. 
122 CONG. REC. Sl8814, pt. 15 (June 17, 1976) (statement of Chair Long, D-La.). In my 
opinion, the real problem was the lower effective rates on the upper income taxpayers as a 
whole. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
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The 1969 House Hearings revealed a split on capital gains between two 
sides. The first was comprised of academic and labor witnesses and 
Members of Congress favoring some of the following capital gains 
reforms: extending the holding period to one year; repealing the alternative 
25 percent rate; taxing unrealized appreciation at death; allowing only 
deduction of 50 percent of capital losses against ordinary income; 
tightening up capital asset definitions; tightening up tax-free exchanges; 
and even substituting income averaging for a percentage exclusion. 168 
Their oppsition consisted of conservative economists, stock exchange 
representatives and investor group witnesses who favored the status quo; 
advocated an increased preference along the 1920's lines with shorter 
holding periods and a special interest repeal of depreciation recapture; and 
only rarely called for channeling the preference by tightening the definition 
or adopting a 1930's sliding scale-like holding period. 169 Both sides by-
and-large rehashed arguments raised in the Mills tax policy Hearings over 
the previous decade. Responding to the Surrey Papers' strong criticism of 
168. See, e.g., 1969 House Hearings, pt. 12, supra note 8, at 4269 (statement of former 
Rep. Schmidhauser); id. at 4318-19 (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. at 4189 (statement of 
Rep. Addabbo); id. at 4471, 4474-75 (statement of Rep. Adams); id., pt. 12, at 4536 
(statement of Stanford Research Inst. Prof. Throop Smith); id. at 4267 (statement of Colum. 
Prof. Shoup); id., pt. 13, at 5001 (statement of Penn. Prof. Bernard Wolfman); id., pt. 12, at 
4263 (H & R Block Pres. Block); id., pt. 13, at 4891-92 (statement of Stanford Ross, Esq.); 
id., pt. 8, at 3087-90 (statement of Reuben Clark, Esq.); id., pt. 13, at 4602 (statement of 
UA W President Reuther). 
169. E.g., 1969 House Hearings, pt. 12, supra note 8, at 4253-54 (statement of Norman 
Ture, economist). 
40 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:1 
capital gains for timber royalties, 170 timber interests were especially well-
represented in the capital gains discussion. 171 
House Ways and Means Committee Chair Mills was unwilling to wait 
for a comprehensive survey promised by the Nixon Administration by 
November 30, 1969. 172 In marathon executive sessions, the Committee 
reported out a bill, and won its passage in the House before the summer 
recess to the amazement of friends and foes alike. 173 The House bill 
170. The Surrey Papers critiqued capital gains for timber royalties, focusing on the 
heavy concentration in a handful of corporations. Sixteen of the largest timber and plywood 
corporations had more than 50 percent of their income from timber royalties, as compared to 
the overall corporate pattern of only five percent of income from capital gains. The five 
largest wood processing corporations had half of their corporate capital gains from timber, 
with the largest corporation enjoying 25 percent of the total corporate timber royalties. 
Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 140 and id., pt. 3, at 434-38, respectively. The 
Surrey Papers also argued that the tax benefit of timber (and coal) royalties 
disproportionately went to high income individuals. "Of the 43,977 taxable [1962] returns 
with net gain or loss from timber and coal, 3,427 returns had adjusted gross income of 
$25,000 or more [about $155,000 in 2004 dollars, and] ... reported 25.4 percent of the 
gross gains." !d., pt. 3, at 435. In fact this was the mirror image of stock transactions where 
75 percent of the gains were concentrated above that level. See table for net long-term 
capital gains, supra note 133. In any event, undoubtedly reflecting the 1963-64 experience, 
the Surrey Papers made no explicit recommendation as to timber royalties. 
171. The members of the Ways and Means Committee appeared particularly well-
coached, and were sent to stage colloquies with public witnesses, to "establish" that (I) 
timber needed the capital gains preference because of the long time it took for a stand of 
forest to mature (twenty to fifty even seventy years) and the resulting low rate of return, 
E.g., 1969 House Hearings, pt. 8, supra note 8, at 2859 (statement of Collett); (2) such 
preference supported reforestation, which began to grow only after the introduction of 
capital gains for timber royalties in 1943; e.g., id. at 2903 (statement of Rep. Dorn); id. at 
2949 (statement of Dr. Zivnuska, Dean of School of Forestry and Conservation, University 
of California); and (3) encouraged scientific management, development, and practices, e.g., 
id. at 2875-76 (colloquy between Rep. Landrum, D-Ga., and Collet and Langdale); id. at 
2878 (colloquy between Rep. Ullman, D-Ore., and Collet). But timber's case was hurt a 
little by the fact that a supply pinch had recently resulted in substantial price increases, 
which particularly disturbed Congressmen with ties to developers, id. at 2878-79 (Rep. Joel 
Broyhill, R-Va.). But see id. at 2822 (statement of Rep. Wyatt) (increase would have been 
more without capital gains preference); id. at 2881 (colloquy between Rep. Watts, D-Ky., 
and Collet). More significantly, questioning drew out that the capital gains tax savings 
ranged from I 0 percent to 20 percent of profits, id. at 2894-95 (colloquy between Rep. 
Schneebeli and Stewart and Bendetsen); timber producers often bought mature stands, id. at 
2899 (colloquy between Rep. Barber Conable, R-N.Y., and Bendetsen); and much of the 
timber harvested came from stands owned by the Federal Government and managed by the 
Forestry Service, id. at 2896 (statement of Bendetsen). 
172. See 1969 House Hearings, pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5529 (colloquy between Rep. 
John W. Byrnes, R-Ill., and Undersecretary Charles Walker and Assistant Sec'y Edwin 
Cohen); Porter, supra note 154. 
173. /d. 
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generally erected two lines of defense against preferences: direct curbs and 
surrogate limitations. 174 For capital gains, the House bill eliminated the 25 
percent alternative maximum rate, imposed a 50 percent limit on the 
amount of long-term capital losses deductible against ordinary income (to 
parallel the then 50 percent deduction on long-term gains), lengthened the 
holding period to one year, and pared the definition of capital gains slightly 
(eliminating capital gains treatment of collections of letters and 
memoranda, of lump sum distributions, and transfers of franchises in 
certain circumstances). 175 It also imposed a minimum tax that would have 
impacted more than 80 percent on the individual capital gains preference. 176 
Witnesses testifying on the minimum tax (as contained in the Surrey 
Papers) at the 1969 House Hearings either (a) favored it; 177 (b) would 
strengthen it; 178 (c) were "sympathetic," but suggested alternatives; 179 or 
174. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22564 (1969) (statement of Chair Mills). A number of 
Members of Congress called for such surrogate approaches. !d., pt. 10, at 12712 (statement 
of Rep. Bertram Podell, 0-N.Y.); id., pt. 13, at 17855 (statement of Rep. Joshua Eilberg, 0-
Pa.). For an outstanding discussion of the policy of direct versus surrogate approaches to 
tax shelters among the leading academicians, former Treasury officials and tax 
administrators of the time, see Panel Discussions on Tax Reform (Invited Panelists) Before 
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
175. H.R. 13270 91st Cong., §§ 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516(c), 1st Sess. (1969); see 
H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 1, supra note 161, at 144-64. 
176. H.R. 13270, supra note 175, at§ 301; H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 161, at 77-80. 
The House bill included as tax preference items both the 50 percent individual long-term 
capital gains deduction and tax-exempt interest. At the time, the Treasury knew that the 
individual minimum tax would mostly tax capital gains. See 1969 House Hearings, pt. 14, 
supra note 8, at 5524 (statement of Undersecretary of Treasury Walker). See infra note 221. 
177. E.g., id., pt. 5, supra note 8, at 1793 (statement of Rep. McCarthey, 0-N.Y.); id. at 
1802 (Statement of Rep. Ed Koch, 0-N.Y.). 
178. !d., pt. 5, at 1776-77 (statement of former Comm'r Mortimer Caplin) (sound 
beginning, strongly supported by late Senator Robert Kennedy, 0-N.Y., and owing much to 
Senator Long's work, but should include accelerated depreciation and intangible drilling 
costs); id., pt. 7, at 2356 (statement of Sen. Javits, R-N.Y.); id., pt. 12, at 4204-06 
(statement of former Comm'r Sheldon Cohen) (it is unrealistic to assume that all 
preferences giving rise to inequities can be corrected over the short run. The minimum tax, 
however, prevents preferences from becoming tax escape routes, and should be strengthened 
as Caplin and Javits recommend); id. at 4333 (Written statement of George Meany, AFLI 
CIO) (if one can not immediately tax exempt and partially exempt income, e.g., impose a 25 
percent rate on preferences, including capital gains, tax-exempt interest, appreciation in 
charitable contributions, and accelerated depreciation except as to low-income housing); and 
id., pt. 13, at 4590 (Statement of Walter Reuther, UA W) (the most serious defect is too 
generous: a 50 percent ceiling on income can be sheltered; a rate should be 75 percent of the 
existing graduated rate). 
179. !d., pt. 12, supra note 8, at 4319 (statement of Rep. Bingham, 0- N.Y.) (it should be 
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opposed it. A consensus of academics who favored directly attacking the 
underlying abusesi 80 and special interest representatives, claimed that the 
underlying abuses should be examined.I 8I A lobbyist for the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce presciently argued that the new tax intended to obtain 
revenue from relatively small numbers of persons would expand in burden 
and scope until virtually all taxpayers come under a gross receipts tax.I 82 
Its current incarnation (the individual Alternative Minimum Tax) covers 3 
percent of taxpayers today but is projected to cover 30 percent by 2010.I83 
Representative George H.W. Bush complained that the individual side 
cuts were to be paid for under the House bill in large part by tax increases 
on the corporate side. I84 He also argued that the total individual side 
the final safeguard if all else fails, and should supplement efforts to directly close tax 
loopholes); id., pt. 14, at 5484-85 (Statement of Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy Cohen) (tax 
preference income should not include tax exempt income or capital gains preference; the 
former because of Justice Department questions as to constitutionality, and the latter 
because it could raise the capital gains effective rate to 35 percent). 
180. !d., pt. 9, supra note 8, at 3409 (statement of Yale Prof. Wright) (imperfect 
substitute for a direct attack on special tax privileges enjoyed by extractive industries); id., 
pt. 12, at 4255 (statement of Norman Ture) (reflects conviction that a frontal attack on 
preferences is doomed to fail, and attempts a backdoor approach. This approach leaves out 
as many troublesome items as are included, and would complicate the system. It sweeps 
under the carpet some of the most serious issues of Federal tax policy); id. at 4269 
(statement ofColum. Prof. Shoup) (prefers continuous rigorous examination one-by-one of 
each preference; a minimum tax would slow if not stop efforts at specific reforms); id. at 
4290 (statement of Wis. Profs. David and Miller) (misdirected and obscured real tax issues 
while making only token changes in current inequities). 
181. !d., pt. 8, supra note 8, at 3028 (statement of John Davidson, The Tax Council) 
(solve abuses at the source, but advocated for lower capital gains rate-the chief preference 
lowering effective rate of high income individuals; id., pt. 12, at 4516-17 (statement of 
George Koch, Council of State Chambers of Commerce) (reexamine the validity of 
preferences rather than the backdoor approach); id., pt. 12, at 4388 (statement of William 
Barnes, Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants) (same; and would further complicate the 
presently over-complicated system); see also id., pt. 14, at 5530 (statement of Rep. John W. 
Byrnes, R-Wis.) ("!have always been somewhat concerned that, if we put our emphasis on 
those proposals in the first instance, we may not focus the necessary attention on the 
individual preferences."). 
182. !d., pt. 12, at 4388 (statement of Walker Winter, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
183. IRS, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE'S 2003 ANNUAL 
REPORT 5-6 (Dec. 31, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_1-15-042.pdf (last accessed Apr. 2, 2005); see also 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, AN OVERVIEW OF ITS 
RATIONALE AND IMPACT ON [ND!VlDUAL TAXPAYERS (Aug., 2000), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00180.pdf (last accessed Apr. 2, 2005). 
184. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22584 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of Rep. George H.W. 
Bush, R-Tex.) ("Furthermore, I would ask, have we, in this legislation, affected the proper 
balance between investment and consumption? Much of the revenue gain distributed to the 
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package, as in the Revenue Act of 1964, was skewed to low and moderate 
income taxpayers. 185 House Conservatives supported the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 because of tax relief, not because of tax reform. 186 House Liberals 
supported it because of limitations on preferences. 187 With one exception, 
this bi-partisan coalition was able to prevent the Conservative Coalition in 
the House from emerging on the Tax Reform Act of 1969.188 
Representative George H.W. Bush, R-Tex., had the gall to cloak his 
opposition to the minimum tax in the mantle of the small, black business 
person189 when actually 80 percent of its impact would fall on capital gains 
sales of public stock held by the rich. 190 In contrast, Senator Jacob Javits, 
R-N.Y., laid out a rationale (besides symbolic reform) to not directly attack 
taxpayer by the tax cut is coming from corporations."). 
185. !d., pt. 17, at 22567 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of House Ways and Means Comm. 
Chair Mills). 
186. !d. at 22582, 22768-69 (Aug. 6 and 7, 1969, respectively) (statement of Rep. 
George H.W. Bush, R-Tex.) (also decried "trend towards centralization"). Bush ultimately 
voted against the House bill on August 7, 1969. 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 611. Bush had 
earlier criticized the 1969 Ways and Means Committee Report as eroding the difference 
between capital and income, and opposed lengthening of the holding period, repeal of 
individual maximum 25 percent capital gains rate and inclusion of the capital gains 
deduction in the limitation on tax preferences, and the allocation of deduction provisions. 
H.R. Rep. No. 413, supra note 161, at 225. 
187. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22572-73 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of Rep. James C. 
Corman, D-Cal.); id. at 22796 (Aug. 7, 1969) (statement of Rep. John S. Monagan, D-
Conn.). 
188. 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at I 054 ("In the House, the coalition appeared only once in 
connection with the tax reform bill."). 
189. 1969 House Hearings, pt. 5, supra note 8, at 1805 (Rep. George Bush, R-Tex.) 
("[U]nless we can find some way around that the small businessman gets clobbered, he gets 
$10,000 gross income and he suffers a $15,000 loss of some sort, business doesn't go well, 
he is just struggling along in the ghetto getting started, say under one of those small business 
programs, that he should be taxed with a minimum tax on him regardless of the fact that he 
is struggling to get a business started under say a black capitalism approach."). As 
President, George H.W. Bush became known for his "choppy" sentences and "fractured 
syntax." A.L. May, Jobs to Get Top Priority, Clinton Says; He Names Advisory Team for 
"High Gear" Transition, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 13, 1992, at A-1; Charles-Gene 
McDaniel, The Truth About Arkansas, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at 42; Paul Richter, 
The President-elect: Just the Average Joe (Or Bill); Personality: A Golf Duffer Who's Often 
Tardy and Battles His Weight, Clinton Has Share of Human Foibles, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 
1992, at A-1; Michael Kranish, Day of Decision; Emotions run high in Bush finale; 
Campaign '92, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1992, at I. 
190. See infra note 221. George Bush represented a district in Houston, Texas, later 
represented by Bill Archer, R-Tex., at which time it would be the 6th most wealthy 
congressional districts in the nation. See David E. Rosenbaum, With a Passion for Tax Cuts, 
and in Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A-I. 
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preferences popularly called loopholes, and reduce them in the light of the 
new standards of fairness and equity: 
[S]ome of these preferences may be found desirable for retention for 
social or economic reasons. When a taxpayer is in a position to take 
advantage of a great number of these preferences at one time . . . the 
resulting cumulative effect is the real inequity in our tax system. 
Therefore, I urge ... as an interim step ... [that] we establish a minimum 
tax below which tax liabilities would not be permitted by reason of the 
preferences or loopholes to which I have referred. 191 
The witnesses at the Senate Finance Hearings on the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 addressing capital gains reform overwhelmingly opposed the 
House-passed reforms, particularly the repeal of the alternative 25 percent 
capital gains rate, the lengthening of the holding period, and the elimination 
of capital gains for lump-sum distributions from qualified retirement 
plans. 192 Those witnesses not opposing the House capital gains proposals 
generally thought that they did not go far enough, and should reach 
unrealized capital appreciation at death, relying on the distributive effects 
of a capital gains preference. 193 Moreover, the vocal Committee members, 
191. 1969 House Hearings, pt. 7, supra note 8, at 2356 (Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y.). See 
also Hearings on High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partnership Tax Issues before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways & Means Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 
(1985) (Assistant Sec 'y for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman); cf Hearings on Tax Shelters, 
Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms before the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1984) (Chapoton, Assistant Sec'y for Tax 
Policy). Another liberal rationale offered later was that reliance on the minimum tax rather 
than increased capital gains rates (in response to the charge that the 50 percent capital gains 
deduction constituted at least 80 percent of the individual tax preference items) added 
progressivity by increasing the effective rate on capital gains income only for higher income 
individuals. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, 20239 (June 24, 1976) (statement of Sen. Walter 
Mondale, D-Minn.). A conservative Senator scathingly replied that the minimum tax was 
imposed, because Congress could not "find any other way to get to capital gains." /d. at 
20244 (statement of Sen. William Brock, R-Tenn.). 
192. E.g., 1969 Senate Hearings,pt. 3, supra note 167, at 955 (statements of Philip H. 
Wielke, Rural-Small Town, Small City Coalition, Inc.); id. at 979-80 (Charles Stewart, 
Pres. Mach. & Allied Prod's Inst.); id. at 1011-12 (Colum. Prof. of Econ. Saulnier); id. at 
1018 ; (John Higgins, Chair Tax Comm. of Amer. Textile Mfrs. Inst.); id. at 1882-84 
(statements of NYSE Pres. Haack); id. at 1904 (Merrill Lynch Pres. Donald Regan); id. at 
1910 (Roland Bixler, Chair, the Tax Counsel); id. at 1923 (Gibraltar Growth Fund Pres. 
Ehlers); id. at 1975 (Sears, Roebuck and Co. Pres. Wood); id. at 1986 (Council of Profit-
Sharing Indus. Chair Geisecke); id. at 2001 (William Drake and Henry Rothschild, Am. 
Pension Conference). 
193. !d., pt. 2, at 918 (Phillip Stem, Nat'! Comm. on Tax Justice); id., pt. 3, at 1928-31, 
1941-43 (Statements ofNaval Acad. and U. Md. Econ. Prof. Hinrichs and Minn. Law Prof. 
Waterbury) (showed capital gains preference biggest source of inequity causing effective 
rate above $1 ,000,000 annual income to drop and advocated eliminating preference and 
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particularly Chair Long, 194 were predisposed to view the House provisions 
as disincentives to investment. Not surprisingly, the Senate Finance 
Committee retreated on both direct and indirect capital gains tax reform by 
limiting the 25 percent alternative capital gains rate to $140,000 of net 
long-term capital gains provided that other preference income did not 
exceed $10,000; restoring the six month holding period; and imposing only 
a 5 percent minimum tax on tax preference items,195 which included the 
capital gains preference. 
On the Floor, the Senate gutted the minimum tax on tax preferences by 
providing an offset for ordinary income taxes paid,196 which reduced the 
potential revenue by more than 60 percent. 197 This offset required the 
imposing taxation at death, substituting averaging and using revenues to reduce rate on 
ordinary income to maximum rate of 40 percent to 50 percent, since no progressivity in 
practice anyway) and (Minn. Law Prof. Waterbury), respectively. 
194. E.g., id., pt. 3, at 1957 (statement of Sen. Robert Bennett, R-Utah, Senate Finance 
Comm. Member); id., pt. 3, at 1905-06 (statement of Sen. Long, D-La.) (House changes 
would cause capital to move to Canada where no capital gains tax), 1913 (lower capital 
gains rates would induce greater investments). 
195. S. REP. No. 552, supra note 103, at 113, 192-93, 200. 
196. The Senators raised the alternative minimum tax rate to 10 percent, but the rate 
increase was more than offset by the Miller amendment adding to the $30,000 trigger an 
alternative floor of the regular income taxes paid for the year. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 28, at 
38297 (Dec. 10, 1969) (statement of Sen. Jack Miller, R-Iowa). The Senate Finance 
Committee provision would have raised $700 million; the Miller amendment was estimated 
to pick up $740 million; id. at 38298 (Statement of Sen. Miller). Subsequent events, 
however, showed that the Miller amendment in fact gutted at least the individual minimum 
tax. The Conservative Coalition defeated an amendment by Senator Vance Hartke, D-Ind., 
which would have reduced the taxes offset by 50 percent. !d. at 38315 (Rollcall vote 52 nays 
to 31 yeas). See 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 38-S (Republicans 35-1, Northern Democrats 23-
8, and Southern Democrats 14-2). Technically the Conservative Coalition did not arise as to 
the Miller amendment itself, because the Congressional Quarterly definition requires that a 
majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats vote one way while a majority of 
Northern Democrats vote the other. See text accompanying supra note 65. On the Miller 
amendment a majority of all three groups voted yea. See 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 38-S 
(Republicans 35-1, Northern Democrats 23-8 and Southern Democrats 14-2). 
The Conservative Coalition also defeated amendments by Senator Edward 
Kennedy, D-Mass., which would have added unrealized appreciation in charitable 
contributions to the tax preference items, and would have substituted a four-bracket 
graduated minimum tax schedule (as proposed in the Surrey Papers) in lieu of the five 
percent rate reported out by the Senate Finance Committee. 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 34-S. 
197. This offset came to be known as the "Executive Suite" loophole to tax reformers. 
See 122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, 20206 (June 24, 1976) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale, D-
Minn.); id. at 20209, 20225 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.). The Miller 
amendment, by providing an offset to the minimum tax base for regular income taxes paid, 
"substantially cut the effectiveness of the minimum tax." 121 CONG. REC., pt. 29, 38291 
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Senate to raise the minimum tax rate to 10 percent and include corporations 
in order to approach the projected revenues from the House version. 198 The 
Senate minimum tax provision prevailed in Conference. In the end 
Congress enacted an extremely watered down version of Surrey's 
minimum tax on tax preferences199 (which principally applied to the capital 
gains preference (80 percent or so of the individual tax preference items )200 
and limited the alternative 25 percent maximum capital gains ceiling to 
$50,000 of annual capital gain.201 
The justification for the individual mmrmum tax was "fairness" or 
horizontal equity (i.e., all similarly situated taxpayers bear equal tax 
burdens).202 Existing tax law with high rates on ordinary income and a 
deep capital gains preference of a maximum rate of 25 percent resulted in 
large variations in the tax burdens placed on taxpayers who received 
different kinds of income.203 In general, high-income individuals earning 
(Dec. 3, 1975) (statement of Rep. James C. Connan, D-Cal.) ("'n 1969, it was predicted that 
the minimum tax for individuals would yield about $300 million annually, but in 1973 it 
yielded only a disappointing $180 million."). The regular income tax offset accounted "for 
about half of the gap between the minimum tax's nominal rate of I 0 percent and the 
effective rate of 4.4 percent. ... It shelters tax loopwhole [sic] income of more than $2.5 
billion that would otherwise be taxable at a minimum rate." 1d., pt. 30, at 38678 (Dec. 4, 
1975) (statement of Rep. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa). It enabled 55 percent of the taxpayers 
otherwise subject to the minimum tax to escape it. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, 20206 (June 24, 
1976) (Statement of Sen. Mondale). Under the above figures, had the $2.5 billion of 
preference income been subject to the I 0% minimum tax, the total revenue from the 
individual sector from the preference tax would have been $250 million greater, or $530 
million. Thus, the effectiveness was reduced by about 60%. 
198. The House Bill would have increased tax liabilities by $40 million in 1970 and $85 
million a year when fully effective, half from taxpayers with incomes of $50,000 and over. 
H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 161, at 80. The Cohen Treasury Proposal would have raised 
$80 million a year when effective, but the big revenue raiser, as in the House bill, would 
have been the allocation of deductions provision - $500 million a year. 1969 House 
Hearings, pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5527-28 (statement of Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy 
Edwin Cohen). The Senate 5% minimum tax as reported out by the Finance Committee 
would have raised $380 miiiion a year from corporations and $320 million from individuals 
when fully effective (the allocation of deductions provisions was dropped). S. REP. 552, 
supra note I 03, at 118. 
199. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22564 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of Chair Mills). A 
number of Members of Congress caiied for such surrogate approaches. 1d., pt. I 0, at 12712 
(May 15, 1969) (statement of Rep. Bertram Podell, D-N.Y.); id., pt. 13, at 17855 (June 30, 
1969) (statement of Rep. Joshua Eilberg, D-Pa.). 
200. See infra note 221. 
201. Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 301, 511, 83 .Stat. at 580-85, 636-37. 
202. See 1969 House Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 8 and S. REP. No. 552, supra note I 03, 
at 112. 
203. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 81-82, 88, 95-98. 
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the bulk of their income from personal services were taxed at high effective 
rates (60 to 65 percent) near the nominal top rates; meanwhile, those who 
reported the bulk of their income from capital gains or who could benefit 
from accelerated depreciation on real estate paid relatively low rates of tax 
(20 to 25 percent) primarily due to capital gains income.204 In fact, 
individuals with high incomes who could benefit from these provisions 
might pay lower average rates of tax than many individuals with modest 
. 205 
mcomes. 
For example, most taxpayers with incomes in the $20,000 to $50,000 
income class pay rates between 20 percent and 30 percent. Most taxpayers 
with incomes between $500,000 and $1 million also pay rates of 20 
percent; however, the latter group has, on the average, about twenty times 
the income of the former group. 
Another way of examining the favorable treatment of certain higher 
income tax returns is to observe that almost five of every ten returns with 
income ranging from $50,000 to $500,000 pays an effect rate of tax of less 
than 30 percent, while almost seven out of every ten returns with income 
from $500,000 to $1 million and about eight out of ten returns with income 
in excess of $1 million pay an average tax rate lower that than 30 percent. 
This runs contrary to the expected results of a nominally progressive tax 
rate schedule.206 
The splitting of the Conservative Coalition on capital gains in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 by the bi-partisan Liberal-Conservative Coalition was 
facilitated, if not driven, by (a) the popular outrage at zero tax millionaires 
arising from Treasury's disclosure very late in the lame duck Johnson 
Administration, 207 and (b) the Vietnam War surtax,208 enabling Chair Mills 
to direct the tax reform that he had been preparing for the previous fifteen 
years.209 Popular enthusiasm for change opened the way for the tax 
204. !d. at 82, 84, II 0. 
205. S. REP. No. 552, supra note I 033, at 122; Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 
96. 
206. !d. at 96-97. 
207. See 1969 Senate Hearings, pt. 26, supra note 167. In total, the disclosure indicated 
155 high-income zero-tax individual taxpayers including 22 millionaires. 
208. See id. I still remember filling out my first income tax return after law school. 
Calculating the tax, and adding I 0 percent for the "the Vietnam War surtax" provoked even 
more antipathy to that war (in which my brother Bob was then serving). 
209. On the House floor, Mills opened the debate on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
proclaiming that "this is the day that I have looked forward to for a long, long time." 115 
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reformers to side step reluctance to reform capital gains taxation by the 
Nixon Administration and the Senate Finance Chair.210 
The individual minimum tax initially served as a mere "excise or 
privilege tax" on the use of tax preferences.211 The low minimum tax rate, 
particularly the offset for regular income taxes paid, rendered the individual 
minimum tax on preferences only "symbolic reform."212 By publicizing the 
problem, but merely enacting a weakened surrogate technique, the 
reformers set the stage for endless further incremental revisions until true 
reform was reached, the problem went away, or tax transaction costs 
outweighed the tax benefits.213 Meanwhile, the populace became cynical 
about Federal taxes and changed perceptions about its faimess. 214 
B. 1970'S: SPECIAL INTERESTS FULLY UNCLOAKED AND FIRST 
APPEARANCE OF THE 28 PERCENT RATE 
1. Prelude to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 
In March 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee held extensive 
panel discussions and public hearings on tax reform, but did not report out 
a bill.215 In 1974, with the Nixon Administration severely weakened by the 
Watergate scandal, the impetus for tax reform shifted to Congress. From 
CONG. REC., pt. 17, at H22562 (statement of Chair Mills). 
210. Tax reform had not been among Nixon's top priorities, but initiative shifted to 
Congress where concerned legislators were inundated by irate mail from constituents 
protesting tax breaks for the rich. Porter, supra note 154. See also 115 CONG. REC., pt. I 7, 
at 22562. For Long's attitude, see 1969 Senate Hearings, pt. 3, supra note 167. 
211. See Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative 
Minimum Tax, 66 TAXES 91,92 n.9 (1988). 
212. See LEFF, supra note 61. 
213. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and 
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 946, 960--61 (1987). 
214. Thomas F. Field, The Emperor Has No Clothes, 101 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003) (the 
"public has lost faith in the claim that our tax system treats both rich and poor fairly. For a 
generation, tax reformers have highlighted the ability of wealthy taxpayers to successfully 
avoid their tax burdens. Simultaneously, tax planners have trumpeted their ability to reduce 
taxes through clever stratagem. Together they have convinced the public that 'only little 
people pay taxes."'). Reformers' exposes via the media may have opened the eyes of many 
to opportunities of such tax reductions. But cf Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality & 
Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 TAXES 91, 98 (1988) ("the significance of 
the connection between [publicized] tax avoidance and reduced compliance ... is far from 
clear"). 
215. Stanley Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEVELAND ST. L. 
REV. 303, 304 (1976). 
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late August 1974 to mid-September 1974 (bracketing President Nixon's 
August 9 resignation) the House Ways & Means Committee, as a follow-up 
to the 1973 Hearings, reached a number of tentative decisions in executive 
mark-up sessions. These included the alternative minimum tax and an 
additional sliding scale capital gains deduction, reminiscent of 1934 and 
1963, but only for securities, businesses and non-residential real estate of 1 
percent per year holding period up to 25 percent of the gain realized upon 
disposition.216 Chair Mills, reflecting political weakness resulting from 
scandals of his own, was unable to secure passage in the House of this 
double-dipping, sliding scale capital deduction regime.217 
In 1974, Representative AI Ullman, D-Ore., replaced Mills as Chair, 
and was also unable to achieve any capital gains legislation for a variety of 
reasons. 218 Yet proposals for (1) additional sliding scale capital gains 
deductions (or indexing of basis for inflation) and (2) differentiation 
between categories of capital gains assets were to resurface repeatedly over 
216. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
OF TENTATIVE DECISIONS FOR DRAFTING PURPOSES ON TAX REFORM PROPOSALS (Comm. 
Print Aug. 22, 1974) (ultimate annual revenue loss of $850 million, but in the next few 
years, revenue gains from an increase in realizations of locked-in capital gains). In the 1969 
House Hearings, Chair Mills had indicated a preference for a sliding scale, either applying 
to the entire gain, or working in conjunction with a 50 percent exclusion. This would 
account for inflation over a long period of time, 25 years for example. 1969 House 
Hearing, pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5524. 
217. See 39 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 4, I 0, 182 (1974). 
218. Surrey notes that the Committee had increased by 50 percent, with over half of all 
new members favoring tax reform, even thought they were unversed in tax matters. Surrey, 
supra note 215, at 303-04. Moreover, AI Ullman was a "decent man," but a weak Chair. 
See Peter Milius, Ullman shakes "Loser" Tag in Give-and-Take with Long, WASH. PosT, 
Sept. 13, 1976, at C7. Part of the problem was the shift from the Mills school of consensus 
building to a committee accountable to the majority party in the House. CONABLE, supra 
note 150, at 23. Conventional wisdom holds that AI Ullman, D-Ore., lost his re-election, 
notwithstanding his Chairmanship, due to his sponsoring the Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, 
H.R. 5665, 96th Cong. (1979), which would have integrated individual and corporate 
income taxes and imposed a I 0 percent value added tax on sales of property and services at 
each stage of the production and distribution process). Jane Seaberry, Treasury Dept. 
Releases VAT Study; Tax Called Close Contender to Plan Submitted by Regan, WASH. 
PosT, Dec. 22, 1984 at B I; Michael White, "Spreading the pain" tax reform will mean 
juggling "fairness," THE GUARDIAN (London), July 15, 1985. ("Everyone remembers the 
horrible fate of Rosty's predecessor, AI Ullman, voted out of office for backing VAT."); 
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Will U.S. Ever Adopt a Consumption Tax?, 93 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 238-S (1993). In any event, it soon died because the Secretary of Treasury opposed 
it and no other Committee members supported it. John Copelan, Burying the Income Tax?, 
95 TAX NOTES TODAY 171-52 (Aug. 31, 1995) 
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the ensuing decades.219 The other recurring capital gains taxation issues 
before Congress throughout the tumultuous 1970's were mostly carry-overs 
from the unfulfilled capital gains reform of the 1960's including: (3) the 
length of long-term capital gains holding period, ( 4) the treatment of capital 
losses, ( 5) the taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death (or the 
second best alternative of a carryover basis), and (6) the capital gains tax 
rate (including the minimum tax on tax preferences). 
2. Tax Reform Act of 1976: High Water Mark of first Wave ofTax 
Reform 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 enacted by the "Watergate Baby" 
C 220 b . 11 h d h . . 221 E. h ongress su stantla y strengt ene t e mmrmum tax. rg ty percent 
of the covered preferences for individuals consisted of the 50 percent long-
term capital gains deduction.222 Chair Russell Long, D-La., objected, 
219. After the window covered by this article, 1989, 1992 
220. Public Hearings and Panel Discussions on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes before 
the House Ways and Means Committee, pt. I, 94th Cong. (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Panel 
Discussions] (statement of Rep. Barber Conable) ("this is a very liberal Congress"); 1975 
Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at 1684, 1703 (statement of Sen. Carl Curtis and Sen. 
Long). See also Surrey, supra note 215, at 305 (Sen. Long in defending the Committee bill 
on the Senate floor "was pressed by a tax reform group better informed and more ably led 
than the Senate had seen before. The center of this activity was Senator Edward Kennedy, 
who ... coordinated a steady drumfire against the bill."). However, by-and-large the 
Liberal Coalition's amendments failed on the Senate floor, often to the Conservative 
Coalition, including an attempt to eliminate the minimum tax regular income tax offset. See 
32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 50-51 (1976). In a "rare victory for the liberals" they did defeat the 
Conservative Coalition, id. at 61, attempting to amend the Senate bill to provide an 
additional sliding scale deduction of I% a year up to twenty-five years with a maximum 
deduction of 75%. The coalition relied mostly on need for additional capital and mobility 
and to a lesser degree on inflation. 122 CONG. REC, pt. 21, at S26096-98, S26099-1 02 
(Aug. 6, 1976) (statement of Sen. Curtis, Sen. Charles Percy and Sen. Cliff Hansen). A 
Liberal Coalition, defeating the amendment 39 to 44 (Republicans and Southern Democrats 
supported it 23 to 7 and I 0 to 8, respectively, roll call vote 493, id. at S261 02, relied upon 
arguments that (I) inflation gains were unrelated to time held; (2) a sliding scale would 
result in more lock-in, and (3) 66 percent of the benefits would go to taxpayers earning 
$50,000 and above ($164,590 in 2004 dollars). !d. at S26092 and S26095 (Statement of 
Sen. Ed Muskie and Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
221. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301, 90 Stat. 1520, 1549-50. 
222. In the debate leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 most spoke of 80 percent of 
the individual tax preference items consisting of the 50 percent capital gains preference. 
E.g., 1976 Panel Discussions, supra note 220, at 80 (statement of Rep. Duncan); 1975 
Senate Hearings, pt. I, supra 167, at 42 (statement of Sec'y of the Treasury Bill Simon); 
122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, at S20232 (June 24, 1976) (statement of Chair Long) (80 to 90 
percent of the minimum tax revenues come out of capital gains); id. at S20240 (statement of 
Sen. Bennett Johnson)(" ... I am wondering of that 75 or 80 percent what percentage is paid 
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however, to a floor amendment by Senator Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., 
reducing the minimum offset for regular taxes to 50 percent of the taxes 
paid, because if the Senate Conferees go to conference with a 50 percent 
offset as opposed to the House's total elimination, the compromise would 
be an offset of 25 percent of regular taxes paid.223 That amendment was 
defeated 44 to 35 by the Conservative Coalition.224 Additionally, the tax 
reformers, spearheaded by Senator Kennedy, enacted "carryover basis" at 
death, a watered down substitute for taxation at death of unrealized 
appreciation in capital assets.225 
Significantly, the Hearings and floor debate on capital gains and related 
items such as minimum tax, taxation of unrealized appreciation, and tax 
shelters over the decade of the 1970's revealed more clearly than ever (a) 
the relative weight of the special interests for which the majority in 
Congress now ostensibly maintained the capital gains preference 
(consisting of small business, farming, ranching and timber interests, 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs );226 (b) the processes of masking the 
by high rollers and what percentage would be paid by ordinary people selling homes, and 
that sort of thing."); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong. (1976) (existing minimum tax is largely a 
tax on long-term capital gains "which constitutes about seven-eighths of the income in the 
minimum base"). In short, the realized capital gains of wealthy taxpayers would have been 
taxed in the 30 percent range rather than in the low 20 percent range. 
223. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 21, at S26164 (Aug. 6, 1976) 
224. Rollcall vote No. 503. !d. at S26164; 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 69-S (Republicans 
and Southern Democrats opposed it 25 to 4 and 10 to 5, respectively; while Northern 
Democrats supported it 26 to 9). 
225. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2005, 90 Stat. 1872-76. The House Ways and Means 
initially reported the ambitious, long-postponed restructuring of the estate and gift tax (H.R. 
14844), which by a 24 to 10 vote included carryover basis at death of capital assets. 32 
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 65. Professor Surrey appears the conceptual father of this 
compromise to taxation of capital appreciation at death. 1959 Panel Discussions, supra 
note 118, at 710-11 (statement of Prof. Surrey). Heated opposition on the Floor by the 
Conservative Coalition led to withdrawal of the bill by Chair Ullman on August 30, 1976. 
32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 66-67. The Senate Tax Reform Bill of 1976 contained, however, 
estate and gift tax reform and the Conference bill adopted carryover basis as well. !d. at 64. 
On the House side, the Conference estate and gift tax provisions were separately voted on 
and an attempt by the Conservative Coalition to delete carryover basis was defeated 229 to 
181. Rollcall vote No. 740. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 24, at H30858-59 (Sept. 16, 1976). 
Republicans supported the attempt 129 to 9, and Southern Democrats tied 42 to 42, while 
Northern Democrats opposed it 178 to 10. 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 158-H and 65-S 
(1976). Interestingly by this point Professor Surrey had changed his tune, severely 
criticizing carryover basis. Surrey, supra note 215 at 326-27. 
226. Revenue Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13511 Before the Senate Finance 
Committee, pt. 4, 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Hearings] (statement of 
Robert Brandon, Director of Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (75 percent of 
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real special interests in capital gains tax legislation;227 and (c) the 
distributive effects of the capital gains preference.228 
Senator Lloyd Bentsen, D-Tex. (subsequently Chair of the Senate 
Finance Committee and President Clinton's first Secretary of the Treasury), 
confirmed in a 197 6 colloquy with Treasury Secretary Bill Simon that a 
major Congressional target of an additional sliding capital gains deduction 
proposed by the Ford Administration was retirement bailouts by small 
businessman.229 After being chastised by Senator Abraham Ribicoff, D-
Conn.,230 for arguing that an increased capital gains preference was the 
most effective way to encourage more investment by small income 
taxpayers,231 when the brokerage firm's true interest was the large investor, 
"capital gains reduction would go to non-stock-market-related investment, primarily in real 
estate speculation, farmland speculation and the like--not very productive investment."); 
accord, id. at 759 (statement of Sen. Bentsen, D-Tex.); 124 CONG. REC., pt. 124, at S35824, 
S35249-50 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). In fact the decreased percentage of 
capital gains attributable to stock was in large part caused by the recognition of recent stock 
market losses. See supra note I 0 I and infra note 261. 
227. See infra text accompanying notes 231-33. 
228. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 755 (Under Hansen-Steiger bill 
3000 people earning over $1 ,000,000 [$2,870,000 in 2004 dollars] a year would get tax 
reductions averaging over $200,000 each [$574,500 in 2004 dollars] - 40 percent of the 
revenue reduction under the bill - and average reductions of $60,000 each [$172,400 in 
2004 dollars] would result for the 20,000 individuals earning over $200,000 a year 
[$574,500 in 2004 dollars] with no benefits to 99.4 percent of individuals or to 93 percent of 
the individuals reporting capital gains; similar statistics for the House bill except 94 percent 
of individuals reporting capital gains would receive no benefit from proposed cuts). See also 
124 CONG. REC., pt. 26, at S35261 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (distributive 
effects of70 percent capital gains deduction). 
229. Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1976 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 43 (1976). 
230. Senator Ribicoff preferring an argument for the true interest of the firm, asked what 
percentage was new customers, the witness stated that a quarter of Merrill Lynch's new 
individual accounts were opened by customers with incomes under $15,000 ($43,090 in 
2004 dollars) and the median income was about $22,000 ($63,200 in 2004 dollars). !d. at 
1845-46. 
231. Senator Ribicoff stated that: 
!d. 
And while I'm certainly aware of the need for large-scale investments by wealthy 
individuals and major institutions, we also need the cumulative contributions of 
the smaller investor. The small investors are especially conscious of the fact that 
the Government is their partner in gains, but not in losses; that many of their long-
term gains result from inflation; and above all, that making any change in their 
investments requires the surrender of part of the total capital built up over the 
years. This hits hardest those in or near retirement who, as a matter of prudence, 
should now seek out more conservative, income-type securities but who, to do so, 
must surrender part of their income-producing assets. 
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a spokesman for Merrill Lynch & Co explained that his real point was that 
an investor retiring from a small business was subject to high capital gains 
taxes in one year.232 Thus, the witness just dug his cloaking hole deeper, 
since stock of a small business entrepreneur isn't even listed on the stock 
exchanges. Capital gains cuts proponents often cloaked their interests in 
the mantle of the small businessmen and residences,233 which even then 
were largely taken out of capital gain realizations with tax-free roll-overs 
into another home until age fifty- five, when a $100,000 gain exclusion 
became available.234 
3. Revenue Act of 1978: Pendulum of Tax Reform Swings Back Towards 
the Rich- Indexing Proposals and 60 Percent Capital Gains Deduction 
In the Revenue Act of 1978, the pendulum of tax reform swung back as 
the Conservative Coalition reversed the tax legislation pattern that began 
with the Revenue Act of 1964's skewing of tax benefits to the lower and 
middle income groups. The 1978 Act provided proportionally greater 
benefits to higher income groups, epitomized in the direct and indirect 
capital gains cuts.235 The Conservative Coalition was bolstered by the 
raging inflation increasing the phantom element in capital gains and the 
"tax revolt"236 engendered in part by popular outrage at "bracket creep"237 
232. "I think the point I was trying to make is that the capital gains tax has fully as great 
if not greater impact of the investor who has one or two investments in the market [sic] and 
might for instance have invested in his own company, a growth investment for years, and 
when he gets-- when he retires he has a transaction which may result in a 42-percent tax on 
that transaction in 1 year." !d. at 1850 (statement of Chrystie ). 
233. E.g., 124CONG.REC.,pt.l9,atH25474(Aug.l0, 1978)(statementofRep. Bill 
Frenzel) (inflation gain in home). See also H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Con g., 2d Sess. 119 
(1978) ("In addition, the committee believes that the present level of capital gains taxes has 
contributed to the shortage of investment funds needed for small businesses and for capital 
formation generally. Moreover, the committee believes that it is inappropriate to subject 
many once-in-a-lifetime gains on the sale of property, such as small businesses or personal 
residences, to the minimum tax.") (emphasis added). 
234. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 §§ 121, 1034. 
235. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 219 (1978); see generally Art Pine, $18.7 Billion Tax Cut 
Sent to the White House, WASH. PosT, Oct. 16, 1978, A-1, A-9. 
236. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 219 ("[L]awmakers, riding the crest of a middle class 
'taxpayer's revolt,' reversed some of the prized liberal 'reforms' of the past- cutting back 
the minimum tax on preferences, and approving a potentially fatal delay of ... [carryover 
basis]."); 1978 Senate Hearings pt. 4, supra note 226, at 834 (statement of Sen. William V. 
Roth, Jr.) (tax revolt has trumped in Congress income redistribution and higher capital gains 
rates); see generally Robert G. Kaiser & Mary Russel, A Middle-Class Congress- Haves 
Over Have-Nots, WASH. PosT, Oct. 15, 1978, A-1 ("Majorities in both House and Senate 
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ansmg from increases in nominal compensation due to such inflation, 
which elevated taxpayers into higher brackets without any increase in real 
compensation. 
The story of the increase in the capital gains preference enacted in 1978 
on the ruins of President Jimmy Carter's capital gains tax proposals238 
reveals the Conservative Coalition's strength at this time. President Carter 
had campaigned in 1976 on repeal of the capital gains preference among 
other tax reforms, repeatedly declaiming that the Federal tax system is "a 
disgrace to the human race."239 This united in opposition the capital gains 
special interests that forced President Carter to back down on repeal. He 
were searching feverishly for legislative Acts that could cater to a 'tax revolt' that many 
members believed was sweeping the country."). See generally E.J. DIONNE, WHY 
AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 246 (1991) ("[I]nflation raised tax rates on the middle class so 
high and so suddenly that its members could not believe that what they were getting out of 
government had any connection with what they were paying. The New Deal had taught that 
government was the middle class's friend. The inflation-tax surge of the 1970s taught that 
government was the enemy."). Others explained the Republican successes in the 1970's and 
1980's Presidential Campaigns (Nixon, Reagan and Bush) in capturing the votes ofworking 
class white males, who formerly voted the Democratic ticket (often, incorrectly called 
"Reagan Democrats") first in the South and then in the Northern, often ethnic, white 
working class neighborhoods as resting on a linked-chain of (a) reaction to the civil rights 
movement (school desegregation in the South followed by cross neighborhood bussing in 
the North as well affirmative action in the workplace), and (b) the above "tax revolt" 
coupled with the perception that the Federal taxes were largely being redistributed to 
minorities, reinforced by (c) culturally potent "rights" and "value" issues. T.B. EDSALL & 
M.D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION passim (1991) ("Under the banner of a conservative 
'egalitarianism,' the political right can maintain the loyalty of its low-income supporters by 
calling for an end to 'reverse discrimination,' while simultaneously maintaining the loyalty 
of the richest citizens by shaping to their advantage government policies that provide them 
with the greatest economic benefits."). 
237. "Bracket creep" is taxation of the same real income at higher marginal and effective 
rates due to inflation. What happened during the 1970's and 1980's was that wages at the 
bottom did not keep up with inflation. See infra note 375. 
238. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 219 ("The bill bore little resemblance to the tax program 
the president had proposed in January. Almost all of his proposed 'reforms,' except for a 
few tokens, had been scrapped, and the cuts were much more skewed towards the upper end 
of the income scale than he had recommended."). 
239. Carter repeatedly used this phrase on the stump and in his acceptance speech at the 
Democratic National Convention. 
It is time for a complete overhaul of our tax system. I still tell you: It is a disgrace 
to the human race. All my life I have heard promises of tax reform, but it never 
quite happens. With your help, we are finally going to make it happen! And you 
can depend on it! 
Text of Carter's Speech Accepting the Nomination, 510 FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS 
DIGEST, at AI (July 17, 1976). 
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still proposed tightening up on capital gains on high income individuals.240 
Once the capital gains lobby was geared up with no major defensive battle 
to fight, it shifted to the offense of routing the capital gains reformers.241 
Consequentially, the House Conservative Coalition242 passed, over the 
objections of then Chair AI Ullman, D-Ore.,243 and future Chair Rep. Dan 
Rostenkowski, D-111.,244 an additional sliding scale deduction of 1 percent 
per year up to twenty-five years for a maximum deduction of75 percent for 
stock and depreciable capital assets. The primary rationale for the "double 
240. President Carter proposed eliminating the residual individual alternative capital 
gains rate and eliminating the minimum tax offset of Yz of the regular taxes. Message from 
the President of the United States Transmitting Proposals for Tax Reductions and Reform, 
95th Cong. (House Doc. No. 95-283 1978) (estimated annual increases in revenue of $284 
million and $100 million, respectively); see generally 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 226. 
241. Tax Cut for Capital Gains Stalled, 7 TAX NOTES 702 (June 19, 1978) (Because a 
majority [the Conservative Coalition] on the Ways and Means favored the Steiger proposal 
of indexing capital gains for inflation, Chair Ullman refused to call the Committee together 
for three months lest it approve the Steiger amendment.). In the floor debate Rep. Charles 
Yanik, D-Oh., recounted that President Carter and his advisors were "totally naive about the 
fundamental legislative process and gave Chairman Ullman no help." 124 CONG. REC., pt. 
19, at H25425 (Aug. I 0, 1978). 
242. When Chair Ullman reconvened the Ways & Means Committee to consider the 
Revenue Bill of 1978 after a three month delay (to allow the Carter Administration to lobby 
for a lesser capital gains cut, unsuccessfully), the Committee in an unexpected move voted 
21 to 16 to adopt the proposal of Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex., indexing certain capital gains for 
inflation. Art Pine, House Unit Votes Inflation Factor for Capital Gains, WASH. PosT, July 
26, 1978, at A-I. "The measure was approved by an unlikely coalition of conservative 
Republicans and Democrats, who are intent upon providing over a billion dollars in tax 
relief for investors, and Democratic liberals, who aim to stop the momentum for the gains 
cut by loading the Jones bill with enough tax breaks to insure its defeat on the House floor." 
124 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 228 (1974); see generally Pine, supra. This Liberal strategy 
backfired as a classic Conservative Coalition on capital gains passed a capital gains 
indexing provision on the House floor. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25474-75 (August I 0, 
1978) (Rollcall vote No. 680, 249 yeas to 167 nays). The Conservative Coalition prevailed: 
the Republicans supported the indexing amendment 142 to I; the Southern Democrats, 59 to 
26; while the Northern Democrats opposed it 140 to 48. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 170-H. 
243. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25472 (Aug. I 0, 1978) (statement of Chair Ullman) 
("this is not the time or place to provide indexing on capital gains .... the committee is 
going to look at capital formation. It may be that we will provide indexing in some form, 
but we ought to do it in relation to some other moves that ought to be made at the same 
time; so I strongly urge a no vote on this committee amendment."). 
244. !d. at H25471 (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski) ("It is inconceivable that we can 
choose to totally insulate from inflation the one type of income in this country already 
cushioned from inflation-- capital gains [by the then 50 percent of gain exclusion]- while at 
the same time ignore the eroding effect of inflation on savings, wages, and salaries."). 
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dipping" additional deduction up to 25 percent was to offset the then 
raging inflation. 245 
The Finance Committee proposed a repeal of the residual 25 percent 
maximum individual capital gains rate (on the first $50,000 of capital gain 
in a tax year), long a goal of tax reformers, rationalizing that it was 
unnecessary with a 70 percent deduction and, hence, maximum 21 percent 
rate.246 Given the tendency of Conferees to split the difference between 
conflicting House and Senate versions of a tax bill, the author surmises that 
Chairman Long and others expected a 60 percent deduction (with a 
resultant 28 percent maximum individual capital gains rate) would prevail 
in Conference.247 And so it was that the Conference Committee 
compromised on a 60 percent deduction,248 which in conjunction with the 
then maximum ordinary rate of 70 percent on investment income, resulted 
in a maximum capital gains rate of 28 percent. At the same time, the 
245. William H. Jones, Consumer Prices in Area Rise 112% in Two Months, WASH. 
PosT, Dec. 23, 1978, at A-6; William H. Jones, AT & T Decision: Cut Rates Or Raise 
Earnings Level, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1978, at E-3 (continuing inflation and interest rates at 
near record levels); Art Pine, Boost in Prime Rate to 11% Triggers Big Market Drop; Prime 
Rate Increase Triggers Market Drop; New Fears Of Recession, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 1978, 
at D-7 (inflation rate 7 to 8 percent). While the effect of inflation on nominal gains and the 
shortage of venture capital due to high capital gains rates frequently were heard in the 
Hearings and on the Floor, see infra note 252, the crescendo was reached in the repeated 
plaint that the maximum tax on capital gains was almost 50 percent counting the AMT and 
maximum tax preference offset or poison. See e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 226, 
at 672 (statements of Deans Stewart, Nat'! Oil Jobbers Council). The conservative coalition 
in the House Ways and Means Committee and its Report by-and-large ignored the facts. 
Farmers, and small businessmen in fact did better than inflation, 1976 Panel Discussions, pt. 
2, supra note 220, at 1233-34; 1237, 1239 (statements of Prof. Michael J. Graetz as to farm 
real estate). Moreover, many capital assets are financed with debt; new equity issues 
followed the market rather than rates, and market followed interest rates; and the actual 
average effective rate on capital gains was 18 percent. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra at 500, 
755, 799, 801. 
246. SeeS. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
247. President Carter was now receptive to a 28 percent rate. See 124 CONG. REC., pt. 
26, at S35262 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Nelson, Senate Finance Committee 
Member); 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 235. Also the House in 1963 had passed a 60 percent 
rather than President Kennedy's proposed 70 percent deduction. In light of this, motivation 
for requesting a ruling that Senator Nelson's amendment to limit the capital gains cut to 60 
percent deduction out of order (due to a drafting defect) so that it never came to a vote, 34 
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 243, may have been to preserve bargaining power in the Conference. 
Senator Ted Kennedy's amendment to delete the increase in the capital gains deduction to 
70 percent was defeated 82 to I 0 by a majority of not only the Republicans (34 to 0) and 
Southern Democrats (17 to I), but also a majority of Northern Democrats (31 to 9), 34 
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 68-S, so that technically, the Conservative Coalition did not emerge. 
248. Revenue Act of 1978 § 401, 92 Stat. at 2866-67. 
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Revenue Act of 1978 finally repealed the alternative 25 percent rate.249 
The Conservative Coalition also retroactively postponed the effective date 
of"carryover basis"250 enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 in lieu of the 
more meaningful taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death, which 
ultimately was repealed in 1980.251 The Act fashioned a separate minimum 
tax for capital gains and excess itemized deductions with a 10 - 25 percent 
graduated rate, but with an offset for 100 percent of regular income taxes 
paid, and repealed the preference poison.252 This substantially weakened 
the individual minimum tax as to the capital gains preference.253 
With a 50 percent capital gains deduction against a top rate of 70 
percent (if the maximum capital gains rate of 25 percent were eliminated), 
and the alternative minimum tax imposing a 15 percent tax on that 
deduction or 8V4 percent, the top nominal capital gains rate would be 43V4 
percent and higher if the earned income subject to a 50 percent maximum 
were reduced by the capital gains deduction as well.254 The 1978 Senate 
Committee Report justified the increased capital gains deduction, rather 
than just modifications to the Alternative Minimum Tax effecting a rate 
reduction just at the top, as benefiting "all taxpayers with capital gains, 
regardless of their respective income levels. "255 Similarly it rationalized an 
increased deduction as tending "to offset the effect of inflation," and 
"unlike the automatic adjustments generally provided for in various 
indexation proposals, it should not tend to exacerbate inflationary 
increases. "256 
The testimony by private and public interest groups, economists and 
their interchanges with the Senate Finance Committee members in the 1978 
249. !d. 
250. !d. § 515, 92 Stat. at 2884. See 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 234. 
251. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-223, § 40l(a), 94 Stat. 229, 
299. 
252. Revenue Act of 1978 §§ 421, 441, 92 Stat 2872, 2878; see supra note 250. 
253. Lawrence B. Lindsey, Giving and Tax Cuts: Recent Experience, 28 TAX NOTES 
1399 (Sept. 16, 1985) (In 1978 tax treatment of capital gains under both the maximum tax 
and the additional minimum tax was made far more generous.); John Zimmerman, Should 
the Income Tax System Be Overhauled?, 25 TAX NOTES 1143, 1145 (Dec. 17, 1984) 
("minimum and alternative minimum tax only applied to 262,000 of the more than 95 
million filers in 1981. (Statistics of Income for Individual Returns for 1981, 3 S.O.I. Bull. 
No. I, p. 9 (1983)). Less than I 0 percent involved capital gains and losses."). 
254. See infra note 260. 
255. S. REP. No. 1263, at 192. 
256. !d. 
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Senate Hearings reveal a somewhat higher level of capital gains debate 
than in earlier years. More attention was being paid to econometric 
studies,257 which also surfaced in the floor debate,258 and to consideration 
of different solutions.259 The Hearings and floor debate made extensive use 
of symbols, particularly the alleged 50 percent maximum capital gains 
effective rate,260 the drying up of venture capital issues,261 and the impact of 
257. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 207 (statement of Ronald Bixler, 
Nat'! Ass'n Mfrs.) (strong support of econometric analysis); id. at 693 (statement of 
Feldstein) (perpetual revenue unlock theory, akin to an argument that capital gains cut 
would unlock a flood of technological improvements); but see id. at 707 (statement of Nw. 
Econ. Prof. Eisner) (response); id., pt. I, at 148 (statement of Sec'y Blumenthal critiquing 
Feldstein's study); id., pt. I, at 698 (solloquy Sen. Hansen, R-Wyo., and Feldstein) 
(Treasury had engaged Feldstein for study in question). Senator Bob Dole, R-Kan., sagely 
concluded that different models yield different answers. !d., pt. I, at 832. See generally 
DIONNE, supra note 236, at 250-51 ("Following a brilliant lobbying and public relations 
campaign, complete with careful academic studies that were to become so central to 
conservative political breakthroughs, Congress voted in 1978 to cut the capital gains tax. 
The theory was not that the rich 'deserved' a break. It was that government would promote 
more investment by taxing it less, and that everyone would benefit from a surge in 
productivity and employment. Advocates of Calvin-Coolidge-style economics thus stole 
away New Dealism's most potent word,jobs."). 
Stagflation, the combination of inflation and a recession or stagnant economy, John 
Jacobs, Carter Lacks Plan to Attack Inflation, U.S. Ex-Aide Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1978, 
at A-3, had an adverse effect on the stock market in the 1970's, Sylvia Nasar, Private 
Sector: An Economic Reality Check From Someone Who's Seen It All, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2002, at B-1; Tom Saler, Ready or Not, Old Man Inflation Is Knocking at the Door 
Again, MIL WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 9, 200 I, at D-1 ("inverse relationship between 
inflation and valuations is one of the stock market's most enduring principles"). 
258. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25427 (Aug. I 0, 1978) (statement of Rep. William 
Steiger); accord id. at 25428 (statement of Rep. Frenzel); id. at H25431 (statement of Rep. 
Archer). 
259. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 651-52, 657 (statement of Arthur 
Levit, Am. Stock Exchange) (credit for investment in small and medium sized firms; 
analysis of which income classes benefit overlooks impact on investment psychology); id., 
pt. 2, at 835-44 (statement of Sec. Indus. Ass 'n) (discussion of capital gains alternatives). 
260. See id., pt. 2, at 672 (written statement of Deans Stewart, Nat'! Oil Jobbers 
Council); id., pt. 2, at 685 (written statement of William McCamant, Nat'! Ass'n of 
Wholesaler-Distributors); id., pt. 2 at 886 (written statement of Dr. Ture in Econometric 
Study); id., pt. 5, at I 088 (written statement of Mark Tanenbaum for the Int'l Council of 
Shopping Ctrs). For the computations behind the "rare" 49.1 percent effective rate, see 
Calvin Johnson, The Economic Waste in Cutting Capital Gains Taxes, 7 TAX NOTES 203 n.l 
(Aug. 21, 1978) ("35% of this maximum arises because half of capital gains can be taxed 
like other income ... [subject to 70 percent rate]. The other 14.1% ... arises because 
capital gains is a tax preference, which is subject to the minimum tax ... and disqualifies a 
taxpayer in part from the benefits of the 50% ceiling on the rate for his salary and other 
service income."). For more extreme calculations, see 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra 
note 45, at 37. 
261. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 460 (colloquy between Sen. Charles 
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. fl . d h 262 d . f: 263 m atron on entrepreneurs an omeowners esp1te contrary acts. 
Moreover, one of the co-sponsors of the Steiger amendment claimed broad 
Hanson, R-Wyo., and former Sec'y of the Treasury Fowler) (stating that Tax Reform Acts 
of 1969 and 1976 treatment of capital gains have had a very real impact in drying up sources 
of equity capital); accord, 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25439 ( Aug. 10, 1978) (statement of 
Rep. Stockman) (noting that supply of risk capital has almost entirely dried up so capital is 
flowing to the low-growth industries rather than the high-productivity, high growth new 
industries; entrepreneurship is waning because of the very high tax rates on high incomes. 
"Today, if you put all those things together you can see why the economy has been growing 
at such an anemic rate and why our rate of growth has been reduced."). But see 1978 Senate 
Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 800 (written statement of Robert Brandon, Public 
Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (debunking myth that Tax Reform Act of 1969 
caused decline in capital gains realizations by showing lack of correlation with effective 
dates of reforms and other causes such as bursting of the stock speculation bubble of the 
1960s, guns and butter inflationary policy of the Johnson Administration, energy crisis and 
Watergate scandal of the early 1970's, and inflation, devaluation of dollar and dislike of 
President Carter of late 1970's); accord 124 CONG. REC., pt. 24, at S34825, S35250 
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). Cf 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 707 
(statement ofNw. Econ. Prof. Eisner) (small investor left stock market, because of better tax 
treatment of retirement plan investments and poor performance of market). 
262. Indexing proponents frequently raised the symbol of the entrepreneur precluded 
from raising capital by the minimum tax, id., pt. 2, at 216-1 7 (statement of Sen. Charles 
Hansen, R-Wyo., S. Fin. Comm. Member); id., pt. 2, at 437 (statement of John Davidson, 
Nat' I Taxpayers Union); id., pt. 2, at 476 (statement of Thomas Corcoran, Esq. [key FOR 
Braintruster]); id., pt. 2, at 503 (statement of Chair Long). For the "homeowner" myth and 
its debunking, see supra note 224. See also 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25428 (statement 
of Rep. Frenzel); id. at H25437 (statement of Rep. Clausen); accord id. at H25474 
(statement of Rep. Frenzel) (inflation gain in home). Rep. Dan Rostenkowski correctly 
pointed out that inflation gain in homes was largely a red herring due to then Section 121 's 
once-in-a-lifetime post-age fifty-five exclusion of up to $100,000 gain. 1d. at H25471. 
Typically up to that age the tax-free rollover provisions of Section 1034 were used. See 
1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 226, at 176 (statement of Sec'y Blumenthal); 1978 
CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra note 45, at 20. For these reasons in 1985 gains from the sale 
of principal residences accounted for only 2 percent of gains subject to tax. Gerald Auten & 
Janette Wilson, Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Income Tax Returns, 1985, 
18 S.O.I. BULL. No.4, at 113, 115 (Spring 1998). 
263. The actual average marginal rate on capital gains had been 18.5 percent and the 
average capital gains tax rate for 1976 had been 15.9 percent, up from 14.5 percent in 1970 
(beginning of minimum tax and of limitation on alternative 25 percent rate under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969) and 11.5 percent in 1954. New Work by Treasury on Capital Gains, 6 
TAX NOTES 728 (June 26, 1978). The 18.5 percent figure was widely cited by tax reformers 
in the Hearings. See 1978 Senate Hearings pt. 2, supra note 226, at 500 (statement of Leon 
Shull, Am. for Democratic Action); id., pt. 4, at 755-56 (statement of Robert Brandon, 
Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (capital gains still primary cause in high 
income taxpayers paying little or no tax; further pointing out that carryover basis or even 
taxation of capital appreciation at death would be better unlock capital transactions than a 
rate reduction); id., pt. 4, at 799,801 (written statement of Brandon) (citing above Treasury 
study). 
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economic benefits from indexing: "[i]f enacted, our proposal will get this 
country moving again. These are the very words used by President 
Kennedy in the early 1960's when he proposed a bold tax reduction plan 
slashing individual and corporate tax rates. "264 The Representative 
supported, of course, repeal of carryover basis,265 while President Kennedy 
had conditioned his capital gains rate cut on enactment of analogous 
taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death.266 
When opponents of a capital gains cut criticized its distribution in favor 
of high income taxpayers,267 some supporters ofthe cut brought up the once 
in a lifetime sale of the family farm or small business,268 while others 
characterized such opponents as repeating "anti-rich statements but they are 
264. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25438 (statement of Rep. Clausen). 
265. 35 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 194-H (1979) (vote 657: Rep. Clausen along all other 
House Republicans but one voted to direct the House Conferees to accept the Senate Bill's 
repeal of carryover basis). 
266. See supra note 121. 
267. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 755 (statement of Robert Brandon, 
Director of Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (75 percent of "capital gains 
reduction would go to non-stock-market-related investment, primarily in real estate 
speculation, farmland speculation and the like - not very productive investment."); accord 
id., pt. 4, at 759 (Statement of Sen. Bentsen); 124 CoNG. REc., pt. 24, at S35249-50, 
S35251-52, S35824 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("! am amazed we have 
not heard about the mom and pop farm yet. But I am sure we will hear about it. Or mom 
and pop's little store.") Of course, they did. ld., pt. 24, at S35355 (statement of Sen. 
Curtis). See also 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 755 (Under Hansen-
Steiger bill, 3000 people earning over $1,000,000 a year would get tax reductions averaging 
over $200,000 each - 40 percent of the revenue reduction under the bill - and average 
reductions of $60,000 each would result of the 20,000 individuals earning over $200,000 a 
year with no benefits to 99.4 percent of individuals or to 93 percent of the individuals 
reporting capital gains; similar statistics for the House bill except 94 percent of individuals 
reporting capital gains would receive no benefit from proposed cuts.). 
268. 124 CONG. REC. S35252 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of S. Fin. Comm. Chair Long) 
("It was my good fortune to buy a piece of land from a dear old couple who had lived on it 
[for 50 years] since they were young. The sale price was $200,000. Those people never 
made more than $25,000 in their lives .... She was a retired schoolteacher and her husband 
a retired plant worker."); accord id. at S35253 (statement of Sen. Hansen) ("[B]ecause a 
family that may have practically every dime of its savings invested in a small business, or a 
farm, or whatever kind of operation, will make a once-in-a-lifetime sale and, as a 
consequence, they can appear in the expanded income columns of the IRS as being in the 
group of taxpayers with incomes of $50,000, $100,000, or $200,000."). Chair Long was 
given to "rhetorical 'histrionics' at the expense of strict objectivity." Daniel Shaviro, 
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated 
by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. I, 13 n.41 (1990). 
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made just on the bald basis, if the rich get a break, it is bad. There is no 
tradeoff. "269 
Small business was a preeminent special interest in the 1978 capital 
gains debate,270 as Representative Ed Jenkins, a Georgia hill country 
Democrat with textile mills in his district, and the Ways & Means 
Committee Report attested: 
[MR. JENKINS:] I was somewhat surprised to see that the one area for 
which your members [National Federation of Independent Business] in 
my district showed great interest in the field of taxation was the issue of 
capital gains. 
I think that is primarily attributable to one of two things. Perhaps they 
believe that if the value of their business builds, they will be able to retain 
some reasonable portion of the value when they sell it. Really, this is the 
main reason that most business people are working. They wish to retain 
something when they finally dispose of the business. Perhaps many of 
them are also investors in land or other capital assets unrelated to their 
business. This is an extremely important issue to them in my district. ... 
All my small businessman simply tell me don't do anything to hurt capital 
gains treatment. Basically this is the message I get from small business.271 
Indeed, Senator Jacob Javits, R-N.Y., an opponent of the 1978 House 
bill capital gains cut, stated that small, not big, business owners now were 
the biggest overt backers of the capital gains preference, rather than the 
reverse as in the 1930's.272 A capital gains cut would not help big industry, 
but only small businesses, which tended to raise capital by retention of 
earnings and borrowed funds not through new equity issues, and therefore, 
269. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 791 (statement of Sen. Packwood). 
Senator Packwood went on to ask whether Brandon would oppose (capital gains) tax cuts 
which took the rich off the tax roll even if they increased revenue. !d., pt. 4, at 791-92. 
Brandon would. "Again, I would rather have whatever level of revenue there is to be borne 
fairly by all taxpayers. I think that is the basic notion of our tax system." !d., pt. 4, at 792. 
270. See H.R. Rep. No. 1445, at 119 ("'n addition, the committee believes that the 
present level of capital gains taxes has contributed to the shortage of investment funds 
needed for small businesses and for capital formation ... generally. Moreover, the 
committee believes that it is inappropriate to subject many once-in-a-lifetime gains on the 
sale of property, such as small businesses or personal residences, to the minimum tax.") 
(emphasis added). 
271. Hearings on the President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals Before the 
House Comm. on Ways & Means, pt. 5, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2803 (1978); see also id., pt. 2, 
at 1253; H.R. REP. No. 1445, at 119. 
272. 124 CONG. REC. S35254 (Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Sen. Javits). Senator Hansen 
agreed. !d. at S35254-55. 
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was taken care of by more rapid depreciation rules and a corporate tax cut. 
It would, however, benefit the rich with their large portfolios of public 
stock. 
Senator John C. Danforth, R-Mo., a capital gams cut proponent 
characterized these remarks as class warfare. 
[Mr. Danforth]: [T]he course of the debate often takes the form of what is 
in it for me, what is in it for this group or that group, as though we are 
involved in some sort of warfare between the rich and the poor, as though 
we always have to choose up sides between those who are relatively well 
to do and those who are not, as though we always have ... cast our vote 
on whether we are for the side of big business or for the side of small 
business."273 
The 1978 Committee Reports incorporated most of the themes 
presented by the proponents of an increased preference in the Hearings. 
The Finance Committee Report, explaining its reduction in the maximum 
capital gains rate (by increasing the capital gains deduction to 70 percent 
from 50 percent), repeated the notion from the 1978 House Ways and 
Means Committee Report that the combined level of direct and indirect 
capital gains taxes contributed to a slower rate of economic growth with 
fewer realizations and a shortage of investment funds.274 The Senate 
Report omitted the 1978 House Ways and Means Committee Report 
explanation that it was "inappropriate to subject many once-in-a-lifetime 
gains on the sale of property, such as small business or personal residences, 
to the minimum tax.',n5 The Finance Committee added its beliefthat: 
[L]ower capital gains taxes will markedly increase sales of appreciated 
assets, which will offset much of the revenue loss from the tax cut, and 
potentially lead to an actual increase in revenues. In addition, the 
improved mobility of capital will stimulate investment, thereby generating 
more economic activity and more tax revenue. Six former Secretaries of 
the Treasury have informed the committee that they believe lower capital 
gains taxes will raise, not lower, revenues.276 
273. !d. at S35255. 
274. S. REP. No. 1263, at 192; H.R. REP. No. 1445, at 119. This was an oblique 
reference to the intense debate on use of "feedback effects" in revenue estimates. See 1978 
Senate Hearings, pt. I, supra note 226, at 179, 197 (statement of Sec'y Blumenthal); id., pt. 
2, at 211 (statement of Chair Long); id., pt. 2, at 452 (statement of former Treasury Sec 'y 
Fowler); id., pt. 2, at 495 (statement of Samuel Cohn, Comm. for Capital Formation through 
Dividend Reinvestment); id., pt. 3, at 688, 697 (statement of Martin Feldstein, Nat'! Bureau 
of Research and Econ., Harv. Univ.). 
275. H.R. REP. No. 1445, at 119. 
276. S. REP. No. 1263, at 192. While the 1985 Treasury Report on the 1978 Capital 
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The data for 1979 shows that the effective rate for the top 1 percent of 
taxpayers for all federal taxes remained in the mid 30's (37 percent).277 It 
Gains Cuts showed revenue gains from the 1978 capital gains cut under the "cross-section" 
analysis now used by Treasury, Chief of Staff Pearlman pointed out that the "time series" 
data, then used by Treasury and still used by the Joint Committee Staff, showed revenue 
losses after the first year or two. Hearings on Tax Incentives for Increasing Savings and 
Investments Before the Senate Finance Committee, 10 I st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter 1990 
Senate Tax Incentives Hearings]; see 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra note 45, at ix. 
The former looks at a large group of taxpayers horizontally across a single year, whereas the 
latter looks vertically through a period of time at aggregate taxpayer data. Revenue and 
Spending Proposals for Fiscal Year 1990: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 
pt. 2, 101 st Cong. (1989) (statement of Thomas Barthold, Joint Comm. Staff Economist). 
Since a capital gains tax cut generally spurs a one-time realization of capital gains that 
otherwise would be realized in future years, a "time series" approach appears preferable. 
Additionally there is the old difficulty of separating market effects from the effects of the 
capital gains rate cut. See id. at 156 (written statement of Robert Mcintyre, Citizens for Tax 
Justice) (growth in venture capital already underway before 1978 capital gains cut). 
277. Effective Federal Tax Rates for All Households by Household Income Category, 
1979 
Income Category Total Individual Social Corporate Excise 
Income Insurance Income Tax 
Tax Tax Tax 
Lowest Quintile 8.0 0 5.3 1.1 1.6 
Second Quintile 14.3 4.1 7.7 1.2 1.3 
Middle Quintile 18.6 7.5 8.6 1.4 1.1 
Fourth Quintile 21.2 10.1 8.5 1.6 0.9 
Highest Quintile 27.5 15.7 5.4 5.7 0.7 
All Quintiles 22.2 11.0 6.9 3.4 1.0 
Top I 0 percent 29.6 17.4 4.2 7.4 0.7 
Top 5 percent 31.8 19.0 2.8 9.5 0.6 
Top I percent 37.0 21.8 0.9 13.8 0.5 
CBO, EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 1997 TO 2000, app. B, at 22-24 (2003) [hereinafter CBO, 1997-
2000 TAX RATES]. 
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is noteworthy that the effective income tax rate of the top 1 percent was 
21.8 percent, and all but 1.4 percent of the remaining effective federal tax 
rate was attributable to imputation of the corporate income tax rate 
according to ownership of capital (13.8 percent).278 
C. 1980's: RISE (20 PERCENT RATE) AND FALL (BACK TO 28 PERCENT 
RATE) OF THE CAPITAL GAINS PREFERENCE 
1. 1981: ERTA- First Riverboat Gamble, 20 Percent Capital Gains 
Preference 
In 1980, Republican California Governor Ronald Reagan campaigned 
for President vowing to cut taxes and government while increasing defense 
spending without increasing the deficit.279 Administration witnesses in the 
1981 Hearings on the President's tax proposals asserted that resulting 
increased incentives would lead to higher output in the economy, 
generating increased tax revenues under "supply side economics,"280 while 
In the analysis, households were assumed to bear the burden of the taxes that they 
pay directly (for example, individual income and payroll taxes). Excise taxes were assumed 
to be borne by households according to their consumption of taxed goods (tobacco and 
alcohol) or - in the case of excise taxes that affect intermediate goods - in proportion to 
overall consumption. Taxes on businesses were attributed to households. CBO assumed, as 
do most economists, that employers' shares of payroll taxes fall on employees and therefore 
that the amount of those taxes should be included in employees' income and the taxes 
counted as part of employees' tax burden. Corporate income taxes were assumed to be 
borne by owners of capital. CBO allocated corporate tax liabilities to households in 
proportion to their income from interest, dividends, rents, and capital gains. 
This analysis is based on adjusted pretax comprehensive household income. That 
measure includes all cash income (both taxable and tax-exempt), taxes paid by businesses 
(which are imputed to individuals on the basis of assumptions about incidence), employee 
contributions to 401 (k) retirement plans, and the value of income received in kind from 
various sources (including employer-paid health insurance premiums, Medicare and 
Medicaid benefits, and food stamps, among others). The tables use the Census Bureau's 
fungible value measure to determine the cash equivalent of in-kind government transfers. 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 1979 TO 2001, at I (2004). 
278. CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277, app. B, at 22-24. 
279. Lou Cannon and David S. Broder, GOP Debaters Restate Basic Positions; Seven 
Republicans Restate Their Basic Positions in N.H. Debate, WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 1980, at 
A-1; Lou Cannon, Reagan Campaign Takes Turn Toward November, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 
1980, at A-1; E.J. Dionne, The Nation; Candidates talk to the Issues, but Address their 
Supporters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1980, § 4, at 4. 
280. Hearings on Tax Aspects of the President's Economic Program Before the House 
Committee on Ways & Means, pt. I, 97th Cong. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 House Hearings] 
(statement of Arthur Laffler). The extreme supply side claims were more audacious than 
supported by evidence and disfavored among mainstream economists. THOMAS J CONLAND 
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making tax shelters relatively less attractive.28 I Such revenue increases 
coupled with spending cuts, higher real economic growth and lower 
inflation would supposedly permit balancing of the budget at a lower level 
of taxation.282 Such results were based on an "economic scenario"283 rather 
than traditional econometric models. OMB Director David Stockman later 
admitted that supply-side economics was merely a cover for the trickle-
down theory, bragging that the across-the-board rate cuts (Kemp-Roth) 
were always a Trojan Horse to bring down the top investment income and 
. 1 . 284 capita gams rate. 
Many Democrats on the Ways & Means Committee were quite 
skeptical of these assumptions, particularly the effects of the across-the-
board cuts on savings rates.285 They were right to be skeptical.286 "Despite 
ET AL., TAXING CHOICES 33 (1990). 
281. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 14 (statement of Sec'y Regan); see 
Reagan Tax Cuts Face Hungry Congress, 12 TAX NOTES 422 (Feb. 23, 1981); 127 CONG. 
REC. S15768 (July 15, 1981) (statement of Chair Dole). 
282. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 17 (statement of Sec'y Regan); id. at 57, 
61, 70 (OMB Director David Stockman) (Spending control plan is the essential and 
indispensable anchor; "combination of incentive-minded tax rate reductions and firm budget 
control is expected to lead to a balanced budget by 1984."); id. at 115, 118 (Chairman of 
President's Council of Economic Advisors Weidenbaum). 
283. !d. at 17, 42, 54 (Treasury Sec'ty Donald T. Regan); id. at 56 (Dir. of Office of 
Mgmt. and Budget David Stockman); id. at 42 (statement ofSec'y Regan) ("What we did in 
fact was to create our own scenario."). 
284. William Greider, The Education of David Stockman, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 27, 47 
(Dec. 1981 ). See also 139 CONG. REC. H2795 (May 25, 1993) (statement of Rep. Sabo ); id. 
(statement of Rep. Obey) ("You remember David Stockman, in his famous book in 1981, 
explained the truth when he said - his words were - 'Supply-side was always a trickle 
down.' It was a Trojan horse. The magic supply-side formula was a Trojan horse through 
which they drove trickle-down economics to the wall, and trickle-down economics produced 
a bonanza for these people at the top of the income scale, a few drops for everyone else."); 
cf 136 CONG. REC. H8057 (Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boxer) (Republican rhetoric 
about growth and investment is only a smokescreen for real agenda of taking care of the 
rich). History was to repeat itself, the second time both as tragedy and farce. In 2003 
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, when he opposed a second round of tax cuts (taxing 
dividends as capital gains) because they would exacerbate a looming fiscal crisis as 
economy was beginning to recover, was cut off by Vice-President Richard Cheney with: the 
tax cut was not only affordable, "Reagan proved deficits don't matter. We won the mid-
terms [congressional elections]. This is our due." RONALD SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF 
LOYALTY 199 (2004). 
285. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 44 (statement of Rep. Sam Gibbons); id. 
at 44-45 (statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle); id. at 54-55 (statement of Rep. Downey); id. at 73, 
131 (statement of Rep. Pease); id. at 74 (statement of Rep. Matsui). 
286. STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL 
BUDGET AND TAX POLICY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991 AND BEYOND, 10lst Cong. 101-21 (Comm. 
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these generous economic stimuli, the hoped-for supply-side 'miracle' did 
not come to pass. Unemployment soared to postwar highs in 1981 and 
1982, while the stock market plummeted and real interest rates escalated in 
spite of a reduction in inflation. More troubling still, the federal deficit 
exploded to levels unimaginable under any of the previous supposedly free-
spending administrations."287 Senator Bob Packwood, R-Ore., later pointed 
out that at the time of the 1981 cuts, the Congressional Budget Office was 
. . 1 288 proJectmg a surp us. 
The reduction by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA") 
of the maximum regular tax rate on investment income from 70 percent to 
50 percent,289 with no adjustment to the three year old 60 percent capital 
gains deduction applicable to all capital assets reduced the maximum 
capital gains rate from 28 percent to 20 percent.290 By 1985, the top 5 
percent of individuals had an effective Federal income tax rate of 17.2 
percent (down from 20.7 percent in 1980) when the maximum ordinary rate 
was 50 percent and maximum capital gains rate was 20 percent.291 
Congress also enacted a three year across the board 25 percent reduction in 
individual rates and an indexing of tax brackets, exemptions and the 
standard deduction.292 
At the same time, the 1981 Act put capital recovery methods (ACRS), 
now encompassing real estate depreciation, on steroids through accelerated 
rates and much shorter than true economic useful lives for depreciation 
Print 1990). Cutting the top rates did not increase private savings as proponents had 
claimed. 132 CONG. REC. Sl3926 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("When the 
1981 tax bill was passed the proponents argued that lowering marginal tax rates for the 
wealthiest individuals from 70 percent to 50 percent would encourage savings and these 
savings would stimulate economic growth that would finance the rate reductions. Between 
1981 and today the savings rate of individuals as a percentage of national income has 
declined from 5 percent to the current 3.2 percent."); see also Hearing on Taxes: Supply-
Side Theory Revisited before the Joint Economic Committee, 99th Cong. (1985) (statement 
of Henry Bosworth, Sr. Fellow, the Brookings lnst.) (to finance the Deficit takes two-thirds 
of all private savings which had stayed in the range of 8 to 9 percent). 
287. CONLAND,supra note 280, at 33. 
288. 139 CONG. REC. S7696 (1993). 
289. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, § I 01, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82. 
290. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong. (1981). 
291. Congressional Reports, Documents at a Glance: JCT Tables of Distributional Data 
by Income Class in Tax Reform Bill, 33 TAX NOTES 73, 74 (Oct. 6. 1986); see generally 
John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal 
Service Corporations and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57, 70-71 n.43 
(1988). 
292. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § I 04, 95 Stat. at 188-90. 
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purposes293 that resulted in the sheltering of (a) investment and business 
income by many more high- and even middle-income individuals,294 and 
(b) of business income by big corporations.295 Of 260,000 individual 
returns in 1983 with "positive income" in excess of $250,000 [$4 70,130 in 
2004 dollars], 11 percent paid less than 5 percent in Federal income taxes 
and 76.4 percent paid less than 30 percent.296 Sixty-four percent of these 
260,000 returns showed partnership losses, a major cause of the low 
effective rates. While Treasury could not break out tax-motivated losses 
from economic losses, the largest source of deductions in these loss 
partnerships was interest, depreciation, and depletion. 
By the early 1980's, high income individuals as a whole ($200,000 in 
annual income) had an effective rate of around 22 percent when the 
maximum rate was 50 percent.297 In contrast, during the 1960's and 1970's 
the average effective rate of high income individuals as a whole was 35 
percent, and only the richest enjoyed a 22 percent effective rate.298 After 
the 1981 Act cuts were effective in 1982, the effective federal tax rates fell, 
especially at the top, with the greatest decrease there in imputed corporate 
income rates. 299 
293. !d., § 20 I, 95 stat. 203-19; 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 91 (1981 ); 127 CONG. REC. at 
S 15768 (July 15, 1981) (statement of Senate Finance Chair Dole). 
294. Hearings on High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partnership Tax Issues before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee, 99th Cong., I st Sess. 
6-7, 12-13 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 House Hearings] (statement of Assistant Sec'y for Tax 
Policy Pearlman). 
295. "[I]n 1955, corporate income taxes represented 27.3 percent of total tax receipts. In 
1989, it was down to 10.5 percent." Hearing on Decline of Corporate Tax Revenues before 
the Senate Finance Committee, 101 st Con g., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Senate 
Hearings] (statement of Chair Bentsen); id. at 4 (statement of Deputy Assistant Sec'y for 
Tax Analysis Rosen) (By 1986 percentage of corporate taxes as a percentage of Federal total 
revenue receipts had dropped to 5.1 percent, thereafter declining trend reversed.). See Lee, 
supra note 291, at 129 n.324 (corporate taxes had declined from 27 percent of total budget 
receipts in 1950 to 8 percent in 1985). For a discussion of the causes, see 1990 Senate 
Hearings, supra at 5-6 (primarily corporate pre-tax profits were lower than estimated, due to 
higher wages and salaries and interest payments than expected) (statement of Harvey 
Rosen); id. at II (statement of Director of Congressional Budget Office Reischauer) (58 
percent of shortfall due to CBO overestimation of corporate profits- due to error in model, 
increased debt financing, and underestimation of depreciation deductions; and 42 percent 
attributable to other factors such as ESOPs and increased use of S Corporations). 
296. 1985 House Hearings, supra note 294. 
297. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DATA ON DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME CLASS OF 
EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (Comm. Print Oct. I, 1986). 
298. See supra notes 122, 165. 
299. Effective Federal Tax Rates for All Households by Household Income Category, 
68 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:1 
One of the structural signatures of President Reagan's 1981 tax cut, 
deficit financing (found also in JFK's 1963 tax proposals300) came to give 
the term a new meaning.301 In 1963, Republicans had opposed deficit 
financing. 302 In 1981, Chair Rostenkowski attempted (unsuccessfully) to 
out-bid Republicans for the swing votes of Southern Democrats by granting 
tax preferences including the Reagan-sponsored rate cuts and investment 
1982 
Income Category Total Individual Social Corporate Excise Tax 
Income Tax Insurance Income 
Tax Tax 
Lowest Quintile 8.2 0.4 5.9 0.5 1.4 
Second Quintile 13.8 4.2 8.0 0.5 1.1 
Middle Quintile 17.9 7.4 8.9 0.7 0.9 
Fourth Quintile 20.6 10.0 9.1 0.7 0.8 
Highest Quintile 24.4 15.3 6.3 2.1 0.6 
All Quintiles 20.4 11.0 7.5 1.4 0.8 
Top I 0 percent 25.3 16.9 5.1 2.8 0.5 
Top 5 percent 25.6 18.3 3.7 3.5 0.5 
Top I percent 27.7 20.0 1.6 5.4 0.4 
CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277, app. B, at 22-24. 
300. See supra note 141. 
301. In fairness to President Reagan, the looming deficit was the product of years of 
fiscal mismanagement, as well as changing macroeconomic forces (including reduced 
inflation that resulted in lower federal revenues), not merely the direct consequence of 
Reaganomics. Indeed, as Gene Steuerle has shown, the "era of easy financing" that 
characterized postwar fiscal policy ended before Reagan took office (Steuerle, 1992, 1996). 
Nevertheless, ERTA 1981 and Reagan's increased defense spending accelerated the day of 
reckoning. Dennis J Ventry Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political 
History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 983, 1064 n.76 (Dec. I, 
2000). 
302. See supra note 14; DIONNE, supra note 236, at 251. 
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incentives.303 Congress took the "Riverboat Gamble"304 that supply-side 
economics would work. 
The other major signature of the Kennedy tax proposals, enactment by 
projecting benefits to income groups skewed to lower income groups to 
increase consumer spending305 was written in reverse by the 1981 Reagan 
tax cuts. Like the Revenue Act of 1978, the 1981 cuts benefitted 
disproportionally higher income individuals and large corporations to 
303. Chair Rostenkowski's open competition for the votes of conservative Southern 
Democrats ("boll weevils") and oil Democrats initially resulted in a Ways and Means 
Committee bill they would support. In the end the Reagan Administration outbid 
Rostenkowski, e.g., with support for Georgia's peanut crop. Melissa Brown, Democratic 
Strategy Backfires - GOP Wins in the House, I 3 TAX NOTES 3 I 5 (Aug. 3, I 98 I); Congress 
Enacts President Reagan's Tax Policy, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 91, 100. Forty-eight 
Democrats defected to Reagan in adopting the Republican Substitute for the House Ways 
and Means bill. !d. See Rollcall vote No. I 77, I 26 CONG. REC. HI 826 I -62 (198 I). 
Technically, the Conservative Coalition did not arise in that a slim majority of Southern 
Democrats remained in the Democratic fold. (Republicans supported the alternative I 90 to 
I, while Southern Democrats opposed it 43 to 36 and Northern Democrats I 5 I to I 2. 37 
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 58-H. The Conservative Coalition did emerge and prevail in the 
final vote on the entire tax bill which lowered the maximum individual capital gains rate to 
its lowest level (20 percent) since I 942. Republicans and Southern Democrats supported the 
bill I 90 to I and 69 to 9, respectively, while Northern Democrats opposed it 97 to 64. 
Rollcall vote No. 178. 127 CONG. REC. at Hl8262-63; 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 58-H. 
304. In the Republican controlled Senate, the Finance Committee bill, which was much 
closer to Reagan's proposals, overwhelmingly passed 89 to I I with majorities of 
Republicans and Northern and Southern Democrats. Rollcall Vote No. 239. I 27 CONG. 
REC. at S I 7983; 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 4 I-S. Indexing of rates and brackets (to begin in 
I 985 after the third year of the rate cuts) was separately voted on, passing 57 to 40 along 
partisan lines. /d. at 35-S, 100-01. Such indexing prevailed in Conference. Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of I 98 I § I 04, 95 Stat. at I 88-90. On the House side in the Conference 
Chairman Rostenkowski leveled the charge that the legislation was not written in 
Committee but "in some downtown hideaway," and carefuiiy laid the Act, "a bold-and 
risky-economic strategy" at President Reagan's door. 127 CONG. REC. at H19521. Others 
called it "a riverboat gamble that is going to make every Member of this body and every 
citizen in the United States pay a big price in the next few years if it does not work out." 
I 27 CONG. REC. at HI 9525 (Aug. 4, I 98 I) (statement of Shannon). And so it did. Senate 
Majority Leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn., originated the phrase. See 147 CONG. REC. S4778 
(2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd); 139 CONG. REC. S3601 (I 993) (statement of Sen. Hollings) 
("Twelve years ago, the new President stepped forth with an audacious plan to slash taxes 
by one-third, drastically increase the defense budget, and trimming domestic spending. 
President Reagan promised that his plan would balance the budget in a year's time. Then-
majority leader Howard Baker called Reaganomics a riverboat gamble, but he urged us to 
vote for it as a solid bet, and a majority of Senators went along with that gamble. I, for one 
dissented. I voted against the Reagan tax cuts. Any simpleton should have foreseen that 
Mr. Reagan's riverboat gamble would leave us up the creek, drowning in deficits."). 
305. See supra text accompanying note I 04. 
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encourage productive investments.306 The 25 percent across the board rate 
cuts, created by raising the bracket breakpoints, were proportional but 
phased in over three years. Other elements, including accelerated real 
estate depreciation that enabled the use of tax shelters to explode, the 28.6 
percent cut in year one in the maximum investment income tax rate from 
70 percent to 50 percent, and the maximum capital gains rate change from 
28 percent to 20 percent, all disproportionately favored the top income 
individuals. Their effective income tax rate fell from the mid-30s to about 
22 percent. 307 
2. 1982 TEFRA: Reappearance of Indexing Proposals 
The Supply Side miracle did not come to pass.308 The economy went 
into a recession in 1981 that continued into 1982, which coupled with the 
1981 tax cuts and increases in defense spending, caused the Federal deficits 
to increase significantly above prior levels. 309 The Administration then 
pushed for loophole closing and improved collections while maintaining 
the three year phased-in across the board individual tax cut and indexing.310 
The Senate Finance Committee was inspired by the Budget Reconciliation 
directives to raise revenues and cut spending.311 By adding the Tax Equity 
306. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 13 (statement of Sec'y Regan); id. at 115 
(statement ofWeidenbaum). 
307. See supra note 297. 
308. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 34. 
309. The 1981 deficit ($57.9 billion) was about the same as 1980 ($59.6 billion) but 
almost twice that of 1979 ($27.7 billion), while 1982 was almost double 1981's ($11 0.6 
billion) and the worst was yet to come (1983, $195.4 billion and 1984 $175.36 billion). 40 
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 142 (1984). The 1982-83 recession was the worst recession as far as 
unemployment went (just under II percent) since the Great Depression. 1992 Senate 
Hearing, supra note 63, at 23 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes, Chair of the Joint Economic 
Comm.). Chair of the Senate Finance Committee Dole, now had no patience with "supply-
siders," quipping in early 1982 that the good news was that a bus full of supply-siders went 
off a cliff; the bad news, two empty seats. JEFFREY BIRNBAUM & ALAN MURRAY, 
SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 31 (1987). 
310. Tax Increases Meet Deficit Reduction Target, 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 29 (1982). 
Notwithstanding floor fights the Senate maintained the three year individual tax cut intact. 
Rollcall vote No. 234. 128 CONG. REC. Sl7195 (July 21, 1982); 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 
36 (amendment to delay scheduled rate cuts for high income individual taxpayers only was 
defeated along largely partisan lines). 
311. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in 
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 514 (1998) ("Section 311(a) [of the 
Budget Act, 2 USC § 642(a)(l) (1994)] effectively requires that any amendment to a 
reconciliation bill be revenue neutral, thereby limiting the ability of members to amend 
reconciliation legislation on the floor. Unlike PA YGO, the offset cannot come from 
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and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA") as a rider to an unrelated 
House revenue bill, the Committee, followed the Administration's 
approach of loophole closing. The individual minimum tax was 
strengthened: it covered the capital gains preference again, and safe harbor 
leasing was restricted. 312 They strengthened compliance while adding 
increases in excise taxes and eliminating additional depreciation and other 
corporate changes scheduled in ERTA to be phased in,313 which actually 
constituted the bulk of the revenue "increases." The Finance Committee 
bill also shortened the capital gains holding period back to six months.314 
On the Senate floor, the Conservative Coalition added indexing for 
stocks and real estate to start prospectively in out years.315 The amendment 
was strongly opposed by Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., because he was a 
long-time supporter of a capital gains preference limited to venture capital 
investments, and double indexing (with ordinary rate being indexed as 
reducing entitlement spending. As with reserve fund limitations, the Senate can waive this 
requirement only by a three-fifths vote; Section 3 I I (a) also applies to amendments in the 
House, which can waive it in a special rule or by majority vote."). P A YGO expired in 2002 
and the Senate attempted in 2004 to reinstitute it as to taxes as weii as discretionary 
spending while the House and the Administration were opposed as to taxes because they 
wanted to make the 2001 and 2003 cuts permanent. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Panel Vote 
Draws Battle Lines for Pay-as-You-Go Tax Cuts, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A-30 
("Acknowledging that applying so-caiied pay-as-you-go rules to taxes would complicate 
efforts to make the tax cuts permanent, White House officials have been lobbying hard 
against the legislation. The House speaker, J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois, has signaled that 
House leaders intend to kiii the provision when House and Senate budget writers meet to 
reconcile differences in their proposals. Republicans say it would be foolish to erect barriers 
to extending tax cuts that have spurred economic growth; Democrats say the cuts are the 
main reason the nation faces its largest-ever deficit in doiiar terms."). 
312. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of I 982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 
201, 96 Stat. 324, 4 I I- I 8 (I 982). Also "safe harbor" leasing or inter-corporate sale of tax 
losses was restricted. !d.,§ 209, 96 Stat. 442-47. See 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 32-3. 
3 I 3. TEFRA, § 206, 97 Stat. at 43 I -32. 
3 I 4. S. REP. No. 494, at I I 7 (1982). 
3 I 5. Rolle ail vote no. 243 (64 yeas to 32 nays, 4 not voting). 128 CONG. REC. at S I 7537. 
The Conservative Coalition prevailed: Republicans (45 to 8) and Southern Democrats (11 to 
4) supported the amendment while Northern Democrats opposed it 20 to 8. 38 CONG. Q. 
ALMANAC at 43-S. Southern Democrat Senators voting for the amendment consisted of 
Senators Bentsen (Tex.), Boren (Okla.), Bumpers (Ark.)(voted yes in order to be able to 
move for reconsideration), Byrd (Va., independent caucusing with Democrats), Ford (Ky.), 
Heflin (Ala.), Johnston (La.), Long (La.), Nunn (Ga.), and Pryor (Ark.). On the motion to 
reconsider, Senators Bumpers, Nunn and Pryor in effect changed their vote. !d. at 17541 
(Roiicaii vote 244, 61 nays to 35 yeas). For a general discussion of the conservative 
coalition in the Senate in 1982, see 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 40-C. 
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well) on distributive grounds would encourage speculation rather than true 
investment. 316 
Senator Bill Armstrong (R-Col.), sponsor of the capital gains indexing 
amendment, pointed to recent data showing that all of the reported gain on 
average was inflation gain, and mostly relied upon examples of 
residences.317 He also employed familiar rhetoric from the late 1970s that 
"in many instances people do own houses, farms, small businesses which 
have been in the families for long periods of time."318 Subsequent studies 
would show that the inflation argument was only half true, and that the 
other grounds accounted for small portions of total capital gains 
realizations. 319 For instance, for 1985 all capital assets, except bonds, for 
taxpayers with $200,000 and over ($348,000 in 2004 dollars) real gains 
constituted 81.5 percent of their nominal gains.320 Similarly, the 
Congressional Budget Office's 1990 study of inflation and capital gains 
using Treasury data concluded that real gains on corporate stock sales on 
the average were positive only as to taxpayers with AGI above $100,000 in 
1981 dollars [$206,000 in 2004 dollars] and negative for taxpayers with 
AGI below $100,000.321 "[T]he average real gain [in 1981] for taxpayers 
with AGI over $100,000 was positive and accounted for 53 percent of their 
total nominal gains. For the tiny fraction of taxpayers with AGI over 
$1,000,000, who accounted for 18 percent of realized nominal gains on 
stock in 1981, real gains amounted to 82 percent of their total gains. 322 
Several Treasury or Joint Committee studies of capital gains 
realizations in the early 1960s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s also 
concluded that the top half by income of these individuals realizing capital 
gains in most years have a real or economic gain of roughly 50 percent of 
the nominal gains reported.323 In all of these studies, the higher the income 
bracket, the better the individuals' rate of return as to realized capital gains 
was in comparison to the rate of inflation. The lower half in annual income 
316. 128 CONG. REC. at Sl7537-38. 
317. 128CONG.REC.atSI7534-35. 
318. !d. 
319. See notes 320-25 infra and accompanying text. 
320. CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 113, at 59 tbl.A-18 (May 1997). 
321. CBO, INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS 23-25 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter CBO, INDEXING 
CAPITAL GAINS]. 
322. !d. at 24 
323. E.g., 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra note 45, at I 0-11 (In 1977, only taxpayers 
with over $100,000 adjusted gross income realized any real gains as to stock sales; for those 
with over $200,000, real gains were of nominal gains). 
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of the individual taxpayers annually reporting capital gains actually 
incurred economic losses on average.324 For example, a 1990 Joint 
Committee study demonstrates that this class of taxpayers enjoyed a 
reported capital gain no more than once in a five year period for an average 
gain of $2,000 in 1980 dollars ($4,600 in 2004 dollars) that amounted to 
less than 10 percent of the capital gains realized.325 
The House unexpectedly went straight to Conference.326 The 
Conference naturally followed the Senate bill, but dropped both the 
provisions that would have shortened the capital gains holding period and 
indexed selected capital assets. 327 The Conference Report barely passed the 
House (226 to 207),328 but nearly half of the Republicans who had 
previously supported President Reagan voted against it, arguing that a 
recession was not a time to increase taxes.329 
3. DEFRA of 1984: Holding Period Tinkering 
In 1984, even though the recession had ended, the deficit continued to 
grow. Again Budget Reconciliation directed tax increases, domestic 
spending cuts and slowed down defense buildup.330 A consensus emerged 
among the House, the Senate and the administration on how much, and 
how to, raise taxes consisting of: (a) closing loopholes,331 (b) delaying or 
eliminating a number of still to be phased in 1981 cuts besides the three 
year, 25 percent individual rate cut and indexing, and (c) levying minor 
324. CBO, INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS, supra note 320; accord, JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION STAFF, TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 26 (Comm. Print 1989). 
325. 1990 Senate Tax Incentives Hearings, supra note 276, at 70 (colloquy between Sen. 
Bradley, D-NJ, and Joint Comm. on Taxation Chief of Staff Pearlman). 
326. The House barely agreed (208 to 197) with Chair Rostenkowski's decision, which 
rested on the technicality that the Senate bill had been a "rider" on an unrelated House 
"revenue bill." Rollcall vote No. 225. 128 CONG. REC. at Hl8385-86. This action meant 
that the House would have little hand in shaping the legislation for which House Democrats 
were grateful. 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 37. 
327. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 477-78 (1982). 
328. Rollcall vote No. 303. 128 CONG. REC. at 22239-40. 
329. 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 38. 
330. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 143 (1984). 
331. S. REP. No. 97-144, at 8-14 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105. This 
encompassed a host of partnership and tax accounting changes aimed at tax shelters which 
had exploded, notwithstanding the lowering of the top rate on investment income from 70 
percent to 50 percent, justified in part as reducing tax sheltering due to the 1981 increased 
richness of real estate depreciation In reality tax shelters exploded after 1981 Act due to the 
rich capital recovery provisions. 
74 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:1 
excise taxes.332 Additionally, in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
("DEFRA") Congress changed the 1978 Act's 1-year capital gains holding 
period back to six months333 as a trade-off for increasing the tax credit for 
working poor from $500 to $550 per year.334 
4. 1984 Treasury Report: The Best Capital Gains Proposals-Universal 
Indexing and No Preferential Rates-Maximum Individual Rate of 35 
Percent 
Near the end of his first term President Reagan announced the 
appointment of a Treasury Group to study tax reform, and report back to 
the President in December 1984 (just after the November Presidential 
elections) provoking laughter among the White House joumalists.335 To 
the surprise of many, the timely 1984 Treasury Report to the President, Tax 
Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth ("Treasury I"), 
espoused many positions producing more equitable results than then 
current law. 336 It would have lowered the top ordinary rate to 35 percent, 
eliminated the Alternative Minimum Tax regimes, resolved major capital 
gains and capital recovery problems by indexing the basis of debt and 
depreciable and other capital assets (while using economic lives rather than 
the much shorter tax recovery periods). 337 
332. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 149-50. 
333. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § I 001, 98 Stat. 494, I 011 
(1984). 
334. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 154. 
335. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309, at 40-41. Although viewed at the time as a 
political ploy, Treasury took the task seriously. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 45. 
336. 2 TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, 
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY 
DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS I, 131 (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I]. Its overriding objective 
was to subject real economic income from all sources to the same tax treatment. I 
TREASURY I, at xii, 13. One of the chief architects of Treasury I was then Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra 
note 309, at 46 (along with economist Charles McClure had Treasury Secretary Regan's ear; 
Pearlman had "a thorough knowledge of the tax code and a theoretical bent"). Pearlman and 
McClure were "allowed to design what they thought was a perfect tax system." !d. at 47. 
"They called for a 'neutral' tax system, a system that does not influence private decisions." 
!d. This was a recurring theme in the floor debate on the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
337. TREASURY I, supra note 336, at 65, 181, 177-200; BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra 
note 309, at 53-54. Secretary Regan who previously was proponent of a capital gains 
preference was persuaded to support indexing instead of a preference when shown that most 
realizations would result in no taxable gain under indexing. 
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Commentators criticized it as too elegant. 338 However, its fatal 
weaknesses were more likely political. The most powerful pressure 
groups thought that they could do better than indexing. The favored 
individual special interests either had scant basis in capital or sold too soon 
for inflation to have much effect.339 Meanwhile, large corporate America 
apparently concluded (correctly it turned out) that it could retain the 
existing accelerated capital recovery for personal property such as 
equipment.340 Much like Surrey's proposals, Treasury I united all interest 
groups against it. "The Best is the enemy of the good."341 The 1985 
Administration tax reform proposals and the 1985 House Tax Reform Bill, 
therefore, retained the capital gains provisions and accelerated cost 
recovery.342 
338. Minarik, supra note !54, at 1367. Also indexing capital assets would have required 
a much higher individual maximum rate (perhaps 40 percent) to achieve distributive equity 
among individual income groups. Hearings on Revenue and Spending Proposals for Fiscal 
Year 1990 Before the House Ways and Means Committee, pt. 2, JOist Cong., at 50 (1989) 
(statement of Robert Mcintyre, Citizens for Tax Justice). 
339. Thirty eight percent of annual realizations in 1985 consisted of stock (both public 
and closely held and mutual fund distributions). Auten & Wilson, supra note 262, at 116. 
Gain from nonresidential real estate amounts to around 24 percent. !d. Installment sales 
gain, largely from closely held stock and real estate, amounts to I 0 percent to 15 percent. 
Timber and livestock, although politically important, amounted to 1.0 and 0.9 percent of 
total 1985 realizations. CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 320, at 49 tbl.A-7. 
Due to the exclusion under section 121 (b) and roll-over provisions, only about 4 percent of 
1985 realizations of capital gains from the sale of principal residences was subject to tax. 
Auten & Wilson, supra note 262, at 113. Small business owners typically capitalized their 
ventures with minimum equity. High-tech venture capitalists similarly invest more sweat 
than cash equity, and historically have done better than inflation; timber lot owners and 
farmers usually deducted most of their growing costs up front. Hearings on Impact, 
Effectiveness, and Fairness of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 before the House Ways & Means 
Comm., JOist Cong. 163 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 House Hearings on Fairness] (Statement 
of Robert Mcintyre, Citizens for Tax Justice); accord id. at 299 (attachment by Rep. 
Wyden). Improved real estate, rarely mentioned in the debate, annually loses basis with 
depreciation. In contrast, high income chumers on the public market have basis, but do not 
hold investments long enough to experience much inflation. Thus, most, if not ail, of the 
traditional interest groups prefer a generic percentage exclusion to indexing of basis for 
inflation. John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 
VA. TAX REV. I, 25-33 (1995). 
340. Minarik, supra note 154. 
341. FRANCOIS VOLTAIRE, DICTIONAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE, DRAMATIC ART (1764), 
reprinted in FRANCOIS VOLTAIRE AND THEODORE BESTERMAN (TRANSLATOR), 
PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY (Penguin Classics 1984). 
342. THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND 
SIMPLICITY 166-169 (1985) [hereinafter TREASURY II] (50 percent capital gains deduction 
(50% x proposed maximum rate of 35% =17.5% effective rate), and elective indexing in out 
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5. Tax Reform Act of 1986 Compact of Lower Rates and Broader Base: 
Unexpected Second Best End ofthe Capital Gains Preference Due to 
Distributional Equity 
In the case of personal property, the total package of post-ERTA 
preferences was the equivalent of currently deducting the cost of such 
property on a present value basis - a backdoor consumption tax.343 The 
recovery period for real estate improvements also was much shorter than 
economic life. Capital intensive public corporations reported little or no 
taxable income in comparison to their financial income.344 Adverse 
publicity of the zero tax multi-million dollar income corporations drove the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986,345 much as the zero tax high income individual 
story had driven the Tax Reform Act of 1969.346 Secretary Regan 
convinced President Reagan of the inequities of the 1954 Code by showing 
"him that General Electric (Reagan's old employer) paid less in taxes than 
the chief executive's personal secretary. "347 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which was largely fashioned 
conceptually on the Senate side, followed both the Treasury I, and Senator 
Bill Bradley's notion of lowering the top rates (to 28 percent on the 
individual side and 34 percent on the corporate side) by limiting 
preferences.348 Like the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Tax Reform Act of 
years beginning in 1991, i.e., preferential deduction for high income and indexing for 
moderate income); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 196-7 (1985) (50 percent deduction for 
individual long-term capital gains in 1986, and 42 percent thereafter, resulting in maximum 
rate of 22 percent in 1986 and 22.04 percent thereafter). 
343. John Lee, President Clinton "s Capital Gains Proposals, 59 TAX NOTES 1399, at 
1410 (1993); Lee, supra note 112, at 968 n.441. 
344. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309, at 11-13 (Mcintyre disclosures naming 
names and media interest). 
345. 132 CONG. REC S 13867 (1986) (statement of Sen. Bentsen) ("Consider an employee 
of a company working out his tax return on April 15 who reads about his own company 
making hundreds of millions of dollars year after year and paying no taxes. He says 
something is wrong with the system. You know, he is right. That is what we have to 
change. There is a perception of unfairness in the tax system. It is more than a perception. 
It is a reality."); BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309, at 11-12; Minarik, supra note 154, 
at 1365-66; CONLAND, supra note 280, at 36-37. 
346. See supra note 16 7. 
347. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 36. 
348. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13782 (statement of Sen. Packwood) (many of suggestions of 
Sen. Bradley, who has been advocating tax reform for at least 4 to 5 years, are incorporated 
in bill); id. (statement of Sen. Eiden) (Sen. Bradley played key role in bringing tax reform to 
the American people). Birnbaum and Murray recount that Chair Packwood in presenting his 
initial individual top rate of 25 percent to his Finance Committee, first showed them the 
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1986 limited preferences mostly by surrogate approaches. The main 
exception was the unexpected elimination of the individual capital gains 
preference, thus ending the vertical and horizontal inequities among 
individual taxpayers from a capital gains preference for the first time since 
1921 349 by a "Second Best" 28 percent compromise. If the top rate was low 
enough, special interests were willing to give up their preferences.350 
Consistent with the 1986 Code's theme of lower rates paid for by a 
broader base,351 the top individual "permanent" ordinary income rate was 
lowered from 50 percent to 28 percent while the top individual capital 
gains rate was increased from 20 percent to 28 percent. 352 Such increase 
was necessitated by the notion of distributional equity, i.e., high income 
taxpayers could not receive as an income class a greater tax cut than the 
middle and lower income taxpayers.353 Distributional equity, however, 
Bradley-Kemp plan which had started the low-rate/cut preferences movement by lowering 
the top rate to 30 percent, explaining "This is the way Bill [Bradley] did it." BIRNBAUM & 
MURRAY, supra note 309, at 209; Minarik, supra note 154, at 1365-66, 1370; CONLAND, 
supra note 280, at 37-38, 143-46, 164. Actually the Finance Committee's maximum rate 
was 33 percent for the well-to-do due to the phase outs of the 15 percent bracket dropping 
back to 28 percent for the rich, which triggered some Liberal opposition and an unsuccessful 
call for a 33 percent rate on the wealthy as well. 
349. Many conservatives criticized elimination of the individual capital gains preference. 
E.g., 132 CONG. REC. at S 13868 (statement of Sen. Gorton) (capital gains preference since 
1921; bothered by repeal without replacing with indexing basis for inflation); id. at S8164 
(statement of Sen. Heflin) (since 1921 capital gains preference has a proven track record in 
stimulating new enterprises and risk taking); id. at Sl3929 (1986) (statement of Sen. 
Wicker) (since 1921 capital gains have always been taxed at lower rates to encourage 
investments in capital assets recognizing the greater risks undertaken by one who invests in 
the future and to avoid the unfairness of bunching. "Our system thrives on such risk-taking 
and now we will upset all tradition in this country by telling investors they are no better off 
investing in a risky start-up than simply putting their money in blue chips."). 
350. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13784 (statement of Chair Packwood) (many witnesses willing 
to give up their preferences if the maximum individual rates were in the range of 20 to 30 
percent.). 
351. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13917 (statement of Sen. Dominici) ("The overall structure of 
the bill is to reduce the rates and broaden the tax base. Adding back deductions, rules or 
credits would mean a rate increase-- this should be avoided.") 
352. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §§ 1, 301-02,100 Stat. 2085,2096,2217-
18. A 5% rate applied above $71 ,900 to phase out the 15 percent bracket (thus the 
maximum tax under this provision was 13% of the amount of income to which the 15 
percent rate had applied. !d. § 1 (g). See note 358 infra. 
353. Kenneth Kies, The Current Political, Budgetary, and Tax Policy Environment 
Suggests the Possibility of Major Federal Tax Legislation in the I OOth Congress, 35 TAX 
NOTES 179, 183 (Apr. 13, 1987); see Lee, supra note 291, at 133 & n.352; see generally 
CONLAND, supra note 280, at 3, 58, 78-9, 114. 
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froze in place the recent erosion of effective rates at the top,354 because 
ordinary income and capital gains rates were lowered in 1981. The capital 
gains income at the top increased during the leveraged buyout run on the 
market, and was offset to some degree by the increase in the effective rate 
of corporate income tax. Effective tax rates for the bottom 80 percent 
concurrently increased, because the effective Social Insurance Tax Rate 
and the Excise Tax Rate went up.355 As in earlier years, the largest 
354. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13899 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (great weakness is that it 
provides yet another tax cut to the wealthiest Americans who have had their tax burden cut 
by enormous amounts during the Reagan years.; accord Floyd Haskell, Tax Reform, 35 TAX 
NOTES 301, 305 (1987); see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-
Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987) 
(Tax Reform Act of 1986 took a large structural step away from progressivity towards a flat 
tax.); 132 CONG. REC. at S13893 (statement of Sen. Kerry)("' am troubled by the fact that 
the bill abandons our traditional commitment to a progressive rate structure in the Tax Code. 
When added to the burden of payroll taxes, the two rates in this bill create what comes close 
to a flat tax for all Americans, with effective rates that actually decline as income rises into 
the range of the wealthy."); id. at S13939 (statement of Sen. Chiles) ("How fair is tax 
reform when the average taxpayer earning between $30,000 and $40,000 receives a tax cut 
of a couple hundred dollars when the most wealthy individual receives a tax cut of almost 3 
grand? How fair is a tax system that taxes middle- and high-income households at the same 
rate and, in fact, includes a higher marginal tax rate of 33 percent for upper-middle-income 
individuals, while offering a lower 28-percent rate for the very wealthy?"); accord id. at 
S13919 (statement of Sen. Sasser) (serious mistake and unfair to treat a person with 
$30,000 taxable income the same a person with a taxable income of $200,000). By 1990, 
the effective rate at the top had been raised back to 27 percent, CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES, 
supra note 277, primarily due to repeal of the capital gains preference and the passive 
activity loss limitations of Section 469. 
355. 136 CONG. REC. at H8321 (statement of Rep. Downey) (171% increase in capital 
gains income from 1978 to 1990). Compare with the table for 1982, supra note 273, with 
the following Effective Federal Tax Rates for All Households by Household Income 
Cat 1985 egory 
Income Category Total Individual Social Corporate Excise 
Income Insurance Income Tax 
Tax Tax Tax 
Lowest Quintile 9.8 0.5 6.6 0.6 2.2 
Second Quintile 14.8 4.0 8.8 0.7 1.4 
Middle Quintile 18.1 6.6 9.5 0.9 1.1 
Fourth Quintile 20.4 8.8 9.6 1.0 0.9 
Highest Quintile 24.0 14.0 6.5 2.8 0.7 
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category of net capital gains by dollar value was corporate stock (37.8 
percent); followed by net capital gains from partnerships, S Corporations, 
and trusts (23.2 percent); residential rental property (1 0.8 percent); and 
depreciable property (9.2 percent). Meanwhile the percentage dollar value 
of capital gains from livestock, timber and farmland was 1 percent or 
less.356 In 1985, joint returns reporting $200,000 or more reported 69 
percent of the capital gains, and those reporting $100,000 to $200,000 
reported 1 7 percent. 357 
Distributional equity required curbing preferences concentrated in high 
income taxpayers, especially capital gains and tax shelters,358 to offset 
All Quintiles 20.9 10.2 7.9 1.8 0.9 
Top I 0 percent 24.7 15.4 5.1 3.6 0.6 
Top 5 percent 25.4 16.7 3.7 4.5 0.5 
Top I percent 27.0 18.9 1.3 6.4 0.4 
CBO, I 997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277. 
356. CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP, supra note I I 3, at 48 tbi.A-7; accord Auten & 
Wilson, supra note 262, at I I 5. Slightly different percentages (stock, 42 percent); real 
estate (26 percent); and passed through (I 9 percent) are contained in CBO, CAPITAL GAINS 
TAXES, supra note 39, at 2 fig. I, but the overall pattern is the same. 
357. !d. at 69 tbi.A-28. 
358. Additionally, distributional equity required the "bubble" 33 percent rate on the near 
rich and limitation on deduction of consumer interest, as well as eliminating the 
deductibility of consumer interest and barring IRA's to upper middle and high income 
taxpayers. Kies, supra note 353, at I 83. IRA's were used most exclusively by those with 
incomes over $50,000, 131 CONG. REC. HI2816 (1985) (statement of Rep. Guarini). 
Because individual capital gains realizations after I 987 were less than estimated in the Tax 
Reform Act of I 986, some of the projected increase in individual progressivity did not come 
about. Andrew Hoerner, Economists Examine Whether Progressivity Has Regressed, 56 
TAX NOTES I 520 (Sept. 2 I, I 992). 
On the corporate side the principal surrogate approach was a strengthened minimum 
tax, but repeal of the Investment Tax Credit was the big revenue raiser. Lee, supra note 
291, at 72 & n.52. Little if any of the corporate sector increases appeared either, with 
annual corporate income tax revenues falling short by $20 to 30 billion. 1990 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 295, at I (statement of Chair Bentsen). About 60 percent of the 
shortfaii arose from since-changed errors in the Congressional Budget Office "model" and 
lower than predicted corporate before tax profits due to higher than predicted wage and 
salary and interest payments. !d. at 6 (statement of Harvey Rosen, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant 
Sec'y for Tax Analysis, Treasury) and id. at I I -12 (statement of Robert Reischauer, Ph.D., 
CBO Director). The increase in interest payments possibly was less due to leveraged 
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cutting the top nominal rate from 50 percent to 28 percent for the minority 
of high income taxpayers without capital gains or tax shelters, thereby 
dividing the rich. President Reagan's pre-condition of revenue neutralitl59 
meant that the 5 percent cut for each individual income class required an 
equal revenue increase - $120 billion over the five year revenue 
window360-and a much higher percentage increase on the capital intensive 
(but not services) corporate side. This provoked strong criticism from 
Senators of industrial, or wannabe industrial states, such as New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.361 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the repeal of the capital gains 
preference rested on a new "bi-partisan"362 coalition of Liberals363 favoring 
buyout actiVIty and more due to high interest rates of the 1980s, but data was still 
insufficient. !d. Forty percent of the short-fall was due to unexpectedly higher use of 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans in the late 1980's and more use of partnerships and S 
corporations as the form of business organization than projected. !d. at 11-12 (statement of 
Reischauer). See 132 CONG. REC. at S 13926 (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("The proponents 
claim that the bill is revenue neutral, that it will not increase or decrease revenues over the 
next five years. I hope they are correct. Too many of the provisions designed to raise the 
revenue being lost through rate reduction may not provide the revenue that has been 
estimated through the static analysis used by the tax committees.") 
359. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 51; BlRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309. 
360. John Waggoner, Sizing up Tax Reform; Tax Debate Centers on Fairness, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 17, 1990, at B-1 ("Are businesses paying a bigger share? No. Congress meant 
to make corporations pay a bigger share of the tax bill so individuals could pay less. It 
hasn't worked out that way, though. One explanation: 'Although Congress tried to close 
corporate tax loopholes, they left some,' says William Melton, senior financial economist 
for IDS Financial Services in Minneapolis. 'And corporations have faster and better tax 
lawyers than individuals do."'). 
361. E.g., 132 CONG. REC. at S 13926 (statement of Sen. Mathias) (Act requires the 
manufacturing sector to finance tax reductions for the rest of the economy, i.e., individuals 
and non-capital intensive corporations.); id. at S 13927 (statement of Sen. Hollings) (noting 
that saddling corporate America with $120 billion in additional taxes over 6 years, while 
also ending investment credits and preferential treatment of capital gains, is simply robbing 
Peter to pay Paul; "[a]nd, more serious, it could impair the ability of our industry to achieve 
price competitiveness in international markets."); id. at 13929 (statement of Sen. Weicker); 
id. at S 13942-43 (statement of Sen. Heinz) (shift in part of tax burden from individuals to 
corporations including elimination of capital gains will harm fragile economy). 
362. E.g., id. at S13962 (1986) (Statement of Sen. Dole) ("[B]ipartisan from the start-
nonpartisan may be even a better word. We have had 2 or 3 years of discussion, and it has 
been on the merits."); 131 CONG. REC. H12233 (1985) (statement of Rep. Bonior)) (bi-
partisan coalition underlay 1985 House bill); 132 CONG. REC. at S 13881 (statement of Sen. 
Kasten). 
363. 132 CONG. REC. at S13899 (statement of Sen. Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va.) (stating 
that the principal purpose is to improve equity by removing numerous special breaks and 
privileges, most importantly restrictions on tax shelters and repeal of capital gains 
preference, that cause the tax burdens of people with similar incomes and family 
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the limitation of preferences, and Conservatives364 favoring the lowered 
rates and equalized taxation of all income and among different kinds of 
businesses.365 Some Liberals also agreed with such equalized taxation.366 
However, as evidenced by the Senate debate on the Conference Bill on the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, some Members of Congress railed against 
elimination of the individual capital gains preference, often identifying a 
special interest of their particular state, such as farmers or ranchers as to 
livestock, farm or ranch land,367 timber,368 real estate, small business or 
circumstances to differ so greatly; also noting the perceptions that tax laws aren't fair have 
done much to destroy public confidence in the system); accord id. at S 13867 (statement of 
Sen. Gary Hart, 0-Col.). 
364. !d. at S8132 (June 23, 1986) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa) (major 
benefit is lower rates which will make the Tax Code less important in making economic 
decisions); id. at S13918 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Steven Symms, R-Idaho) 
("They move the Tax Code generally in a positive direction with respect to rates and the 
policy of allowing the free market to control the flow of capital. I intend to oppose any 
attempt in the future to raise the rates."); id. at S 13948 (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston, D-
Cal.) ("The 1986 Tax Reform Act is progressive because it broadens the tax base by closing 
loopholes and limiting deductions which advantage high income taxpayers. This increases 
the tax burden on these taxpayers and makes it possible to reduce the tax burden on lower 
income taxpayers. And it makes it possible to lower the rates for all individuals and 
corporations."); id. at S13785 (Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Fin. Comm. Chair 
Packwood, R-Ore.) ("We tried to equalize the taxation among different kinds of income, 
whether that income is capital gains or income from dividends or interest, or income earned 
from the sweat of your brow as a wage earner working in the factory. We, by and large, 
achieved that."). 
365. See Boris Bittker, Tax Reform - Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 44 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 11, 14 (1987); EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE 90-92 (1992); Lee, supra note 
291, at 137. The shape of this coalition was discernable as early as the mid-1950s. See 
1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117, at 327 (statement of Dr. Butters). House Ways 
and Means Chair Rostenkowski articulated the tax policies [undergirding this political 
realignment] as "fairness and economic efficiency." 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, 
supra note 339, at 5-6. For early 1990 analysis of economic efficiency from 1986 Act, see 
id. at 247,254 (statements of Sen. Bill Bradley, 0-N.J., and Rep. Dick Gephardt, 0-Mo.). 
366. 132 CONG. REC. at S13949 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Joseph Eiden, D-
Oe!.) ("[T]his bill will also create a more efficient economy by greatly reducing tax 
advantage as a consideration in economic decision-making. Investors will give more 
thought to the economic value of their decisions, and less to achieving tax advantage. The 
Federal Government will have a reduced role in 'managing' the economy.") 
367. E.g., id. at S8132 (1986) (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa) (supports 
but has reservations as to elimination of preference as to farmland); id. at S 13934 (Sept. 27, 
1986) (statement of Sen. Jeremiah Denton, R-AJa.) ("I am in favor of special tax treatment 
for capital assets held for long periods of time such as the old family farm, small businesses 
which have passed from generation to generation and timber which takes several decades to 
mature. In times like these, some are having to sell the fruits of a lifetime to pay off debts. 
To tax them at ordinary income rates is simply unfair. I am particularly concerned about 
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start ups,369 and rarely mentioned public stock (in the guise of concern for 
capital formation, jobs, and international competitiveness).370 Alternatively, 
they criticized it for failing to account for inflation.371 
Senator Bob Dole noted that Congress now "knew a lot more about 
how corporations and individuals avoid paying taxes on all of their 
economic income," namely using preferences such as the special rate on 
capital gains income. "We have had an opportunity to review and 
reevaluate our priorities, and we have made the decisions we think are 
appropriate. "372 Surrey's goals of identifying tax preferences to lower rates 
how the loss of this deduction will effect the timber industry and other capital intensive 
industries."); id. at Sl3888 (statement of Sen. Howell Heflin, D-Ala.) (undecided but 
opposed repeal of capital gains preference for livestock and timber). 
368. !d. at Sl3927 (Sept 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings, D-S.C.) 
(discourage investment in timber and real estate.); id. at S13939 (statement of Sen. Mark. 0. 
Hatfield, R-Ore.) (in favor of bill but, "elimination of capital gains for individuals and 
corporations likely will have a serious impact on Oregon's Christmas tree farmers and small 
woodlot owners"); id. at S 13875-76 (statement of Sen. Alan Dixon, D-Ill.) (family business, 
small farm and timber); id. at S 13918 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Steven Symms, R-
Idaho) (elimination of capital gains preference together with repeal of rule that corporations 
are not taxed on appreciation in assets distributed in liquidation or sold pursuant to timely 
liquidation would have "devastating to a retiring small farmer"). 
369. !d. at S 13793 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Russell Long, D-La.) ("What are 
we doing to the future of America? Venture capital where somebody is willing to take a 
risk, somebody is willing to take a risk and put off instant payoff for the possibility of long-
term reward-- so we repeal the capital gains differention [sic]. We tax everything the same. 
We say, in effect, to our business people. 'Get something safe, get something that returns 
money now. There is no special reason for you to make a long-term investment or take a 
long-term" ... The effect of the repeal of the capital gains differential on stock options will 
mean that it is much more difficult for a new company, a company that is starting up, to go 
out and hire first-rate, experienced people. What do they have to offer the people? A risk 
for nothing? Stock options that do not take advantage of the capital gains differential?"); id. 
at Sl3929 (statement of Sen Lowell Weicker, R-Conn.) ("Lowering the top individual rate 
from 50 percent to 28 percent and the top corporate rate from 46 percent to 34 percent 
sounds good. But in the process of slashing the top rates, we're bulldozing over a 
generation of deductions and credits many of which achieved important social and economic 
goals .... [I]t will have devastating, perhaps even crippling effects on capital formation 
especially for small business [start-ups]."); id. at 13919 (statement of Sen. Sasser, D-Tenn.) 
(elimination threatens business start ups). 
370. !d. at Sl3926 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias, D-Md.) 
(elimination along with curtailment of capital recovery provisions "will result in less 
investment, less productivity growth, and a further erosion of the American balance of 
trade."); id. at Sl3927 (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings, D-S.C.) (Elimination "will 
discourage investment in vital industries such as timber and real estate .... But the good 
outweighs the bad."). 
371. !d. at S 13886 (statement of Sen. Tribble). 
372. E.g., id. at S13962 (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[W]e retained some tax incentives in 
the tax law that will reduce taxable income in some cases below real economic income. 
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by base broadening had finally bore fruit. 373 Since the high ordinary rates 
only existed "on paper" with progressivity "more apparent than real,"374 a 
farce due to the capital gains sieve, the lowered top rates merely brought 
the nominal top rates closer to the actual effective rates. Those rates had 
however, recently fallen substantially at the top due to the 1981 ordinary 
and capital gains income cuts, and substantial increase in capital gains 
income at the top.375 In short, the disparity between capital gains and 
ordinary income rates was finally eliminated, but at a much lower meeting 
point than the 50 percent envisioned by Surrey in the 1950's and 1960's. 
Time would tell that lowering the ordinary rate, even halving it, did not 
lessen the desire of special interests, or at least of some politicians, for a 
That caused some concern about whether some corporations could escape tax, even under 
the new rules. As a result, the Senate adopted a very stringent minimum tax .... We should 
feel confident that we now have an 'escape-proof minimum tax."); id. at SI 393 I (statement 
of Sen. Andrews) ("Our present Tax Code has evolved into a maze of tax deductions, 
credits, and loopholes which have only helped the rich get richer and the poor get poorer."). 
373. I 39 CONG. REC. S5985 (1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) ("It was Stanley 
Surrey's particular fate that few of his ideas for tax reform ever were reaiiy adopted by the 
Kennedy or the Johnson administrations in which he served. But two decades later, in I 984, 
in the celebrated Treasury I proposal, it was pure, if I may coin the term, 'Surreyan.' Ail his 
large ideas about cleaning the Tax Code, cleaning out the loopholes and the avoidances and 
the ambiguities and circularities and getting rates down by broadening the base, there it 
was."); CONLAND, supra note 280, at 22. 
374. See 132 CONG. REC. at SI3889 (statement of Sen. Hart) ("current law's 
progressivity is more apparent than real. We have high rates on paper, but the rich can 
shelter, exclude, or exempt far more of their income than lower or middle income people. 
Some estimates indicate that those who make more than $200,000 can now exempt as much 
as half of it."); id. at SI391 !(statement of Sen. Boschwitz) ("[D]ual rates of 15 and 28 
percent are just terrific. [A higher rate] would be fine if people in the higher rate and higher 
incomes were paying them. But I think history shows if you are making over $200,000 that 
indeed you know how to protect your tax situation, and people were not paying those 
rates."). 
375. The resultant true limitation of (individual) preferences described below finaiiy 
reversed the pattern of tax reform from I 969-8 I. Each tax reform during this period had 
taken the budget "surpluses" from bracket creep (inflation moving individuals into higher 
brackets) (a) to give a baiiyhooed tax cut through rate reductions or more frequently raising 
the rate breakpoint coupled with partiaiiy curbing some abuses, while (b) actuaiiy using the 
greater portion of the bracket creep revenues to increase tax preferences primarily used by 
high income individuals and corporations, whose effective rates feii while an ever 
increasing portion of the revenue burden was borne by the middle class. William Greider, 
The Tax Machine, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1978, at AI (describing process every two years in 
1960s and 1970s of a bracket creep tax cut); Lee, supra note 291, at 128-33. Because only 
the high income taxpayers had a substantial increase in real income from I 979 through 
I 985, see supra note 355 and accompanying text, their share of the Federal income tax 
burden during this period actuaiiy grew. See CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277, 
app. B, at 22-24 tbl.2B. 
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capital gains preference. A study of the capital gains preference in the 
1920's and early 1930's would have predicted that.376 
The Conference and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 followed the Senate 
repeal of the capital gain preference for individuals and corporations. 377 
However, the 1986 Act left the capital gains and losses definitions in place 
explicitly so that the preference could be simply restored if Congress 
subsequently increased the ordinary rates. 378 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From enactment in 1921 until repeal in 1986, the individual capital 
gains tax preference undercut the progressivity of the Federal income 
system, thus violating vertical equity. With the advent of high income 
taxpayers with large service income but small capital income, the 
preference violated horizontal equity as well by favoring capital income 
over services income.379 All of the classic arguments in favor of the 
individual capital gains preference are ill-founded with one possible 
exception: offsetting for inflation?80 Even there, the higher the taxpayer's 
income the more on average that recognized capital gain was real or 
. 381 
economrc. 
Why then has reform of the individual capital gains preference proven 
so exceedingly difficult? Part of this difficulty is due to the influence of 
high income taxpayers owning the majority of public stock in individual 
hands on the political system to obtain special legislative privileges as 
Populism would predict.382 Another factor is the power of local special 
376. 1932 House Hearings, supra note 52, at 41 (colloquy House Ways and Means Chair 
J.W. Collier, 0-Miss., and Undersecretary of Treasury Mills) (repeal of 12Yz percent flat 
capital gains rate when top surtax rate was 20 percent would still block transactions). 
377. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 301, I 00 Stat. at 2216. 
378. I.R.C. § I (h) (2005). S. REP. No. 99-313, at 169 (1986). Some feared that this was 
"Freudian slip because this fits hand in glove with what the chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee has been saying for some time, and that is we are going to have to have a 
tax increase." 132 CONG. REC. at H9408 (statement of Rep. Swindall); id. at H9416 
(statement of Rep. Gingrich). 
379. E.g., text accompanying supra note 204. 
380. See Lee, supra note 13, at 8-10. 
381. See supra text accompanying notes 320-25. 
382. Populism may be defined as distrust of aggregations of economic power because of 
resulting ability to obtain special privileges. Lee, supra note 112, at 947; compare William 
Julius Wilson, Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics, 568 ANNALS OF AM. 
ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCIENCE 78 (Mar. 2000) ("Political power is disproportionately 
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interests, other than large owners of public stock (who garner the bulk of 
the benefits of the preference), such as timber, livestock, start ups and small 
business in general. An underlying factor during the first period of the 
capital gains preference is that the creation, and further substantial 
increases in the capital gains preference in 1921,383 1938,384 1942,385 
1978/86 and 1981,387 all coincided with a downturn in the economy and/or 
in the stock market. Finally, proponents of a capital gains preference have 
often cloaked their interest in public stock in more appealing garb, such as 
the family farm or family residence. 
The same political pressures that promoted an individual capital gains 
preference also led within a dozen years after Tax Reform Act of 1969 to 
the Conservative Coalition greatly weakening the individual capital gains 
preference in the Revenue Act of 1978. Initially, 80 percent of the 
individual minimum tax base consisted of the 50 percent capital gains 
deduction.388 After the Revenue Act of 1978 made the minimum tax 
treatment of capital gains more generous, less than 10 percent of the 
individual minimum tax reported involved capital gains.389 
Clearly most of the political pressure arises from any large gap 
between the income tax rates applicable to ordinary income and to capital 
gains. Only by eliminating this gap was the Tax Reform Act of 1986 able 
to repeal the capital gains preference. Other potential approaches to 
splitting the special interest groups from the wealthy holders of public 
stock were not attempted during this era of the first capital gains 
concentrated among the elite, most advantaged segments of society. The monetary, trade, 
and tax policies of recent years have arisen from and, in tum, deepened this power 
imbalance. And, although elite members of society have benefited, ordinary families have 
fallen further behind."). A more nuanced political science analysis is that "[r]ather than 
using coercive power, economic elites exercise power by controlling values and limiting the 
scope of alternatives considered in public decisions (i.e., by limiting the definition of what is 
politically possible). This control of the 'agenda,' which serves to limit the bounds of 
government action, is not seriously opposed because of mass inculcation of capitalist 
values." Geier, supra note 6, at 122. For an excellent illustration of such mass inculcation, 
see William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in 
Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287 (1996). 
383. See supra note 49. 
384. See supra notes 62-39. 
385. See supra note 101. 
386. See supra notes 257, 261. 
387. See supra note 301. 
388. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
389. See supra note 253. 
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preference, such as providing more favorable capital gains rates for the 
special interest groups390 or modest income sellers of public stock, whose 
gains are devalued by inflation, than for wealthy sellers, whose gains are 
mostly real. 
390. A stock exchange representative in the 1955 Mills Tax Policy Hearings facetiously 
suggested: 
I might suggest instead of having just one basket labeled "capital gains" and the 
other with everybody subject to ordinary income rates, you might consider having 
5 or I 0 baskets, each of them labeled different things, each of them carrying a 
different rate, or as an alternative, may I suggest facetiously you might subject 
everybody's income, by definition, to a capital-gains rate, then we can start all 
over again. [Laughter.] 
1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117, at 345-46 (statement of Jonathan Brown, New 
York Stock Exchange). 
